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This thesis is an exploration of ‘integral ecology’, a new paradigm of Catholic political 
theology, through an ethnography of Les Alternatives Catholiques, a prominent Lyon-based 
association of lay Catholic intellectuals. A cornerstone of Pope Francis’s 2015 encyclical 
Laudato Si’: On The Care for Our Common Home, the term ‘integral ecology’ indexes the 
synergy between climate change and global socioeconomic inequality, suggesting that ‘all is 
connected’. Drawing on Laudato Si’, Les AlterCathos host conferences on political 
participation and green conversion, and run a café as a microcosm for their advocacy of a 
holistic, environmental and human ‘Common Good’. This case study of public Catholic 
praxis in secular Republican France brings into conversation the concerns of three 
anthropological traditions, which have respectively addressed Catholic lives, the ethical self- 
formation of religious actors, and the presence of religion in modern public spheres. Intended 
as a positive counterpart to the anthropological work on pious religiosity, this thesis aims to 
take seriously the ‘worldly’ commitments of religious institutions and actors, suggesting 
political theology as a locus of anthropological and ethnographic investigation. 
   Ethnographies of Islam in France have exposed the uneasy place of religion in the secular 
Republic; here, I offer a parallel inquiry into French Catholicism. I demonstrate, firstly, that 
the place of Catholics in the French Republic is simultaneously central and marginal – both in 
their political participation in the public sphere, and in their cultural relationship with the 
sphere of education. I situate the rise of ‘integral ecology’ as an explicitly Catholic politics in 
the national aftermath of the 2012-2013 anti-same-sex-marriage and anti-surrogate-pregnancy 
protest ‘La Manif Pour Tous’, widely viewed by the public as a religious incursion into 
secular politics. This bioethical protest, predating Laudato Si’, ineluctably set the stage for all 
subsequent attempts by French Catholics to politically or discursively defend ‘Nature’ and 
‘mankind’. 
   It is in this equivocal context that the lay philosophers of Les Alternatives Catholiques 
articulate Laudato Si’ and the Social Teaching of the Catholic Church into political 
guidelines, through public conferences. I address the ways in which Les AlterCathos 
authoritatively spearhead a turn to Catholic environmentalism through the day-to-day running 
of their café and, by including lapsed Catholics and non-Catholics as participants, negotiate 
the place of belief and piety in their efforts. Finally, I argue that the praxis of integral ecology 
relies on the cultivation of subsidiarity – and show how this advocacy of small-scale, locally-
situated lifestyles runs against two hurdles: the narratives of Republican commentators who 
fear a reactionary promotion of the (rural and Christian) ‘roots’ of France, and the discourses 
of segments of the Catholic population who do uphold just such an ‘integralist’ stance. 
   This work offers a case study of lay Catholics’ efforts to combine religious, political, and 
philosophical epistemologies, and to position their praxis within and besides the institutions 
of the Catholic Church. Attending to the modes of subjectivation of this instance of political 
theology, the thesis endeavours to showcase the worldly modalities of ‘caring for Our 
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Everything is connected. Concern for the environment thus needs to be joined to a sincere love for our 
fellow human beings and an unwavering commitment to resolving the problems of society.  




Two journeys bookend this thesis. Not my own to and from the field – arriving in Lyon, 
France, in late 2016 and departing a little over a year later – but rather journeys taken by a key 
interlocutor, Marie Sève 1 , a young Catholic intellectual whose political convictions she 
considered best served, on those two momentous occasions, by leaving Lyon to attend pivotal 
events elsewhere. At the start of this thesis, we are in March 2013, and Marie ‘goes up to 
Paris’ to take part in La Manif Pour Tous, the massive anti-same-sex-marriage demonstration 
which captured the attention of the international liberal press with its vehemence, duration, 
and sheer numerical size. By the end of the thesis, it is July 2018, and Marie flies to Rome. 
Personally invited to the Vatican, she contributes to its International Conference marking the 
3rd anniversary of the papal encyclical Laudato Si’: On Care for Our Common Home. The 
first event is often analysed as evidence of the abiding and deep-rooted social conservatism of 
France; of the pervasiveness of right-wing, bourgeois, Catholic morals. The second has 
 
1 Unless indicated otherwise, all names are pseudonyms. Marie occasionally publishes articles and opinion 
pieces in French broadsheets and Catholic magazines under the pseudonym ‘Marie Sève’, and asked me to use 
this name in my thesis as well. 
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attracted far less scrutiny – Marie’s participation in this conference does not allow such 
seemingly-easy interpretations of her political leanings or class interests, and while Catholic 
morals presumably still feature, it is less clear what those morals might be. After all, the 
conference is convened by Pope Francis, whose Argentinean background contrasts with 
conventional representations of the ‘establishment’ of the Holy See, and whose namesake, St 
Francis of Assisi, was chosen for his love of nature and particular concern for the cause of the 
poor. The topic at hand, Pope Francis’s encyclical Laudato Si’, is also considered a game-
changer in Catholic spheres – it is at once an environmental manifesto and far more than that. 
It is an indictment of the global economic system which, according to Francis, drives both 
climate change and worldwide inequality; and it is a call for the global Catholic Church to 
develop and implement solutions to these two intertwined worldly ills.  
   The premises of Marie’s two journeys are therefore ostensibly different, yet both events 
seemed to her sufficiently important to warrant personal attendance, even at the cost of a long 
cross-country coach ride in 2013, and of international air travel in 2018. This begs the 
question of how Marie herself reconciled her successive presence at a conservative street 
protest and an anti-capitalist environmental conference – and indeed whether she reconciled 
them at all, or had experienced a rupture in the meantime. If Marie’s two physical journeys 
bookend the thesis, then, the body of this work addresses the intellectual, ethical, and to a 
certain extent spiritual journey she and other Lyonnais interlocutors underwent in the 
intervening five years, shaping and transforming their conception of ‘the political’ and of the 
ways in which, as highly-educated young French Catholics, they can attend to the unfolding 
social, political, and environmental issues of France and of the world. 
   In mapping these journeys, this thesis explores lay French Catholics’ engagements with 
‘worldly’ politics. In conversation with the anthropological canon on pious religiosity, it 
addresses religious actors’ commitments to building ‘good worlds’, and suggests political 
theology – religiously-informed visions of how to order the political – as a locus of 
anthropological and ethnographic investigation in its own right. The first part tracks the ways 
in which, in tension with the normative secularism of the French public sphere, conservative 
middle-class Catholics seek to curate the world of the family, culture, and the nation by 
casting themselves as representatives of the ‘real France’. The second part explores the rise of 
a new political theology spearheaded by a younger generation of French Catholics, who build 
on yet seek to transform this set-up. Known as écologie intégrale, or ‘integral ecology’, this 
new paradigm is a holistic endeavour to protect ‘the future of life on Earth’ writ large: centred 
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on the premise that ‘everything is connected’, it addresses the safekeeping and wellbeing of 
humanity, biodiversity, and the environment. Overall, the thesis follows the transformation 
and tensions of Catholic political theologies in France, from a broadly secular engagement 
with statecraft through which conservative Catholics mediate their place and their public 
visibility in the French Republic, to a new, ecological Catholic political theology which is no 
longer centrally indexed on the scale of the nation-state but instead engages on a daily basis in 
the worldly concerns of many scales, from the local to the entire planet. Throughout, I argue 
that a thorough anthropological engagement with religious worldly commitments must resist 
dissolving them into either ‘pure politics’ or ‘pure piety’. Instead, I suggest that we should 
attend to the scales and defining qualities of the political worlds religious actors negotiate, as 
well as to the modes of subjectivation through which they endeavour to make these worlds 
good. 
 
Catholicism(s) in secular modern France 
‘I am often struck,’ writes John Bowen in his seminal anthropological study of French 
Republicanism, ‘by the tendency of French public figures to frame the discussion of nearly 
any important social issue in terms of its long-term history’ (2007: 5). My French 
interlocutors are not (all) public figures, but they agree wholeheartedly that in order to 
understand the contemporary place of Catholicism in France, ‘you must look back’ (ibid.). In 
our day-to-day conversations, in casual snippets, they would evoke precise periods of history 
to illuminate the present day – for example, any contemporary disagreement between French 
bishops and the Pope, and indeed every agreement as well, was indexed against the 17th and 
18th-century history of Gallicanism, when the French King ‘by divine right’ had as much 
power as the Pope over the Catholic Church in France. To ground the exploration of French 
Catholics’ ‘worldly’ engagements conducted in this thesis, they would advise looking to the 
past to illuminate not only the contemporary relationship of Catholics to the French State, but 
also the internal pluralism of French Catholicism today. 
   As a Frenchwoman myself, I also find it instinctive to start with history, although it is 
perhaps a testament to the many years spent living away from France that I cast no further 
back than the French Revolution of 1789. Hardly any introduction is necessary there: by 
toppling the absolutist Ancien Régime of monarchy ‘by divine right’ (monarchie de droit 
divin) and instituting a Republic based on popular sovereignty, the Revolution foundationally 
recast the place of Catholicism in the French ‘state-system’ and ‘state-idea’ both (Abrams 
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2006). After the Revolution, another date is key in explaining the contemporary place of 
Catholicism in secular France: 1905, and the ‘Law of Separation between Church and State’2 
which established that ‘the Republic does not recognise [...] any religion’ (Article 2). Both 
emancipating the State from religious responsibility or interference, and affirming citizens’ 
freedom of religion against interventions of the State, the law set the tone for the emerging 
principle of laïcité (French secularism): since 1905, Republican governments’ reluctance to 
admit religion ‘as a visible presence in the public space’ (Scot 2003: 20) is due to the informal 
motto of ‘Religion divides, la République unites’ (Salton 2012 : 139). 
 
‘Progressives’ vs. ‘intransigeants’: The question of modernity 
1789 and 1905: these iconic dates symbolise, in the collective French imaginary, the 
institution of the modern, secular French state. They define the place of Catholicism in France 
‘from the point of view’ of the State, as it were. But historians have argued that other key 
moments of tension, between Catholics themselves, have been crucial in framing the 
interactions between the Catholic Church and French modernity throughout the 19th and 
early-20th centuries. These are historical moments to which my interlocutors refer regularly 
themselves: if I retrace them here, it is not only as a historical overview, but also as an 
ethnographic evocation. My fieldwork was conducted among highly-educated French 
Catholics who have strong ties with the academic spheres of Lyon and Paris. They 
recommended historical and sociological textbooks as a matter of course, and more than that, 
they regularly offered to put me in touch with the authors – ‘my cousin, who wrote the 
definitive history of Catholic intransigeance in France’, ‘my friend, who published an analysis 
of Catholic participation in social movements over the last 50 years’. As a result, the majority 
of the French sources cited throughout this thesis should be understood as ethnographic 
objects in their own right: they were written, if not by my own interlocutors, then often by 
somebody they knew themselves, and my encounter with these books was always mediated 
by the suggestions, endorsements, or exegetical lenses of French Catholics who were engaged 
in curating their own story on many levels simultaneously. 
   French historians – of varying degrees of closeness to ‘my field’ – have argued that fierce 
contestations between French Catholicism and secular Republican modernity throughout the 
19th and early-20th centuries were powered by a contradictory ‘double demand’ (double 
 
2 Available online: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000000508749/2020-09-25/ 
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exigence) for the French Catholic Church to both be ‘of its time’ (de son temps) and ‘combat 
this time’ (combattre ce temps) – in other words, to both find ways to inhabit the new secular 
order of modernity and resist its gradual socio-cultural slide away from the values of 
Christianity (Pelletier 2019: 279-280). This paradoxical impetus, at several points of the 19th 
and early-20th centuries, polarized French Catholics according to the progressivism or 
‘intransigeance’ (Frölich 2002; Tincq 2008: 299ff) of their engagement with secular 
modernity – a polarization which also characterized the interventions made ex cathedra by 
Popes who, from the 1880s to the 1920s, offered (occasionally contradictory) guidance 
regarding French Catholics’ navigation of their new secular world. For example, while Pope 
Leo XIII recommended that French Catholics should inhabit the Republic and protect the 
interests of the Church ‘from the inside’ (1884; 1892), Pope Pius X later advised that they 
should entirely reject the Republican ‘Law of Separation’ (1906a; 1906b; 1907). Neither Pope 
managed to coalesce all French Catholics into a single opinion, however: as my interlocutors 
would say, the history of Gallicanism is alive and well anytime a French Catholic chooses not 
to listen to the Pope. 
   Key dates in the development of the tension between French Catholic progressives and 
intransigeants include the Affaire Dreyfus in the late 19th century – a complex miscarriage of 
justice which provoked bitter divisions around matters of antisemitism and loyalty to the 
Republic – followed by the rising and waning of the Action française, a far-right political 
movement which held sway in the first decades of the 20th century and later returned under 
the Régime de Vichy. Throughout, the tension between progressive and intransigeant 
Catholics followed a broad Left/Right binary, but these categories indexed changing 
economic and political stances as time passed: 19th-century ‘progressives’ accepted the 
Republic but were economically liberal, while early-20th century ‘progressives’ started 
engaging in increasingly social(ist) movements; and 19th-century ‘intransigeants’ were 
monarchists while their 20th-century counterparts no longer disputed the Republic but 
contested any hint of socialism in political and spiritual terms (cf. Pius X 1910). 
   Indeed, the question of spirituality was an added axis of contestation which did not map 
clearly onto the Left/Right binaries described above (and still does not, cf. Donegani 1993). 
The intransigeant, monarchist, antisemitic and anti-Republican Action française, led by 
Charles Maurras, advocated a slogan of Politique d’abord! (‘politics first’) and argued that 
Catholics should focus their efforts on the political sphere such that France might once again 
become politically Christian (ideally in the form of a federal monarchy indexed on the 
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structure of the Church). Against Maurras, philosopher and author Jacques Maritain replied 
with a text entitled Primauté du spirituel (‘primacy of the spiritual’, 1927) arguing that 
French Catholics should primarily act ‘en catholiques’ – ‘as Catholics’ in the sense of 
doctrinal virtue – instead of acting ‘en tant que catholiques’, that is, ‘explicitly as Catholics’ 
in the sense of public visibility and political mobilisation. Maritain’s binary of en catholiques 
vs. en tant que catholiques, perhaps best translated into English as a distinction between 
acting ‘as’ and ‘qua’ Catholics, remained prevalent thereafter to analyse the practices of 
French Catholics, across the board of progressivism and intransigeance, according to their 
search for piety and/or visibility. 
   The history of the ‘double demand’ for the Church to both inhabit and combat secular 
modernity will sound familiar to anthropologists of religion. Comparative sociologist José 
Casanova’s ground-breaking study of Public Religions in the Modern World also highlights 
the desire, on the part of the global Catholic Church, to be both modern and public – and 
therefore paradoxically anti-modern in its very publicity (1994: 9). However, Casanova 
attributes the launch of this paradoxical stance to the Council of Vatican II in the mid-1960s: 
by contrast, French historians contend that, on the smaller scale of France, this articulation 
occurred far earlier, and had in fact waned by the 1960s. The high-strung battles between 
progressives and intransigeants – two possible Catholic stances vis-à-vis modernity – had, 
French historians argue, started to lose intensity as early as World War II, as French Catholics 
of all political sides were faced with the Occupation (R.Dumont 1943; Saudejaud 1999; 
Pelletier 2019: 188ff).  
 
Vatican II and the ‘silent revolution’: The question of culture 
Just as the contestation between progressive and intransigeant Catholics was starting to lose 
its salience in France, the Council of Vatican II (1962-1965) returned to the question of the 
relation between Catholicism and modernity on a global scale. While it re-launched a round 
of moderate confrontations between French partisans and opponents of the aggiornamento 
(literally the modern ‘updating’ of the Church with reforms to ritual, oecumenism, and the 
role of the laity), the Council did not spark nearly as much debate in France as the events of 
the 19th and early-20th centuries had done. Indeed, the 1960s were marked by a generational 
crisis of transmission which ended with the cultural revolution of May 1968 (Mendras & Cole 
1991: 226; Bourg 2007). Not only were previously-strong modalities of progressive or ‘left-
wing Catholicism’ (so-called ‘cathos de gauche’, Pelletier & Schlegel 2012) and of 
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intransigeant anti-modernity (Frölich 2020: 43ff) disbanded or dissolved for lack of 
transmission; there was more broadly a lack of new engagements with and through Vatican II 
(Pelletier 2019: 245ff). 
   The final two decades of the 20th century are known as the ‘silent revolution’, a phase of 
initially imperceptible but eventually profound transformation of the French clergy, which 
attracted fewer priests and less politicised ones (Béraud 2007; Dumons 2016). The relative 
‘invisibility’ of French Catholics on the public scene throughout this period was entirely in 
line with the Republican impetus for religion to stay private rather than public (Asad 2006b; 
Bowen 2007) – and it was offset by the contrastingly visible rise of charismatic Protestantism, 
often in oecumenical public communities (e.g. Taizé, cf. Itzhak 2016: 250). 
   Marked by the charismatic but conservative pontificate of John Paul II, the French ‘silent 
revolution’ was accompanied, historians argue (Donegani 1993; Pelletier 2019: 279ff), by an 
overall rise in social and moral conservatism among French Catholics. This conservatism, 
although broadly associated with ‘the Right’ (Frölich 2002: 154), was framed in terms of 
‘culture’ rather than politics. After the death of John Paul II, the recently-elected Pope 
Benedict XVI visited Paris in 2008: in a well-known speech, he claimed that French and 
European culture are grounded in ‘Christian roots’. Anthropologist Elayne Oliphant has 
argued that this narrative has allowed the Catholic Church in France to bring Christian art into 
the public sphere by labelling it as a shared, and therefore crucially ‘secular’, national heritage 
(2015). More broadly, this episode confirmed, in the eyes of historians of French Catholicism, 
a shift in modalities from the earlier fierce contestations about the putative political impetuses 
of the Catholic faith, to a perception of ‘Catholicism’ as a fixed cultural object associated with 
a ‘desire for the past’ (désir de passé, Pelletier 2019: 284). 
   Meanwhile, the rising visibility of charismatic Protestantism and especially of Islam in 
France produced, according to historian Denis Pelletier, a ‘feeling’ of increasing 
multiconfessionalism (un ressenti) – largely independent from genuine statistical assessments 
of the relative distribution of religious and non-religious populations in France, and within the 
former, of the respective proportions of Catholics by contrast with Islam, Protestantism, and 
Judaism3 (2019: 302-303). This has led to two significant configurations in terms of the 
 
3 A 2016 poll cited by Denis Pelletier suggests that the French population is split into roughly 50% Catholics, 
40% non-religious, and 10% ‘other’ religions. Another poll from 2010 detailed 6% for Islam, 3% for 
Protestantism and 1% for Judaism (2019: 302). These numbers have likely evolved in the intervening years. 
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‘visibility’ of Catholicism in the French public sphere in the 21st century. On the one hand, 
polls suggest that among French Catholics, only a small minority are ‘practicing’: only about 
8% of Catholic respondents declare attending Mass once a month or more (ibid.), while the 
non-practicing majority engage with Catholicism in terms of ‘culture’ or ‘tradition’ more than 
‘faith’ (cf. Mayblin 2017; Caille 2017). On the other hand, political efforts on the part of a 
very small minority of inheritors of the intransigeant, anti-modern Catholic tradition – for 
example attempts to ban films judged to be blasphemous – have at times taken the spotlight 
and established highly-publicised narratives qua Catholics, overwriting the ‘invisible’, 
cultural majority. Presenting themselves as an ‘offended religious minority’ (minorité 
religieuse blessée, Favret-Saada 2017), these narratives have complicated the image of 
Catholicism in the French public sphere. Rather than recognisably representing an 
intransigeant minority among French Catholics, these efforts broadcast a public image of 
French Catholicism overall as an intransigeant minority, thereby destabilising longstanding 
perceptions of Catholics as the ‘moral majority’ in France (Favret-Saada 2017; cf. also 
Béraud et al 2012). 
 
The return of Catholics on the public stage: The question of nature 
Following the early-21st century sedimentation of the image of Catholicism into a widespread 
cultural identity ‘in the background’ (Oliphant 2019), a further turning point once more raised 
the ‘question of Catholicism’ (Pelletier 2019: 11), that is, the question of its public presence 
in secular France, and the question of its valence as a political motivator (Clanché 2014; 
Béraud & Portier 2015a; Fourquet 2018). This turning point is one that my interlocutors took 
part in themselves, and to which I will return in Chapter One of this thesis: La Manif Pour 
Tous, the 2012-2013 anti-same-sex-marriage ‘Demonstration for All’ mentioned at the start of 
this Introduction. 
   Hundreds of thousands of protesters converged on Paris from all corners of France in 
opposition to the ‘Marriage for All’ law proposal. The demonstrators, waving pale pink and 
light blue flags representing cartoon families with one father, one mother, one son and one 
daughter, claimed that their refusal of same-sex marriage was motivated by a universal, 
‘natural’ conception of the family (Brustier 2014); and not by any religious or political 
affiliations. But the press, and the government, instead referred to the protest as overarchingly 
Catholic. Media coverage judged that the protest’s ‘apolitical and aconfessional 
independence’ was an ‘illusion’ behind which were ‘omnipresent Catholic networks’ 
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(Libération 13/09/2013). Some went so far as to claim that the entire protest has been 
‘orchestrated by the Church’ (OJIM 22/05/2013). La Manif brought ‘Catholicism’ back to the 
forefront of French news as a public identity – defined by external commentators if not by the 
protesters themselves – and as a putative political force, seemingly unified rather than divided 
as in the previous century. 
   The media and later sociological studies depicted La Manif as an ‘anti May-68’: an equally 
large-scale and long-running protest leading to the articulation of new moral ideologies and 
the politicisation of a generation of French youth (Mendras & Cole 1991: 226ff; Bourg 2007; 
Brustier 2017), albeit a fundamentally repressive and anti-liberal one driven by traditional and 
powerful Catholic networks (Béraud & Portier 2015a). This set a precedent for viewing 
Catholic discussions of ‘nature’, ecology, and environmentalism – launched in this initial case 
in narratives about the ‘natural’ family and ‘natural’ procreation – as nothing more than 
instrumentalisations of green tropes in service of longstanding conservative agendas. But 
French Catholics proved to continue to carry out ecological discourses over subsequent years, 
leaving external commentators largely stymied4. 
   Shortly after La Manif, in 2015, Pope Francis published an encyclical letter on the topic of 
environmentalism – its treatment of ‘nature’, however, is rather different from Manif 
protesters’ concern for ‘natural’ families. In Laudato Si’: On Care for Our Common Home, 
Pope Francis argues that ‘everything is connected’ among the most pressing ills of the 
contemporary world, namely climate change and global inequality (Revol & Ricaud 2015). 
He claims that both are driven and perpetuated by global capitalist systems prioritising 
technocratic expansion and financial profit over the ‘Common Good’. In response, Francis 
therefore advocates an ‘integral ecology’ (original Latin: integra oecologia, French: écologie 
intégrale; 2015: §137-§162; cf. Danroc & Cazanave 2017), which is ‘integral’ in that it takes 
into account the entirety of the planet and its people, and ‘ecological’, rather than merely 
environmental, in that it addresses the links and interconnections between all the parts of this 
whole: 
We urgently need a humanism capable of bringing together the different fields of 
knowledge, including economics, in the service of a more integral and integrating vision. 
Today, the analysis of environmental problems cannot be separated from the analysis of 
 
4 More recent analyses by Bertina (2017) and Raison du Cleuziou (2019) have drawn on long-term research 
among Catholic spheres (to which one of them belongs personally) to begin interpreting this phenomenon. 
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human, family, work-related and urban contexts, nor from how individuals relate to 
themselves, which leads in turn to how they relate to others and to the environment. 
There is an interrelation between ecosystems and between the various spheres of social 
interaction, demonstrating yet again that ‘the whole is greater than the part’. (Pope 
Francis 2015: §141) 
   Recent publications in France have suggested that ‘a Catholic moment’ is underway in 
French politics (Boëdec et al 2014; J-N.Dumont 2017; Marion 2017), and specifically that 
one or several ‘Laudato Si’ generation(s)’ is/are on the rise among young French Catholics 
(Lang 2020), many of whom, like my interlocutor Marie Sève introduced at the very start of 
this thesis, first encountered political engagement in the context of La Manif Pour Tous. What 
this thesis is able to address, that earlier political analyses in the immediate aftermath of La 
Manif could not yet, are the contemporary public and political engagements of French 
Catholics which make reference to ‘nature’ in diverse and changing ways. How do they 
attempt to think about and curate the world – building on or moving away from generations of 
French Catholics who engaged first with the question of modernity and then with that of 
culture – and how do they manage their actions both ‘as’ Catholics in terms of doctrine, and 
‘qua’ Catholics in terms of public visibility? 
 
The anthropology of public religious projects 
The dynamics described above in the history of French Catholicism speak to longstanding 
anthropological engagements with the ways in which religious actors define themselves, work 
on improving or ‘publicizing’ their piety, and are defined in turn by the (secular) populations 
and States around them. This literature illuminates key first steps for a study of contemporary 
French Catholics’ changing public and political engagements. 
 
Religious ‘visibility’: The question of power 
The study of what I call religious ‘visibility’ – as a shorthand for the two processes of how 
religion is defined and rendered public – has a long history in anthropology. Talal Asad 
argued that the definition of ‘religion’ is a discursive one, which involves relationships of 
power: the power to produce authoritative knowledge claims about religious truth, and to 
establish disciplinary practices. The crux here is that this power may be held by religious 
figures over their own religion, but it may also be held by secular powers over religion. Asad 
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shows how, in this way, the very definition of ‘religion’ as an interior, individual faith in a set 
of propositional beliefs arose after the Reformation; arguing that the category of ‘religious’ 
selves, alongside those of ‘modern’ and ‘secular’ selves, are all equally shaped by the 
narratives of Western, modern, liberal nation-states (1993; 2003). In turn, Asad shows that 
secularism is not simply the absence of religion from the world, but rather that secularization 
is also a discursive and constructive5 process in and of itself (1999; 2003; Agrama 2012). 
Asad’s work points to the fact that the ‘secularisms’ of diverse nation-states are articulated 
differently (2003: 5), as well as to the observation that these different secularisms in turn 
‘treat’ diverse religious traditions and communities differently (ibid. 159ff) – in particular, he 
highlights the ambiguities in discourses defining Europe as the ‘home’ of ‘Christian 
civilization’ by opposition with Islam (ibid. 166ff). 
    Paradigmatic of Asad’s approach are his explorations of the place of Muslims in the secular 
French Republic, followed by many others (Asad 1999, 2006b, 2006c; Jansen 2006; Bowen 
2007; Silvestri 2007; Iteanu 2013; Fernando 2014). Asad analyses the French ‘affair of the 
veil’ in the early-2000s – when Muslim schoolgirls were forced to remove their headscarves 
on the grounds of laïcité, and a law was passed to ban ‘religious signs’ from schools – as a 
series of events during which government officials articulated Republican principles in an 
effort to make sense of the distinctions between the religious and the secular. By exploring the 
‘affair of the veil’, Asad and others therefore shed light not only on Islam but also, crucially, 
on key tenets of French Republicanism – and their internal contradictions (Bowen 2007; 
Fernando 2014). The main contradiction at hand is that in the course of defining Republican 
secularism, or laïcité, the French State also comes to label persons who fail to meet its 
criteria, such as veiled Muslim girls and women: in other words, despite the 1905 principle 
that ‘the Republic recognises no religion’, it holds the power to construct religious identities, 
in addition to its more conventional authority over secular ones (Boyer 2005; Asad 2006b). 
But if secularism does not ‘treat’ all religions on the same terms, as outlined above, then it is 
important to bear in mind that the French Republic’s dealings with Islam might not accurately 
 
5 Before Asad, Carl Schmitt had argued the recursive point that ‘all significant concepts of the modern theory of 
the state are secularised theological concepts’ (1985 [1922]: 36). What Schmitt calls ‘political theology’ – in a 
definition which differs from that employed throughout this thesis – is an analysis of the systematic structures of 
political institutions which parallel or originate in religious concepts. 
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or entirely account for its dealings with Catholicism – a religion discursively ‘at home’ in 
Europe – which have not yet been the focus of sustained ethnographic study6. 
   Asad’s insights illuminate the discursive construction of religious visibility, but also prompt 
the question of religious ‘invisibility’, in cases such as the ‘silent revolution’ whereby French 
Catholicism became seen primarily as a latent cultural presence in the second half of the 20th 
century. With reference to Catholicism in India, David Mosse confirms that ‘if we have an 
impression of Catholicism as a coherent and universal cultural system it is because it has been 
“hard won” through the conscious formation of religion as a distinct category’ (in Mayblin et 
al 2017: 4; Mosse 2012, 2017). The (in)visibility of Catholicism in the French public sphere 
coincides with the view, widely held in the anthropology of religion, that Catholicism has 
been quite invisible in our discipline itself (Mayblin et al 2017: 4; Casanova 1994: 235n7). 
Following Hann & Goltz’ point that there is a ‘high degree of congruence [of Catholicism] 
with secular, national identities’ (2010: 5), the editors of the recent reader on the 
Anthropology of Catholicism speculate that,  
Catholicism’s presence-as-nonpresence in many Mediterranean ethnographies is 
indicative not only of its success as a cultural form but also of its politico-historical 
legacy and subsequent naturalization in the institutional sense. As with other dominant 
sociocultural positions in Western societies – maleness, for example, or whiteness – that 
are similarly undeveloped as prominent categories because of the power already wielded 
by those who occupy them, Catholicism’s relative invisibility could, in the southern and 
eastern European context at least, be linked to its historical connection with deeply 
entrenched systems of power. (Mayblin, Norget & Napolitano 2017: 4) 
   In other words, Roman Catholicism has historically been more present in the ‘background’ 
(Oliphant 2019) of the anthropology of secularism and modernity, and ironically, of the 
anthropology of French Islam, than as a central subject of its own, precisely because it is 
perceived to have ‘a kind of immanence combined with immobility, forming part of a ‘local’ 
 
6 There are few English-language anthropological explorations of contemporary French Catholicism (Oliphant 
2015, 2019; PhD thesis of N. Itzhak 2016), and research from within French ethnology has been sparse as well 
(Le Wita 1994; Favret-Saada 2017). French sociologists, political scientists, and historians have been more 
prolific in addressing French Catholicism, especially since La Manif, but none of these studies (cited throughout 
this Introduction) have been translated. Only the work of prominent French sociologist of religion Danièle 
Hervieu-Léger (1999; 2000 [1993b]; 2003) has, to a certain extent, passed into the English-language 
anthropological canon. 
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context’ (Coleman 2014: 281). There have been very few 7  studies taking European 
Catholicism as a starting point – addressing its presence in secular public spheres ‘from the 
bottom up’, as it were. But efforts to redress this absence must avoid swinging too far in the 
other direction: a study of the public sphere ‘from the point of view’ of Catholicism does not 
absolve from acknowledging its connections with ‘entrenched systems of power’ (cf. above) 
which expand further than ‘Catholics’ narrowly defined. I have already noted one way in 
which this is the case in France: there is no clear-cut separation between my ‘field’ of French 
Catholic interlocutors, and the academic spheres of France who produce authoritative 
historical and sociological knowledge about French Catholicism. 
 
Religious politics: The question of the ‘theologico-political’ 
In this thesis, I am interested in looking at how my French Catholic interlocutors engage in 
and with politics writ large rather than solely secular modernity. To this effect, it is relevant to 
discuss the body of literature that addresses religiously-motivated forms of politics: often 
issued from the discipline of history, it largely focuses on pre-modern articulations of religion 
and politics. 
   Asad briefly touched on ‘the long history since Constantine, in which Christian emperors 
and kings, lay princes and ecclesiastic administrators, Church reformers and colonial 
missionaries, have all sought by using power in varying ways to create or maintain the social 
conditions in which men and women might live Christian lives’ (1986: 3). History and 
divinity studies offer thorough accounts of these institutional intersections between the 
Catholic Church and politics over time: the most well-known is Ernst Kantorowicz’s 
discussion of The King’s Two Bodies (1957). What Kantorowicz calls ‘political theology’ is 
elsewhere referred to as the ‘theologico-political’ (Assmann 2000; Lefort 2006; Nancy 2006; 
de Vries 2006) – I will employ this terminology here in order to keep it distinct from the use 
of ‘political theology’ I propose later. The theologico-political complex, most often explored 
in relation to the Antiquity (Détienne 2006) or medieval Europe (Kantorowicz 1957; Pranger 
2006), refers to the 
 
7 Andrea Muehlebach has notably explored the convergences and disjunctions between Italian Catholic morals 
and neoliberalism (2009; 2012; 2013). Paolo Heywood also addresses Italian Catholicism (2015; 2018). 
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[...] nonseparation and irremovable imbrication of religion and the polis, the [...] 
consubstantiality of the two orders of the ecclesia and the imperial state. (de Vries 2006: 29, on 
Assmann 2000) 
   The medieval Catholic Church’s history of merging with the body politic of European 
nations is a paradigmatic example of the theologico-political. Among the theorists of 
contemporary secularism, José Casanova makes the most mention of this period – in fact, he 
employs it as the basis of his ongoing analytical use of the archaic definition of a ‘church’ as 
‘a territorially organized, compulsory religious community coextensive with the political 
community or state’ (1994: 62). He argues that, 
All modern territorial national churches cease to be sociologically speaking a ‘church’ the 
moment they cease being compulsory, coercive, monopolistic ‘sacramental grace institutions’. 
This happens either when the church loses its own means of coercion and enforcement, or when 
the state is no longer willing or able to use its means of coercion to maintain the compulsory 
and monopolistic position of the church. Indeed, the moment heretical ‘sects’ and ‘apostasy’ are 
officially tolerated within the same political community, or the principle of religious freedom 
becomes institutionalized, even the still established state church ceases being, strictly speaking, 
a ‘church’. (Casanova 1994: 47) 
In this view, there is a strict normative articulation between being a ‘church’ and politics – 
and therefore, by adopting the principle of ‘religious freedom’ during the Council of Vatican 
II, the Catholic Church ceased to be a ‘church’ in Casanova’s terms. This is an extreme 
stance, but other (less stringent) authors have also viewed doctrine as a normative reason for 
aspects of the Catholic Church’s relationship with modernity. For example, for controversial 
Catholic jurist Carl Schmitt, it is because Catholics do not consider Jesus to be a private 
person that, as the body of Christ8, the Catholic Church must remain visible and public 
(Schmitt 1996 [1923]: xxii; Hollerich 2019). 
   However, contemporary anthropology has been reluctant 9  to engage with ‘theologico-
political’ frameworks since Talal Asad’s original call for an anthropology of Islam in 1986. 
 
8 Beyond secular modern politics, the question of the Catholic Church as ‘the body of Christ’ is of eminent 
relevance to contemporary studies of the materialities of Catholicism and its gendered, hierarchical, structured 
bodies (Mayblin 2010, 2014, 2019; Napolitano 2016; Mayblin, Norget, & Napolitano 2017). 
9 After 9/11 especially, authors focused on ‘debunking’ public narratives about ‘violence in Islam’, rejecting 
claims that the Muslim faith enforces certain gender relations (Hirschkind & Mahmood 2002) or practices such 
as martyrdom (Roy 2004). It was critical, intellectually and morally, to avoid normative claims about the 
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Any contemporary investigation into the ways that Catholicism, Islam, or any other ‘world 
religion’ might differently grasp and regulate ‘politics’ and ‘the political’ – what I broadly 
term ‘worldly’ concerns – must, before anything else, attend to Asad’s critique of the 
characterisations, in Ernest Gellner’s work, of Islam and Christianity’s ‘fundamental’ 
relationships with political power. Asad considered that Gellner’s view, cited here, posed 
problematic analytical premises: 
Islam is the blueprint of a social order. It holds that a set of rules exist, eternal, divinely 
ordained, and independent of the will of men, which defines the proper ordering of 
society. [...] 
Judaism and Christianity are also blueprints of a social order, but rather less so than 
Islam. Christianity, from its inception, contained an open recommendation to give unto 
Caesar that which is Caesar's. A faith which begins, and for some time remains, without 
political power, cannot but accommodate itself to a political order which is not, or is not 
yet, under its control. [...] Christianity, which initially flourished among the politically 
disinherited, did not then presume to be Caesar. A kind of potential for political modesty 
has stayed with it ever since those humble beginnings. [...] But the initial success of Islam 
was so rapid that it had no need to give anything unto Caesar. (Gellner 1981, in Asad 
1986: 3) 
   While Asad’s main purpose was to critique the characterization of Islam in such a view, he 
paused to express a certain doubt vis-à-vis the portrayal of ‘humble’ Christianity as well. It is 
now relatively widely accepted, in the anthropology of Christianity, that there is a paradox 
there: the Roman Catholic Church does indeed preach a theology of ‘rendering unto Caesar 
the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's’10, but simultaneously 
boasts one of the last remaining religious states of the modern era, the Vatican, as a very 
tangible reminder of its millennia of imperialist expansion and ubiquitous embodiments as the 
established church of national body politics (Napolitano & Norget 2009). Throughout this 
 
‘intrinsic politics’ of world religions, and to counter clumsy or ill-intentioned comparisons of the figures of 
Muhammad as Prophet and warrior versus Christ’s ‘render unto Caesar’ gospel (Fernando 2014: 270n14). 
Efforts were also made to disentangle ‘Islam’ from the economic and socio-cultural deprivations which, it was 
argued, were responsible for events such as the rioting of young Muslim men in French banlieues in the early-
2000s (Roy 2005; Iteanu 2013; Fernando 2014: 17). 
10 A teaching which appears in three out of four Biblical Gospels: Matthew 22: 15-22, Mark 12: 13-17, and 
Luke 20: 20-26. 
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thesis, the relationship between Catholic doctrine – such as the recently-published encyclical 
Laudato Si’ – and Catholic politics will therefore be questioned, rather than assumed. 
 
Public religiosity: The question of piety 
The anthropology of religion, particularly since Asad synthesized Alasdair MacIntyre’s and 
Michel Foucault’s insights to study religious traditions (Foucault 1977, 1979, 1990, 1992; 
MacIntyre 1981, 1988; Asad 1986, 1993), is well used to addressing the epistemological work 
and the relations of power which are entailed in the elaboration and implementation of 
religious doctrine in general. The anthropology of ethics, also inspired by the early works of 
Asad, is for its part well used to offering rich ethnographic investigations of how doctrinal 
discourses are received by religious agents and mobilised in religious self-formation, for 
example in the contexts of Islamic revivalism (Mahmood 2005; Hirschkind 2006) or 
Pentecostal and Evangelical Christianity (Harding 2001; Robbins 2004; Luhrmann 2012).  
   These studies address the presence of religion in public spheres through case studies of 
religious ‘publicization’ (Engelke 2013). They call our attention to the ‘publics’ our religious 
interlocutors construct (Cody 2011) – those they see themselves as belonging to, and those 
they address. For instance, when Charles Hirschkind describes the ‘public noise’ of da‘wa 
cassette sermons in Cairo (2001b; 2006), he shows the conflict between Muslim revivalists’ 
attempts to reach the entire population with their pious soundscapes, and the Egyptian state’s 
attempts to return such sensibilities to the private sphere, defining revivalists as a bounded 
‘counterpublic’ (2001a). However, because these studies focus on cases of deliberate public 
religiosity – predicated on collective projects of revivalism, evangelization, or ‘re-
christianization’ (Elisha 2011) – they are quite different from Manif Pour Tous protesters’ 
reluctance to be categorized qua Catholics. They have in common that their key interlocutors 
tend to be devout, and to participate in collective religious publicity alongside or within 
individual projects of piety; a premise which cannot be taken for granted in the case of the 
Manif. 
   What these studies therefore share is an interest in subject-oriented forms of religious self-
cultivation, with teloi of personal piety, for instance, or individual salvation. And while this 
focus on the ‘government of the self’ has on rarer occasions been accompanied by riveting 
ethnographic investigations of the ‘government of others’ in religious settings, most studies of 
the place of politics in Muslim and Christian lives have addressed the cultivation of ‘good’ 
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political behaviour through the overarching lens of piety (Deeb 2006; Marshall 2009; Hefner 
2000, 2009, 2016, 2017). 
   Crucially, there have not (yet) been studies of Catholicism within the anthropology of ethics 
strictly speaking – either in terms of piety or of pious politics. And this is far from a 
coincidence: indeed, Catholicism is hardly known for its pious subjects. Instead, rejoining the 
historical analyses described earlier with reference to France, the anthropology of Catholicism 
has pointed out its tolerance for ‘non-practicing’ or ‘cultural’ identities. As Maya Mayblin 
puts it in a seminal article, ‘non-believing, religiously indifferent, and ritually disengaged 
Catholics retain their Catholicism, becoming lapsed Catholics’ (2017: 504-505). Introducing 
the recent reader on the Anthropology of Catholicism, Mayblin, Norget and Napolitano further 
elaborate this point: 
It is fairly axiomatic that Catholicism as a marker of identity is not always and 
everywhere primarily about ‘belief’. [...] In the English language, people will refer to 
themselves as ‘Catholic, but nonpracticing’. One also encounters ‘lapsed Catholics’, 
‘cultural Catholics’, ‘ethnic Catholics’, ‘cradle Catholics’, and ‘nonobservant Catholics’. 
Such denotations suggest that Catholicism is open to identifications that index aspects of 
personhood beyond religious belief – kinship, territoriality, ethnicity, belonging – 
identitifications that remain variously distanced, critical, and uncertain with regard to 
Catholicism’s key propositional content. (Mayblin et al 2017: 18) 
   In short, a study of Catholic actors’ ethical engagements with public life and politics is not 
only overdue, but also potentially opens up new and fruitful avenues of investigation. A study 
of ‘Catholic’ conceptions of politics must, like all studies in the anthropology of Catholicism, 
pay particular attention to what is meant emically by ‘Catholicism’ at all times – renewing 
Asad’s call to observe emic definitions of religion – and attend to the possibility that such 
‘Catholic’ modes of subjectivation might transcend the sphere of doctrine and piety. 
 
‘Worldly’ religous commitments:  The suggestion of political theology 
This thesis makes a case for the merits of devoting anthropological attention to political 
theology: religious discourses which consider not only the pious self, but, more widely, the 
values and structures of common life in society. These are currently receiving increasing 
attention in theology and political philosophy (de Vries & Sullivan 2006; Hovey & Phillips 
2015, Kim & Day 2017; Cavanaugh & Scott 2019). Rather than remaining the sole province 
of metaphysical disciplines, I suggest that political theologies should be viewed as productive 
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loci of ethnographic investigation, supported by the foundations laid by the anthropologies of 
religion and ethics over recent decades. 
   While the anthropologies of ethics and religion have jointly been extremely adept at 
understanding the cultivation of good Muslim or Christian selves, they have devoted less 
attention to the discursive and disciplinary work involved in the production, by religious 
actors, of good worlds. Accordingly, I suggest that we might benefit from scrutinising 
religious doctrines’ and actors’ distinctions between the cultivation of a religious self for the 
self, and the cultivation of a religious self for the world. The two may, of course, at times be 
entirely coextensive: Lara Deeb, for instance, illustrates that for ‘pious modern’ Shi‘i women 
in Lebanon, ‘self-improvement should lead a person to truly desire to contribute to her 
community while also better enabling her to do so effectively’ (Deeb 2006: 30-31). Here, 
‘pious modern’ Shi‘i women cannot be ‘good’ for their community separately from the 
primordial development of their own piety; indeed, it is their very piety which renders them 
sensible to the needs of the community and their own place in its service.  
   But this might not always be the case, and the religious articulation of personal goods and 
worldly goods might be different elsewhere – it is intuitively clear, for example, that Pope 
Francis’s recent encyclical Laudato Si’: On Care for Our Common Home foregrounds 
‘worldly’ teloi in its discussion of environmental protection and social justice. This, then, is 
the hallmark of a political theology; and my Lyonnais Catholic interlocutors’ self-reflexive 
efforts to brainstorm and implement lifestyle changes in accordance with Laudato Si’ should 
therefore be seen as a conscious process of turning this particular political theology into 
praxis. Despite their very different national contexts, doctrinal references, and everyday 
applications, French Catholics’ changing engagements in the public sphere and Lebanese 
Shi‘i women’s pious praxis of iltizām (‘commitment’ or ‘public piety’, 2006: 34) can speak to 
one another through the comparative frame of political theology, insofar as they each develop 
a vision of the world and of religious actors’ roles within it. 
   The phrase used by Pope Francis – the call for Catholics to ‘Care for Our Common Home’ –  
is, to my mind, a ‘window into complexity’ (Candea 2010: 34) calling forth ethnographic and 
analytical engagement with religious actors’ worldly commitments. What homes do religious 
actors care about, and care for? To what extent are they defined doctrinally or experienced in 
the everyday, by religious institutions and by lay actors? What makes them common? To what 
extent do these ‘common homes’ map onto, question, or discard other collective imaginaries 
such as nations, states, ethnic boundaries, cultures, social movements, and indeed religious 
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communities? What forms are taken by religious actors’ care for them? How do they envision 
their own agency to maintain desired orders and effect desired changes, and through what 
modes of subjectivation do they endeavour to do so? By defining ‘political theologies’ as 
religious visions of how to order the political, I aim to go beyond analytical interventions 
questioning the adequation between public religions and modernity – a line of analysis which, 
as outlined earlier, historians of France have argued is no longer relevant to the contemporary 
place of Catholicism in France. 
   Moreover, I suggest that attending to the ethnographic modalities of praxes of political 
theology enriches our understanding of religious ethics in contexts where the pursuit of 
devotion or piety proves equivocal (Schielke 2009a, 2009b, 2012; Fadil & Fernando 2015; 
Mayblin 2014, 2017, 2019). Indeed, this new angle allows the contextual study of religious 
modes of subjectivation developed with specific pursuits in mind, even if these prove to be 
separate from, or not subsumed into, the concomitant cultivation of forms of piety. For 
example, it allows us to track French Catholics’ reception and implementation of Pope 
Francis’s call for an ‘integral ecology’ sui generis, and then to explore whether and how it ties 
into more classic modes of doctrinal Catholic observance such as charity or chastity (Chapter 
Five). It allows us to address ethnographic puzzles such as how one might try to be a virtuous 
(political or environmental) Catholic while simultaneously failing to attend Sunday Mass 
(Chapter Four). In other words, by forcing us to question the usual ‘hierarchical 
encompassments’ of religious virtue (Robbins 1994, 2007, 2013; Robbins & Siikala 2014), a 
focus on praxes of political theology enables us to be alert to possibly idiosyncratic 
articulations of religious modes of subjectivation, and to their emic deployments in service of 
pious teloi, but also of political and social ones. 
 
Fieldsite and interlocutors 
Lyon 
This thesis is grounded in ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Lyon in late-2016, throughout 
2017, and for shorter intervals in the summers of 2018 and 2019. Situated in the eastern-
centre of metropolitan France, Lyon is the third-largest French city, with a population of half 
a million Lyonnais inhabitants. The Grand Lyon (‘greater Lyon’) metropolis is composed of 
59 adjacent towns or communes, which add up to 1.4 million inhabitants (INSEE 2016). In 
this sense, reference to ‘Lyon’ in this thesis may in fact concern, for example, the towns of 
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Villeurbanne, Vénissieux, or Caluire-et-Cuire, which physically mesh with the city of Lyon 
itself (Polère 2014). 
   Prominently (upper-)middle-class and supported by strong local industries, Lyon has a 
higher GDP per capita than the French average; while there are important economic 
disparities within the city, those are nevertheless smaller than the inequality present in Paris 
and Marseille (Buisson & Mignot 2005). Most economic divergences can be mapped onto the 
nine municipal arrondissements (boroughs) which subdivide the city of Lyon, and which have 
their own councils and town halls. For instance, the central 2ème Arrondissement, in which I 
spent most of my time, is known for its fine architecture and concentration of old Lyonnais 
Catholic families, in particular within the area of Ainay (Reynaud 1999; Thiou 2005; Chapter 
Four). The Catholic University of Lyon (UCLy, Moulinet 2016) has long been installed in 
Ainay, and attracts large numbers of students in human, economic, and social sciences as well 
as in law. 
   The historical coincidence in Lyon of economic driven-ness and Catholic faith is alluded to 
with the designation of two of its neighbourhoods as ‘the hill that works’ and ‘the hill that 
prays’. The steep hill of La Croix-Rousse, la colline qui travaille, used to be the centre of 
Lyon’s family-based silk industry. The equally-steep hill of Fourvière, la colline qui prie, 
faces it across the River Saône: it is dominated by the prominent basilica Notre-Dame de 
Fourvière, and the slopes of the hill are constellated with convents, monasteries, and private 
Catholic schools. The Archdiocese of Lyon is the most ancient Catholic diocese in France 
(Gadille et al 1983), and its Archbishop, often a Cardinal, has received since 1079 the 
additional title of primat des Gaules in deference to the post's history as the first bishopric of 
Roman-era Gaul. The primat des Gaules is, in honorific terms, the highest-ranking Catholic 
official in France, although the Archbishop of Paris often takes precedence in practice (Mas 
2007). While other faiths have strong anchors in the city11, Catholicism remains by far the 
dominant religion in Lyon, both in terms of the numbers of faithful and of the prevalence of 
its architectural and cultural patrimony12. 
 
11 There are three Orthodox churches, one Anglican church, five Protestant temples, one Jewish synagogue – the 
Grande Synagogue de Lyon – two Buddhist temples, and multiple mosques, the most important being the 
Grande Mosquée de Lyon. However, these religious buildings are far outnumbered by innumerable churches. 
12 The annual 8th of December Fête des Lumières ('Lights Festival') is a world-famous event dedicated to the 
Virgin Mary (Chatelan 2016). The Basilique Notre-Dame de Fourvière and the Primatiale Saint-Jean de Lyon 
are UNESCO World Heritage Sites; and the Église Saint-Nizier de Lyon is a National Heritage Site. 
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   I had, years before my PhD fieldwork, lived in Lyon for two years as a boarder in a private 
Catholic high school. When I returned for fieldwork, none of my high school acquaintances 
remained – nonetheless, my familiarity with the city and with its system of private Catholic 
schools were assets allowing me to meet new circles of Lyonnais Catholics, introduced 
below. During my fieldwork, I was only very rarely asked directly if I was Catholic myself (I 
expand on this in Chapter Four), but I was asked about my schooling history when I 
introduced myself as a Frenchwoman studying in the UK. Disclosing the fact that I had 
attended a Catholic school in Lyon sufficed to establish – in one interlocutor’s words – that I 
was ‘catho-compatible’: not anti-clerical (I expand on this source of worry in Chapter One), 
and conversant in general Catholic culture (Chapter Two). To the extent that I am indeed a 
non-practicing but ‘cultural’ Catholic, I belong to one of the subsets of French Catholicism 
described earlier in this Introduction – I return below to the complex ways in which this 




Within Lyon, my fieldwork was conducted among what is known by some as la cathosphère. 
The Lyonnais ‘Cathosphere’ is a middle- to upper-class bourgeois population. In French, la 
bourgeoisie and the adjective ‘bourgeois’ index culturally traditional, often highly-educated 
populations who typically wield more economic, social, and cultural capital than the English 
‘middle-class’, and who value tradition and stability above financial ambition (Le Wita 1994). 
When I refer to ‘bourgeois Catholics’ throughout this thesis, I therefore mean an ‘old’, socio-
culturally established bourgeoisie (Bourdieu 2010 [1979]: 302, 312), rather than the 
aspirational middle-classes defined by the (at times derogatory) term in English. In practice, 
the cathosphère of Lyon is diffusely definable by its participation in an interlocking grid of 
private Catholic schools, Catholic parishes, and lay Catholic associations ranging from 
charities to youth organisations, the Scouts, choirs, entrepreneurs’ meeting circles, and 
conference centres (Caille 2017: 179-181; Association diocésaine de Lyon 2017). 
   The term cathosphère is not used by all its members, but it is an endogenous term, 
employed especially by interlocutors who were in a position to survey the diversity of 
educational, religious, and social bodies administered by Catholics across Lyon (Angleraud et 
al 2016). These interlocutors were employed, for instance, as publicity officers for the 
diocese, or as reporters for Catholic news outlets, and encountered representatives from the 
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various segments of the Lyonnais ‘Cathosphere’ as part of their daily work. They used this 
term structurally, as a collective reference to these institutions and associations, but also as a 
synecdoche to highlight the handful of individuals holding key positions of power across one 
or several of these bodies. Culturally, the term also served as a more tongue-in-cheek 
designation of the families who orbited entirely and only within Catholic circles to satisfy 
educational, spiritual, and leisurely needs (these often coincided with the old aristocracy, 
while most other subsets of the casthophère merged at points with the non-Catholic 
population of Lyon). In Chapter Two, I explore why the designation of Catholics as a ‘sphère’ 
may be fraught in the general context of French Republicanism, and especially in the current 
context of growing fears over religious communalism (communautarisme, Bowen 2007: 156; 
Fernando 2014) and transformations in the public image of French Catholicism from a ‘moral 
majority’ to an (‘offended’) ‘religious minority’ (Favret-Saada 2017). 
   The cathosphère can loosely be divided into subsets. I did not have much to do with its 
minority of the old aristocracy – although I did encounter some who remain monarchist to this 
day and memorialize the death of King Louis XVI with a Mass every 21st January. I had more 
contact with what are known as ‘les grandes familles lyonnaises’, the ‘great Lyonnais 
families’: a series of dynastic families who rose to prominence during Lyon’s industrial 
expansion, and until the end of the 20th century virtually controlled the local economy (Sapy 
& Desseigne 2013a; 2013b). Catholic with a few exceptions, these families’ many children 
intermarried, cementing economic and social networks of influential community leaders (les 
notables), or joined the Church, strengthening the same families’ reach over local spiritual 
matters. Although their economic supremacy has declined in recent decades, the great 
Lyonnais families’ networks remain significant, and all the more powerful for the fact that 
declining prestige allows a more discreet, subtle presence in key posts of the local industry, 
school boards, funding committees, town government, and Church. My own encounters with 
les grandes familles were sporadic rather than ongoing: I was invited to join interlocutors 
from these networks during public political rallies in the build-up to the 2017 presidential 
election; I visited several of their homes on the occasion of private political gatherings they 
hosted during the same period (see Chapter One); and I occasionally met men13 from these 
families at their workplace for interviews. During large gatherings, I ensured that my status as 
 
13 Among the grandes familles, I did not develop any close ties with women: political meetings gathered a 
majority of men. While several introduced me to their wives as my fieldwork progressed, these stay-at-home 
mothers (Le Wita 1994: 143ff) did not become regular interlocutors. 
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a researcher was explicit and acknowledged by anyone I spoke to, and I do not cite in this 
thesis anyone whose informed consent was in any doubt. 
   My fieldwork among la cathosphère mainly concerned its majority of members who are 
neither aristocratic nor part of the grandes familles. I met them through semi-private Catholic 
conference centres (cf. Oliphant 2015) attached to the private Catholic schools forming the 
backbone of the cathosphère (Chapter Two). I refer to them throughout this thesis as 
‘traditional’, ‘conservative’, ‘bourgeois’, or ‘highly-educated’ Catholics depending on 
respective interlocutors’ personal investments in socio-cultural tradition, right-wing 
conservative politics, bourgeois socio-economic networks, or intellectual spheres and 
pursuits. 
   The vast majority of my interlocutors in the cathosphère had participated in La Manif Pour 
Tous several years previously – it was the topic they were keenest to discuss when I 
introduced myself as a researcher. Because I was recognized in the field as ‘catho-
compatible’, it was expected that I would be sympathetic to – or in agreement with – my 
interlocutors’ choice to protest same-sex marriage. I routinely explained that I would not have 
gone to La Manif myself – but in several cases, unfazed interlocutors replied that I was biased 
by my years in England: if I had stayed to study in France after high school, they argued, I 
would most likely have remained in Catholic educational spheres and gone to La Manif with 
classmates and friends. Their expectation that I would treat their stories sympathetically did 
not wane – however, they made additional efforts to ensure that I got ‘the full picture’ (une 
vue d’ensemble). Given that I had not participated in the protests myself, they considered that 
the topic was best tackled by talking to as many demonstrators as possible. I was, throughout 
the duration of my time in Lyon, continually put in touch with family members, friends, and 
acquaintances of the interlocutors whom I knew more closely, in order to interview them 
about their respective experiences of La Manif. As a result, I collected a vast number of 
personal Manif histories, shared in ‘one-off’ interviews by Lyonnais Catholics with whom I 
did not interact on a regular basis or even at all thereafter. Although express consent was 
granted for these interviews to be used in my thesis, I have not cited any of them here – I have 
preferred to cite closer interlocutors whose consent was more thoroughly informed and 
confirmed over time. They nonetheless contributed to shaping my overall perspective on La 
Manif, described in Chapter One. 
   I mentioned at the outset of this Introduction that my interlocutors were engaged in curating 
their own story on several different levels: they explicitly sought to orient my research by 
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sharing retrospective stories about La Manif, recommending historical and sociological books 
about Catholicism in France, and drawing my attention to the thriving debates they held 
online14 about daily news, particularly any press releases concerning Catholicism. 
  
Les Alternatives Catholiques 
Within la cathosphère, my main interlocutors were an association called Les Alternatives 
Catholiques, or ‘Catholic Alternatives’. Marie Sève, introduced at the start of this thesis, is 
their Vice-President. Founded in 2011 by a group of Catholic graduate students in philosophy 
and the humanities, Les AlterCathos were originally a small-scale reading group whose 
participants wanted to ‘make a link between [their] passion for politics and [their] faith’, in 
Marie’s words. Taking an interest in political structures and processes on local and national 
scales, they used Catholic doctrine as a lens to develop their opinions on current issues, and to 
structure their own engagement in response. 
   It is in this vein that they began reflecting on same-sex marriage and parenthood – a key 
topic of the 2012 presidential elections – and later took part in La Manif Pour Tous in 2012-
2013. By late-2016, when I started my fieldwork in Lyon, the topic of same-sex marriage was 
no longer central to Les AlterCathos’s interests, contrary to the rest of the cathosphère. 
However, when asked, AlterCathos members all referred to La Manif as a key moment in the 
foundation of their association: I retrace this history in Chapter Three. In 2016-2017, Les 
AlterCathos hosted public conferences on political participation and green conversion, 
drawing on the recently-published encyclical Laudato Si’. Their conferences were part of the 
wider network of conference centres across the cathosphère, mentioned above. They also ran 
a café, called Le Simone, as a microcosm for their transition to a Catholic ecology: my 
fieldwork was centred around this café, which served as a gathering ground for the 
cathosphère. 
   Neither with Les AlterCathos, nor the wider cathosphère, did I participate in the ritual lives 
of those among my interlocutors who were practicing Catholics themselves. This was partly 
due to the fact that they kept their ritual lives private from one another as well: as one 
interlocutor put it, they attended different Masses, if they attended Mass at all (Chapter Four). 
 
14 On blogs, Facebook (where I was added to several ‘closed’ groups dedicated to discussing the news), and 
especially Twitter: there is a large and active community of French ‘twittos cathos’. 
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I did not seek to follow them to church unless they asked me to join them: they did so for a 
few special events such as the Lyonnais ‘Festival of Lights’ in honour of the Virgin Mary on 
December 8th, and I accompanied them on those occasions. More broadly, as I explore 
throughout this thesis, my interlocutors were engaged in negotiating the articulation between 
their pious lives and their religiously-motivated political lives – ‘making links’ between 
politics and faith, but not merging them. At no point did my interlocutors among Les 
AlterCathos or the cathosphère claim that their politics were unrelated to piety, or ‘just 
politics’ – however, they expressed in complex and occasionally fraught ways that they found 
it important that politics and religion could be kept separate: that it was not all ‘just piety’ 
either. Their private ritual lives – private from me and from each other – were part of their 
negotiation of the intersections between acting piously ‘as’ Catholics (en catholiques) and 
acting explicitly ‘qua’ Catholics (en tant que catholiques). As a result, this thesis is self-
consciously not ‘about’ personal piety as a primary object of study. It focuses on the ‘worldly’ 
commitments and political engagements of my interlocutors, and addresses their negotiations 
of piety as and when they arose in the political contexts described. 
 
Outline of the dissertation 
The thesis is organised in two parts. Part One explores the contemporary place and public 
political concerns of conservative bourgeois Catholics – la cathosphère – within secular 
Republican France. It also provides an ethnographic and analytical background for Part Two, 
which focuses on the intellectual and practical development of a new political theology, called 
‘integral ecology’, by Les Alternatives Catholiques. 
 
Part One: France, our common home? 
Chapter One explores the place of Catholics in French public politics: taking La Manif Pour 
Tous and its aftermath as an entrypoint, it shows that French Catholics are simultaneously 
central and problematic to definitions of ‘French order’. It argues that the family is a battle 
ground in conservative Catholics’ efforts to curate their vision of the world: paradoxically 
emerging as public political actors in the course of defending their conception of the private 
family, conservative Catholics both contend with and challenge – in diverse and uneasy ways 
– the secular Republican dispensations of public and private. The chapter further shows the 
contestations which arise around conservative French Catholics’ claims to represent the ‘real’ 
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or ‘whole’ France and its natural order; as they are attacked on the grounds that their protests 
are the efforts of a minority interest group introducing social disorder. 
   Chapter Two continues this theme with an exploration of the ambiguous place of Catholics 
in relation to French notions of culture (Bourdieu 1984; Le Wita 1994). It argues that there is 
a relationship of mutual risk between French Catholic and Republican conceptions of culture, 
each envisioning itself as protecting a universalist ‘French culture’ which the other degrades 
through particularist concerns. Ethnographically, Chapter Two takes Catholic conference 
centres in Lyon as an entrypoint to discuss the French sphere of education and the national 
trope of ‘public intellectuals’ and philosophers (Bourdieu 1984; Fabiani 1988, 2010). These 
centres are intended to support private Catholic schools yet remain tethered to the national 
public education system, and therefore showcase how Catholic intellectuals curate the world 
of ‘French culture’ by navigating the debated place of Catholic history and philosophy within 
the peculiarly French category of ‘general culture’ (culture générale). 
   Overall, Part One focuses on the cathosphère of conservative, bourgeois Catholics in Lyon, 
and shows that French secularism – itself reliant in complex ways on visions of the ‘Christian 
roots’ of ‘European civilization’ (Asad 2003) – allows unique affordances to French Catholics 
in the public sphere. While Chapters One and Two show that Catholicism is in many ways 
rendered marginal by the secular Republic, as is Islam (Asad 2006b; Bowen 2007), they also 
jointly make the case that French Catholics can nonetheless seamlessly imagine themselves to 
be central to public French politics and culture. In other words, where Maryon McDonald 
had, in 1989, explored Breton regionalists’ claim that ‘We are not French!’, I show that 
conservative French Catholics in Lyon engage, in nuanced ways, in claims which go beyond 
‘We are French’ to ‘We are the French’. By negotiating their public presence in terms of 
representing the ‘whole’ of France, I argue that French Catholics can to a certain extent act on 
their own visibility qua Catholics (Maritain 1927; Oliphant 2019) and manipulate or resist 
categorization as a ‘religious minority’ (Favret-Saada 2017).  
 
Part Two: Towards an integral ecology 
Within the Lyonnais cathosphère, Part Two focuses on the rise of écologie intégrale (‘integral 
ecology’), a new Catholic political theology spearheaded by the lay philosophers of Les 
Alternatives Catholiques. In line with the anthropology of everyday religious ethics (Schielke 
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& Debevec 2012), I explore écologie intégrale both as a new religious ‘grand scheme’ 
(Chapters Three & Five) and ‘everyday practice’ (Chapters Four & Five). 
   Part Two starts with the third chapter, which retraces the development of Les Alternatives 
Catholiques since their foundation in Lyon in 2011. As mentioned above, Les AlterCathos 
were originally intended as a platform for young Catholics belonging to the cathosphère to 
‘make a link between [their] passion for politics and [their] faith’. In Chapter Three, I show 
that this initially entailed the development of a ‘prefigurative’ (Krøijer 2015) Catholic 
political epistemology, later combined with tenets drawn from the papal encyclical Laudato 
Si’, published in 2015. Contributing to anthropological accounts of cultural change and 
religious transformation (Robbins 2004; 2007b) through a focus on changing political 
theologies, this chapter argues that the ‘grand scheme’ (Schielke & Debevec 2012) of 
écologie intégrale challenges the pre-existing political practices of bourgeois Catholics and 
yet crucially retains and celebrates an attachment to ‘roots’. 
   If Chapter Three primarily focuses on the founders and current Committee-members of Les 
AlterCathos, Chapter Four includes their growing audiences. It explores how Les AlterCathos 
put into practice the paradigm of écologie intégrale – their new vision of Catholic politics, 
elaborated in the previous chapter – in the space of their café ‘Le Simone’. Ethnographically, 
it tracks the ways in which café customers are introduced to the core tenets of écologie 
intégrale, and how they come to participate in ways which at times include lapsed- and non-
Catholics, and at other times enter into conflict with more traditional forms of Catholicism 
found in the surrounding cathosphère. Chapter Four argues that Les AlterCathos’s efforts to 
instantiate écologie intégrale and transmit it to new audiences creates but also manages a 
tension between ‘ethics of efficacy’ and ‘ethics of conviction’ among the diverse customer 
base of Le Simone, not all of whom are (practicing) Catholics or invested in the philosophical 
narratives favoured by Les AlterCathos. Contributing to Part Two’s investigation of the rise of 
a new Catholic political theology, this chapter aims to go beyond ‘piety’ in the study of 
religious actors’ imagination and curation of ‘good worlds’. 
   Finally, Chapter Five observes the ways in which Les AlterCathos deploy the Catholic 
principle of ‘subsidiarity’ as a mode of subjectivation to orient their personal practice of 
écologie intégrale. It argues that subsidiarity, as a scalar vision of the world, enables Les 
AlterCathos to contribute to the welfare of ‘Our Common Home’ on many concatenated 
scales at once, attending simultaneously to local, national, and global scales of climate change 
and social inequality. It suggests that this mode of subjectivation undercuts previous French 
Catholic conceptions of politics, explored in Part One, which were predicated on the scale of 
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the nation-state and on ‘Frenchness’. This chapter concludes Part Two’s exploration of the 
core concerns and modes of subjectivation of écologie intégrale, as well as the overarching 
investigation of French Catholic politics conducted throughout this thesis, making the case for 
anthropological and ethnographic engagements with religious actors’ diverse conceptions and 
curations of ‘good worlds’. 
   Throughout, this thesis addresses the embodiments of several concatenated scales and 
connected spheres: the small, daily scale of Les AlterCathos’ café, but also the wider Catholic 
social spheres of Lyon; the lay and clerical audiences of Catholic conferences across Lyon, 
but also the wider prestige of philosophers and intellectuals on the national scale of French 
culture; the putatively private sphere of religion in secular France, but also the wider public 
debates surrounding Catholic politics since La Manif; the nominal modern separation of 
Church and State, but also the wider universal ambitions of both the French Republic and the 
Catholic Church. Each of these historical, geographic, social, and ideological scales provides 
crucial insights to understand recent transformations in ‘worldly’ commitments among French 
Catholics: as Pope Francis would put it, ‘everything is connected’. I offer snapshots of two 
particular modes of Catholic engagement with ‘worldly’ considerations and the political: la 
cathosphère and Les AlterCathos share a juxtaposition of traditional socio-cultural roots, 
French citizenship, and Catholic faith, but I trace how they become articulated into two 
different ‘political theologies’. 
   In turn, the prism of French Catholics’ engagement with political theology allows me to 
contribute to current debates in the anthropology of secular and neoliberal Europe (Asad 
1999, 2003, 2006; Holmes 2000; Muehlebach 2009, 2012, 2013), in the anthropology of 
everyday and self-reflective ethics (Lambek 2010; Fassin 2012; Laidlaw 2014), as well as to 
participate in the current expansion of the anthropology of Catholicism (Mayblin 2010; 
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‘La Manif Pour Tous’: 




This chapter addresses the ways in which family and politics intersect for conservative French 
Catholics, through the lens of the 2013 anti-same-sex-marriage protest La Manif Pour Tous 
and its aftermath. It argues that the family is a battle ground in French Catholics’ efforts to 
curate their vision of the world: paradoxically emerging as public political actors in the course 
of defending their conception of the private family, French Catholics both contend with and 
challenge, in diverse and at times uneasy ways, secular Republican dispensations of public 
and private. The chapter explores contestations which arise around conservative French 
Catholics’ claims to represent the ‘real’ or ‘whole’ France and its natural order – while they 
are attacked precisely on the grounds that their protests are the efforts of a minority interest 
group and introduce social disorder. Part One of this thesis contributes a new, complementary 
angle to longstanding anthropological accounts of French Republicanism and secularism: by 
focusing on the domain of public politics, this chapter formulates a first instantiation of the 
argument that Catholics in Republican France are in the paradoxical situation of being both 
marginal in some respects and yet able to claim that they are ‘the French’. 
 
Introduction 
By definition, millions can claim to have marched in a millions-strong street protest – it is 
exponentially rarer to be able to take credit for having organised such an event. Marie Sève, 
depending on who she is talking to, will either simply state that she ‘was there’ during La 
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Manif Pour Tous, the massive anti-same-sex-marriage demonstration of March 24th 2013 in 
Paris, or she will confide that she had a small role in its running. Marie, nowadays, no longer 
campaigns against same-sex marriage; and she worries that her present-day political concerns 
– ‘present’ in the ethnographic present of 2017 – will be misconstrued if her interlocutors 
‘associate her’ primarily with anti-same-sex-marriage activism. Nonetheless, she enjoys 
recalling the practicalities of coordinating a nationwide protest – particularly the political 
games of representation played between organisers, demontrators, the French government, 
and the media. 
   One such game lies in the head-count of protesters – not every protest is a millions-strong 
protest, after all – and this is where Marie became a player. Asked by the Manif Pour Tous 
leaders if she would like to hold a banner during the street march, or perhaps make a speech 
or give an interview to the press, she requested instead to help with ‘the counting’. She was 
given a handheld device with a thumb-activated clicker, and instructed to click each time a 
line of ten protesters – an estimate based on the width of the Parisian street – passed by the 
fixed point where she stood for a few hours’ shift. More Manif ‘clickers’ were positioned at 
strategic points along the streets taken by the demonstration. The police did its own head-
count; the official one for administrative records. At the end of the day, both parties released 
their number: according to La Manif Pour Tous, there were 1.4 million protesters, a record-
breaking attendance by French standards. According to the police, they were only 300,000. 
And according to Marie, the wild discrepancy between head-counts is, in and of itself, the 
most interesting point: it is a hallmark of French public politics.  
   The symbolic bar of the million participants mattered deeply to protesters, who hoped to 
signal that their opposition to the law was representative of the whole French population’s. 
The police’s head-count, which seemed paltry based on aerial photographs of the event, also 
mattered: protesters saw in it a marginalizing ploy to prevent this very synecdoche between 
demonstrators and ‘the French people’. Contradictory head-counts are a well-known staple of 
French street protests, les manifestations: it is widely acknowledged that both the police’s and 
protest organisers’ numbers are more symbolic than accurate (Denigot 2011). But in the case 
of La Manif Pour Tous, these head-counts mattered for an additional reason: the protest 
having been portrayed in the media as a particularly ‘Catholic’ one, the head-counts not only 
symbolised resistance to the government’s law proposal, but quantified a visible religious 
presence in the secular French public sphere. 
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   This chapter’s exploration of La Manif Pour Tous sets the scene for the thesis’s overarching 
study of recent Catholic politics in secular France. A key paradox of La Manif Pour Tous was 
the protesters’ complex efforts to present themselves as a-confessional, secular demonstrators, 
while the secular media and government instead persistently characterized them as ‘Catholic’. 
La Manif therefore allows an exploration of the place of religion in the secular French 
Republic; fleshing out and in some respects modifying the picture presented by 
anthropological studies of Islam in French public spheres (Asad 2006b; Bowen 2007; 
Fernando 2014).  
   The topic of La Manif Pour Tous – same-sex marriage and parenthood – also forms a 
starting point for the exploration of ‘worldly’ Catholic commitments which forms the core of 
this thesis, as Manif protesters attempted to curate French law according to their conceptions 
of the family. La Manif, I will suggest, crystallized competing visions of the family held by 
French Catholics and the French Republic; a debate which encompassed both the ‘order of 
nature’ and the ‘order of law’ (Schneider 1968). ‘Kinship has long been used to conceptualize 
ideas about the bounded integrity of nations’, anthropologists have argued (Franklin & 
McKinnon 2001: 19; Schneider 1969); because kinship can be apprehended as ‘a microcosm 
of the relationship between nature, society, and symbol’ (Strathern 1992a: 198) and therefore 
‘becomes a cultural technology not only for naturalizing relationships but also, and at the 
same time, for the reverse – for transforming naturalized relations into cultural forms’ 
(Franklin & McKinnon 2001: 16; on Strathern 1992b).  
   In France, not only does it hold true that the family has historically been a site for the 
construction of the nation, this process has been peculiarly self-aware and reflective. Historian 
of ideas Camille Robcis retraces, for example, that: 
Both the 1804 Napoleonic Code and the 1939 Family Code, the foundational texts for 
French civil law and for family policy, respectively, [...] set up the family as the best unit 
to organize solidarity and build political consensus, the most universal and most 
abstractable mode of social representation, and the purest expression of the general will. 
Both documents insist on the idea that the family is never simply private: as the 
foundation of the social order, it is intimately connected to the public. (Robcis 2013: 4) 
   La Manif is therefore worth addressing at the start of this thesis not only because it 
showcases an instance of religious visibility in the secular public sphere; not only because it 
introduces contemporary Catholic references to ‘Nature’ through the topic of ‘natural’ 
kinship; but more profoundly because the two feed into one another in French political 
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philosophy. Debates around the – heteronormative or ‘homoparental’, ‘natural’ or legal, 
secular or religious – family highlight what counts in the eyes of French Catholic protesters 
and the French government as they vie over competing definitions of the natural and cultural, 
symbolic and political order of France; and in turn define the place of Catholics within such 
orders. 
   This chapter therefore investigates the place of Catholics in the public politics of the French 
Republic through the lens of La Manif Pour Tous and its ongoing aftermath in 2017, during 
my fieldwork. It does not have the vocation of presenting a comprehensive overview of 
Catholic conceptions of the family, nor of the chronology or rhetorics of La Manif Pour 
Tous15. Instead, it focuses on several instances, during La Manif and in its aftermath, of 
deliberations regarding the definition of ‘family’, of ‘Catholics’, and of ‘Catholic families’; as 
well as deliberations regarding the assumption that these ‘belong’ in the private sphere by 
virtue of their religious and domestic character (Asad 2006b; Bowen 2007; Fernando 2014).  
   Complementing anthropological works on the marginalization of Islam in the French 
Republic (ibid.), I will argue that French Catholics can be represented as both central and 
marginal in French public politics. I will show how conservative Catholics narratively lay 
claim to the foundations of French public order, and how they can be seen to threaten it in 
contexts such as La Manif Pour Tous. Overall, I will argue that, in a French secular sphere 
which is built upon a Christian understanding of ‘internal’ faith (Asad 1993), conservative 
Catholics are afforded the possibility of modulating – if not always easily or successfully – 
the ‘visibility’ of their presence as religious actors. 
 
French universalism and the place of the family 
Debates about same-sex marriage, in France, have never been only about marriage – at their 
core, they are about ‘children first’ (Bloche & Pécresse 2006). The legalisation of same-sex 
unions came under consideration in 1982 when homosexuality was decriminalised, but early 
 
15  It is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse in detail the stances of French Catholics vis-à-vis 
homosexuality, or other family-related issues such as abortion, in counterpoint to anthropological explorations of 
religious and modern discourses on these topics (Ginsburg 1998; Paxson 2004; Elisha 2011). However, for 
thorough analyses of La Manif Pour Tous, see Brustier (2014), Clanché (2014), Béraud & Portier (2015a); and 
for a theological response to recent debates on the family see publications by the Conference of French Bishops 
(Conférence des Évêques de France 2018). 
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propositions for a new civil contract – distinct from the existing marriage law – gave rise to 
fierce debates over the significance of such a reform in terms of the foundations of French 
political philosophy. The core tenet of this ‘French model’16 of républicanisme is abstract 
universalism:  
To be able to speak and govern in the name of the general interest, of everyone, [is] the 
guarantee of equality before the law and [preserves] the unity, cohesion, and integration 
of the French nation. (Robcis 2013: 7)  
   In the 1980s, proponents and opponents of the creation of a new civil union all articulated 
their views in terms of Republicanism. For some, same-sex unions were ‘deemed anti-
republican because they were perceived to be catering to the particular – and hence 
nonuniversal – interests of homosexuals. They were [...] communitarian, the opposite of 
republican’ (ibid.). For others, the proposed civil contract was ‘quintessentially universalist, 
[because] it refused to distinguish homosexual from heterosexual’ (ibid.: 241). Beyond the 
question of equality between couples, the proposed new civil union also raised concerns 
regarding the equality of children across France. A ‘proper’ psychosocial development during 
childhood, it was argued by opponents of same-sex unions at the time, relies on the 
knowledge of one’s biological filiation and the experience of a gendered education: a civil 
union would, it was thought, legally entrench disparities between the psychosocial 
development of heterosexual and homosexual couples’ children.  
   It was therefore not so much same-sex alliances as the question of same-sex descent which 
was felt to threaten the anthropological and psychological ‘symbolic order’ of the family and 
the nation (Robcis 2013: 215). As a result, when a new contract, the Civil Solidarity Pact 
(Pacte Civil de Solidarité or PACS), was eventually legalised in 1999, it ‘essentially 
encompassed the same rights and benefits as marriage, except for two: filiation and 
nationality. Unlike married couples, PACS contractors could neither acquire French 
citizenship nor have access to adoption and medically assisted procreation’ (Robcis 2013: 
262). The PACS re-entrenched the link tying the legal and symbolic ‘order’ of the French 
nation to the ‘order’ of the heterosexual family. 
 
16 The ‘French model’ of Republicanism has, since 1789, been constituted by opposition to the ‘Anglo-Saxon 
model’ of (multicultural) liberalism, and more recently it has come to oppose ‘totalitarian models’ such fascism, 
Nazism, and Communism (Bowen 2007: 14-15; Robcis 2013: 8, 242). 
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   Throughout the 1980s and 90s, debates around same-sex marriage in France – contrary to 
other Western countries – had therefore not pivoted around empirical observations of family 
configurations, or around human rights discourses: family law, it was contended across the 
Right/Left spectrum, 
did not simply exist to satisfy individual demands or to confer random ‘rights’ on 
individuals. Rather, its primary purpose was to ensure the proper integration of 
individuals into the social world and to guarantee their psychic wellbeing. Gender, 
sexuality, and kinship did not simply pertain to the private: they were the universal and 
transhistorical structures upholding the public, the état de droit. (Robcis 2013: 12-13) 
   But over time, the language of the debates shifted from anthropological and psychosocial 
considerations – questions of ‘symbolic’ rather than ‘natural’ order – to include both 
biological and rights-based discourses. Following the PACS, half a decade of discussions 
around adoption for same-sex couples were eventually halted by the publication of a right-
wing governmental report entitled ‘L’Enfant d’abord’, or ‘put the children first’ (Bloche & 
Pécresse 2006). It argued that ‘the Law should not be seen to support a position that is so far 
removed from biological reproduction and which does not respect the truth of the biological 
origin of the child’ (Roger 2006: 24, in McCaffrey 2009: 60). The rights of the child (droit de 
l’enfant) were declared to trump same-sex couples’ and single adults’ right to have children 
(droit à l’enfant). 
   The issue was laid to rest until Socialist François Hollande ran for President of the Republic 
in 2012: one of the cornerstones of his campaign was the promise of ‘Marriage for All’. At 
stake was not the creation of additional rights for same-sex couples, but rather the inclusion of 
all couples into the existing Civil Code in the name of Republican abstract universalism – in 
other words, the Law of the Republic would henceforth no longer distinguish between 
heterosexual and homosexual couples in any matter, including the ‘universal and 
transhistorical structures’ of filiation and procreation (Robcis 2013). 
   It is significant that the notion of Republicanism proved so ubiquitous, and was in fact 
wielded by all sides of the debates to support vastly different stances. This rejoins John 
Bowen’s observation that ‘those in government and the media find Republicanism to be the 
safest place to anchor their particular policies, attacks, and analyses, especially when these are 
under siege’ (2007: 11) – yet that ‘the history [of Republicanism] they appeal to depends on 
the precise point they wish to make’ (ibid. 13). Bowen’s observation, however, referred not to 
policies about the family, but to the 2004 ‘law of the veil’ banning religious signs such as 
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Islamic headscarves from the secular public sphere. The parallel between the multiple uses of 
Republican discourses in matters of religion and the family highlights one more takeaway 
point from this historical overview of debates around same-sex marriage: contrary to 
‘politicians elsewhere’, French political actors have never turned to ‘religion, morality, 
tradition [to] ground their objections against gay marriage and medically assisted 
reproduction’ (Robcis 2013: 1). This avoidance at the level of government highlights, by 
contrast, any use of religious narratives by civil actors in those debates. 
   During the buildup to the PACS in 1998-1999, anti-PACS protesters from civil society – 
rather than governmental or Parliamentary opponents – had been explicit about their religious 
motivations, and constituted a ‘multi-denominational’ Front de la Foi, or ‘united front of 
faith’ (Béraud & Portier 2015b: 61). When the matter of same-sex unions was raised again in 
the 2012 ‘Marriage for All’ law proposal, however, the opposition was explicitly presented as 
a-confessional and ‘independent’17 from all religious hierarchies. While the same Catholic 
associations which had resisted the PACS were, once again, key in organising and funding 
repeated large-scale street marches throughout the autumn 2012 and spring 2013, they made a 
point of dubbing these efforts the ‘demonstration for all’, La Manif Pour Tous, and of 
insisting that their own role was simply that of facilitators for a wider movement defending 
universal – not religious – family values18 and natural procreation.  
   Once more, slogans focused not on same-sex marriage per se, but on the rejection of same-
sex parenthood: ‘Dad + Mum: nothing better for a child!’, ‘All born from a man and a 
woman’, ‘One Dad, one Mum, don’t lie to children’, ‘Dad, Mum, and the kids: it’s natural’19. 
While the protest was unsuccessful – ‘Marriage for All’ was enshrined in law on May 17th 
2013 – it gained one major concession: the government backtracked on allowing reproductive 
technologies to lesbian couples for the time being (Béraud & Portier 2015b: 67). 
   However, the matter returned to the fore as a polarizing theme of the 2017 presidential 
election. Several candidates promised to open access to medically-assisted procreation to 
single women and couples of women, and possibly to surrogacy for male couples. Other 
 
17 La Manif Pour Tous website: https://www.lamanifpourtous.fr/qui-sommes-nous/mouvement/ 
18 La Manif Pour Tous website: https://www.lamanifpourtous.fr/qui-sommes-nous/notre-message/ 
19 ‘Papa + Maman: Y’a pas mieux pour un enfant!’, ‘Tous nés d’un père et d’une mère’, ‘Un Papa, une Maman, 
on ne ment pas aux enfants’, ‘Papa, Maman, et les enfants: c’est naturel! ’. 
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candidates instead guaranteed to enshrine biological fertility and procreation as the only legal 
modes of filiation, or even to revoke the ‘Marriage for All’ reform outright. Nearly five years 
after La Manif Pour Tous, therefore, its legacy was visible in the widespread assumption that 
the question of same-sex parenthood would form the litmus test for the constitution of 
electoral blocks. This is when I arrived to the field: my first few weeks in Lyon in the winter 
of 2016-2017 were spent attending political meetings, which attempted precisely to convince 
Lyonnais Catholics that notwithstanding their previous political loyalties, their vote should be 
cast on the basis of the ‘protection of filiation’. 
 
Frigide Barjot and the protection of ‘bio’ filiation 
A key character throughout this chapter is Virginie Tellenne20, better known across France as 
‘Frigide Barjot’, the most emblematic figurehead of La Manif Pour Tous. I met Virginie in 
Lyon in 2017, and my retrospective understanding of the events of 2012-2013 owes much to 
her vivid story-telling and to the reminiscences of Manif protesters to whom she introduced 
me. Virginie is a force of nature: in her fifties when I met her, she stood out from bourgeois 
Catholic women of her generation through her brash, take-charge and take-no-prisoners 
attitude, and through her signature outfit of a miniskirt, leather jacket, and layered necklaces 
bearing a tangle of Catholic medals – a carefully curated, stereotype-defying self-presentation 
as a ‘trendy Catholic’ (catho branchée), as her several autobiographies attest (Tellenne 2011; 
2014; 2015). 
   Virginie has many names. Born Virginie Merle, she was brought up in a well-connected, 
conservative Catholic family of the Lyonnais bourgeoisie. She left that world by launching a 
career as a humourist and political commentator in the 1980s in Paris. There, she married a 
fellow political parodist, becoming at the same time Virginie Tellenne and ‘Frigide Barjot’, a 
stage-name pun referring to actress Brigitte Bardot yet literally meaning ‘frigid nutcase’. As 
‘Frigide’, she was a well-known pillar of Parisian nightlife, developing wide-ranging 
friendship networks among the gay cabaret scene. But ‘Frigide’ was a multi-faceted persona – 
as ‘Frigide’, Virginie also publicised her ertswhile loyalty to the RPR Gaullist party, then 
widely talked about the renewal of her Catholic faith after a pilgrimage in 2004, and raised a 
100,000-signature-strong petition in support of conservative Pope Benedict XVI in 2009 
while his popularity was low. It is still as ‘Frigide’ that Virginie spearheaded La Manif Pour 
 
20 As a public figure, Virginie is not anonymised. 
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Tous in 2013, turning her quirky acting persona into a nom-de-guerre for the occasion, and 
trusting that her longstanding friendships with Parisian LGBT+ networks would prove, in the 
public eye, that her resistance to ‘Marriage for All’ was motivated by objective legal concerns 
rather than homophobia.  
   She met President Hollande, to whom she suggested the creation of a new civil union for 
same-sex couples: it would improve on the PACS by including the same rights as heterosexual 
parenthood but differ in its legal recording of children’s filiation. President Hollande wasn’t 
convinced; unfortunately for Frigide, her co-instigators in La Manif weren’t convinced either. 
On the 5th of May 2013, six months after the start of the protests, she was spectacularly ousted 
from her role as Manif spokeswoman by the other leaders, who altogether refused any 
extension of rights for same-sex couples beyond the existing PACS. From that point onwards, 
‘Frigide Barjot’ gave way to Virginie Tellenne, who for a (short) time refocused on her 
private life and family, which had been upset by the months of turning her duplex flat in Paris 
into an activist HQ. 
   When I started my fieldwork in Lyon in late-2016, without knowing much about its 
Catholic spheres, I searched for events organised by Frigide Barjot, whose name I knew from 
media coverage of La Manif. Frigide had since created an association called L’Avenir Pour 
Tous (LAVT), a ‘future for all’: in 2016 and the spring of 2017, she used LAVT as a platform 
to attempt to influence Catholics’ votes in the upcoming presidential election. I first attended 
a publicly-advertised but poorly-attended LAVT conference held in a rented municipal room – 
there I met Frigide/Virginie Tellenne, who promptly invited me to join a more private version 
of this same conference, held at a friend’s home a few days later, and then gradually started 
including me in her Lyon-based campaigning more widely. 
   Frigide/Virginie’s campaigning style is rather idiosyncratic. Her conferences involve a long 
and complex PowerPoint presentation with which she is so familiar that she no longer truly 
pays attention, in each individual talk, to whether she has actually broached every point or 
whether her audience is following at all. As Virginie launches into her talk, it is, in my 
experience, never quite clear what its central topic is supposed to be. In the first forty-five 
minutes, she touches in rapid-fire succession – and with a feverish delivery shifting 
bewilderingly from earnestness to deadpan irony and cynicism – on the topics of filiation 
legislation, the 1956 film And God Created Woman, contraception, biological vs. social 
bodies, transgender parents, the Freemasons, the Original Sin, Catholic stances vis-à-vis 
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homosexuality, smartphone apps to find surrogate mothers in Ukraine, and François Fillon’s 
candidacy to the presidence of the Republic. 
   Finally she gets to the point of her campaign. It is a strategic one: only two candidates to the 
upcoming 2017 presidential election, far-right Marine Le Pen and conservative-right François 
Fillon, plan on firmly prohibiting medically-assisted procreation (Procréation Médicalement 
Assistée, PMA) for lesbian couples and single women, as well as surrogate pregnancy 
(Gestation Pour Autrui, GPA). However, centrist liberal Emmanuel Macron is likely to reach 
the second round of the election; he is openly in favour of PMA, and Virginie fears that he 
hides an inclination to support GPA. ‘It is well-known that he is backed by media mogul 
Pierre Bergé’, Virginie stresses, ‘who once said that selling one’s womb is after all no 
different to selling the strength of one’s arms’. The goal of L’Avenir Pour Tous is therefore to 
bar Macron (faire barrage) from reaching the second round of the election, by ensuring that 
both Le Pen and Fillon come out on top of the first round. In this scenario, regardless of who 
wins the final round, ‘biological filiation, la filiation bio between a man and a woman, will be 
protected’. 
   Since polls predict Le Pen will go through, Virginie has been tirelessly campaigning for 
Fillon for months, holding endless iterations of the same PowerPoint at private ‘apartment 
meetings’ (of which I describe an instance at the end of this chapter) and public conferences. I 
attend several of each, and witness how Virginie promotes Fillon by adapting her opening 
spiel to her audiences’ political leanings. If the audience seemingly gathers a majority of far-
right Front National voters, Virginie tries to persuade them that, Le Pen being de facto 
qualified, they should instead vote for Fillon, ‘since it’s the second place behind Le Pen that is 
being played – if you vote FN in the first round, you’ll let Macron go through and risk him 
winning the second round, and then, adieu la filiation bio’. 
   ‘Bio’ is a shorthand for biologique or biological. Most obviously, ‘biological filiation’ in 
this sense refers to heterosexual descent, but there is an additional layer of meaning – ‘bio’ is 
also a legal label for organic produce. At first, Virginie’s reference to descent as bio therefore 
rings oddly; it evokes bio free-range chickens or bio live-culture yoghurt. But this is precisely 
her intention: as she makes clearer throughout the meeting, she is not satisfied with 
definitions of filiation which take DNA into account but allow technical medical 
interventions. Instead, she wants human procreation to remain bio, that is, ‘organic’ rather 
than ‘fabricated’ (fabriquée) through genetic manipulation, or mass-produced (en batterie) 
through paid-for surrogacy. 
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   This is an updated vision of the ‘order of nature’ described by David Schneider fifty years 
ago (1968), which takes into account the growing availability of reproductive technologies: 
the ‘nature’ that Virginie wants to protect, here, refers not only to ‘blood’ or genetic material 
(ibid.) but also to the very processes of insemination and gestation. Virginie readily states that 
she believes same-sex couples should be allowed to adopt and raise children, as long as a 
legal record is kept of the children’s birth parents: this does not, in her view, threaten ‘human 
ecology’21 (écologie humaine), that is, the survival of humanity as a species (hence the name 
of her association, L’Avenir Pour Tous, ‘a future for all’). Reproductive technologies, 
however, jeopardise ‘human ecology’ for two reasons in her book: firstly because they run 
against the ‘order of nature’ described above, but also because the recourse to anonymous 
gamete donations or surrogate mothers perturbs the ability of the State to keep track of, and 
legally enshrine, the relation between all parties – ‘the order of law’ (Schneider 1968). For 
Virginie, the role of the Law is clear: it must not ‘lie’, that is, it must not replace ‘biological 
truth’ with aspirational modes of ‘intentional filiation’ or ‘social fertility’22. 
   The presidential election, in Virginie’s view, is therefore crucial: if Fillon and Le Pen make 
it through to the second round and defend ‘bio filiation’ in France, this will serve to protect 
France from the progress of what she calls the ‘Anglo-Saxon trend’ of ‘artificial’ or ‘rootless’ 
reproduction (la reproduction artificielle / la reproduction hors-sol – the term hors-sol 
literally means ‘out-of-the-earth’ and is borrowed from the technical language of hydroponic 
agriculture). These high stakes are the reason behind her initial investment in La Manif Pour 
Tous in 2012-2013, and her continued tireless campaigning in the year ahead of the 2017 
presidential election. 
   I focused on Virginie alone in this section, but, overwhelmingly, my interlocutors from the 
Lyonnais cathosphère (cf. Thesis Introduction) explained their participation in La Manif and 
their ongoing investment before the 2017 election in similar terms. While most did not have 
as detailed a narrative as Virginie’s, all referred to the ‘protection of filiation’ as a key 
 
21 On écologie humaine and écologie intégrale, see Chapter Three. 
22 The question of whether the Law is meant to be performative or transformative is a long-standing one in 
France (Thomas 2011): in the first instance (inherited from medieval Christianity), the Law is meant to enshrine 
empirical precedent, while in the second (inherited from Roman Antiquity), the Law is intended to create new 
abstractions which transcend the limitations of reality. The very foundations of the French Republic oscillate on 
this knife’s edge: the core tenet of Republican equality is meant to ensure judicial equality (égalité en droit), 
sublimating the (in)equality of citizens in fact ((in)égalité de fait). 
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motivation. This yields several important observations. If my interlocutors’ participation in La 
Manif wasn’t primarily concerned with same-sex marriage per se but with its correlates in 
terms of reproduction and filiation, then it was more than an attempt to intervene in the rights 
of same-sex couples23: it was an effort to control something they felt they had a stake in, 
namely the family. Moreover, the way they framed their vision of the family – in terms of 
‘biological’ reproduction and of the duties of the State regarding filiation – meant that in their 
view, everyone with a concern for the future of the family ought to reject the ‘Marriage for 
All’ law, on the basis that it was the ‘thin end of the wedge’ for the disappearance of 
‘biological filiation’. They therefore approached La Manif in the spirit, not of a ‘religious 
minority’ defending its own rights, but of a ‘moral majority’ (Favret-Saada 2017) concerned 
with the welfare of the entire French population. This did not mean that religion played no 
role in their investment, however, as I explore in the next section. 
 
‘Mobilising the Muslims’: Inter-faith negotiations and Republican interfaces 
Virginie introduced me to two brothers, Thomas and Pierre-Marie Delorme, who had been 
close associates of hers and helped to launch La Manif Pour Tous in Lyon in 2012. In his late-
twenties at the time, single and footloose, Thomas Delorme had served as her general 
factotum throughout the entire duration of La Manif in 2012-2013. When ‘Frigide’ had been 
replaced in the Manif Pour Tous leadership, Thomas had convinced Pierre-Marie, a half-
decade his elder, to continue to follow her ‘line’. Now in 2017, Pierre-Marie led a settled life: 
he had a wife, two children, a large house, and he directed a temp agency in a well-to-do 
neighbourhood of Lyon. Thomas, footloose once more after having clerked for several right-
wing parliamentarians since La Manif, was supported by his parents financially and devoted 
his time to attending and facilitating Virginie’s rounds of conferences. He was particularly 
keen to share his recollections of La Manif with me – partly as a way to distract himself from 
his current unemployment. 
   In 2012-2013, Thomas and Pierre-Marie had actively sought to raise awareness and recruit 
participants for the incipient Manif Pour Tous. In particular, Pierre-Marie had contacted 
Muslim associations across Lyon. Thomas was the first to mention the topic of Muslim 
participants in La Manif: 
 
23 None of my interlocutors ever discussed their own sexual identity – they spoke of same-sex couples in the 
abstract, rather than as persons they might know (or be) themselves. 
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My brother, with some Muslim friends, they created Les Musulmans Pour l’Enfance, 
‘Muslims For Childhood’. With a nice logo, little kids in a crescent... I mean I don’t know 
the numbers for sure, but they filled fifty-ish coaches, with Muslims who went up to Paris 
from Lyon for the demonstrations in March... 
The presence of Muslim protesters at La Manif Pour Tous came as a surprise to me: I had 
been under the impression that the demonstration had been overwhelmingly attended by 
Catholics. Thomas explained that the media representation24 of the protest as homogeneous, 
rather than diversified, had been one of the points of contention throughout La Manif – I 
return to this below. At the time, though, ‘mobilising the Muslims’ had been a priority for 
Pierre-Marie Delorme. When I asked the latter for more detail, he answered with his signature 
blunt frankness: 
Yeah I tried to mobilise the Muslims, because they understand what we meant by this 
basis of the family, except they’re more violent about it. So first, we had to do some work 
against homophobia, and once we managed to do that, then we did some work to get 
them to accompany us on those big demonstrations. And by the way, I told them, you did 
more for your integration as French citizens in 6 months of Manif, than in 15 years of 
joining left-wing anti-racism associations that basically typecast you, really.  
Pierre-Marie’s (patronising) positioning vis-à-vis the Muslim associations he was trying to 
recruit sheds light on the ways in which conservative bourgeois Catholics can frame their own 
place in France with reference both to other religious populations, and to the Republic. 
   On the one hand, Pierre-Marie saw the possibility of an interfaith relationship between 
Catholics qua Catholics and Muslims: both populations, in his view, share values 
progressively lost by the rest of secular society – namely, they each value the primacy of the 
family. On the other hand, Pierre-Marie’s neocolonialist approach renders transparent his 
implicit judgment of the marginal place of Muslims in the French Republic (Fernando 2014). 
It is telling that he felt compelled to ‘educate’ Muslims (Iteanu 2013) in a variety of ways – 
about ‘violence’, about homophobia, about ‘integration as citizens’ – while the majority of 
Catholic protesters (as well as the minority of Protestant and Jewish demonstrators) he left to 
their own devices and assumed to master these codes already. 
 
24 Later analyses in academic political sciences confirm that the presence of Muslims, but also of Evangelical 
and Jewish associations (Raison du Cleuziou 2019: 209), and the presence of left-wing protesters (ibid.: 207), 
were subsumed into the single image of a Catholic and right-wing protest by media coverage (ibid.: 217). 
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   Pierre-Marie positioned himself and Catholics as intermediaries between Muslims and the 
Republic, capable of teaching the former how to fully integrate into the latter. Integration is a 
central concern in French political philosophy: new citizens such as children and foreigners 
can and must assimilate25 into the body politic of Republican civic nationalism (Bowen 2007; 
Iteanu 2013; Fernando 2014). Discursively, Pierre-Marie’s shift from siding with Muslims 
against secular modernity, to siding with the Republic against (his assessment of) as-yet-
unintegrated ‘Others’, was seamless. His self-conscious stance as a Republican ambassador 
vis-à-vis Muslim communities showcased the extent to which he, as a Catholic, could imagine 
himself as a fully-integrated member of the Republic, even as he engaged in protesting the 
law. In his own view, his critique of the government’s law proposal was operated from within 
the Republic: he sought to exercise his right as a citizen to contest particular politics, without 
questioning the entire architecture of the state. Indeed, it is by protesting in the streets and 
claiming a stake in the government of the whole nation that he considered his – and Muslims’ 
– duty to the Republic to be fulfilled, and their Republican integration re-affirmed. 
   In the event, French Muslims unforgivably ‘tripped up’, in Pierre-Marie’s view, and, by 
exposing ‘their’ underlying anti-Republicanism, threatened the public image of the entire 
protest. Indeed, when representatives of the main religious communities in France released 
statements outlining their position on the same-sex marriage debate, the stance taken by 
Muslim leaders stood out. While the Catholic Permanent Episcopal Council and Episcopal 
Council for the Family, the Council of the Protestant Federation of France, the National 
Evangelical Council of France, and the Assembly of Orthodox Bishops of France26, all made 
reference to ‘anthropological’, ‘psychological’, and ‘natural’ arguments reiterating the 
‘ontological complementarity of woman and man’ (cf. Robcis 2013), the French Council of 
the Muslim Faith 27  based its protestations on ‘Islamic law, Koranic text and prophetic 
traditions’ (Béraud & Portier 2015b: 67-82). In Pierre-Marie’s cruder assessment, ‘that imam 
 
25 I return in Chapter Two to the place of education in the construction of the French nation. 
26 In order of listing: the Conseil Permanent de la Conférence des Évêques de France (CEF), including its 
Conseil Famille et Société; the Conseil de la Fédération Protestante de France (FPF); the Conseil National des 
Évangéliques de France (CNEF); the Assemblée des Évêques Orthodoxes de France (AEOF); and the Conseil 
Français du Culte Musulman (CFCM). 
27 It is worth noting that the Chief Rabbi of France’s personal statement can be joined with the former group, in 
its claims to universalism and avoidance of religious arguments (Béraud & Portier 2015b: 81-82). 
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went and said they were against gay marriage because of the Shari‘a and bam, shot us all in 
the foot’. 
   In other words, by calling attention to their faith-based motivations, the French Council of 
the Muslim Faith ultimately failed to show the expected support for a single, ‘natural’ 
conception of the ‘universal’ family – the common-ground Pierre-Marie imagined them to 
share with Catholic protesters, against more progressive visions of ‘chosen’ families (Weston 
1991). More critically, Pierre-Marie was incensed because Muslim leaders explicitly cast their 
participation in the protest as a self-motivated one, rather than one concerned with the 
interests of the whole Republic. In Pierre-Marie’s view, this risked re-casting other religious 
communities’ involvement as equally particularistic and fundamententally anti-secular. 
   Interestingly – and here I take some distance from Pierre-Marie’s narrative – none of the 
news reports I have read from 2013, and none of the academic analyses of La Manif published 
in later years (Brustier 2014; Raison du Cleuziou 2019), dwell at length on the statement by 
the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM). As far as I can tell from archival material, 
this episode went relatively unnoticed in the grand scheme of the protest, and hardly ‘shot [it] 
in the foot’, as Pierre-Marie alleged. In this sense, what is significant about the statement by 
the CFCM, for the purposes of this chapter, is not its (debatable) importance on the national 
public stage, but the way in which Pierre-Marie himself honed in on it as a critical political 
misstep. His anger towards his Muslim counterparts highlights, by contrast, what he expected 
a ‘proper’ political participation on the part of religious actors to entail: a self-conscious 
capacity to moderate their public discourses and present them in a properly Republican frame. 
   I now turn, in the next sections, to the ways in which conservative Catholics attempted to 
modulate their own public presence in this way during La Manif Pour Tous, showcasing the 
confidence with which they wield Republican narratives, but also the extent to which their 
strategies of self-presentation as the ‘moral majority’ (Favret-Saada 2017) can be turned 
against them. The following sections are based on retrospective accounts compiled in dozens 
of interviews with conservative bourgeois Catholics in Lyon. They do not aim to present a 
comprehensive overview of La Manif Pour Tous, but rather to highlight a number of ways in 
which my interlocutors rememorated, four years down the line, the contestations which had 
taken place in 2013 regarding the place of Catholics in the French public sphere. 
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Manif memories #1: An orderly protest? 
Manifestations are a type of street demonstration which has been part of the French political 
scene since the end of the nineteenth century (Tartakowsky 2004: 149; 2011), and are now a 
standard institutional form. They involve a specific spatialisation – they are formed of long 
walking processions winding through a town following pre-approved routes, often chosen for 
their symbolic evocations – and a finite temporalisation, lasting for a pre-approved duration 
within a single day. These two dimensions are mutually constitutive: walking along the same 
route a day later does not make a manif’, and equally, one leaves the lawful manif’ by 
marching down another street. 
   This recognisable chronotope28 defines a ‘manif’’ by contrast to any other form of political 
action, and in turn evokes a host of memories, expectations, and assumptions tied to this form. 
Nowadays, manifs are broadly perceived to be politically ineffective (Thorkelson 2016: 502), 
yet are still considered the paradigmatic form of French political protest. It is therefore a 
peculiarity of the French political scene – or at least, it was until the 2019-2020 ‘Yellow 
Jackets’ (Gilets Jaunes) changed the landscape of French street protests – that performing a 
manifestation ‘properly’ or ‘correctly’ matters as much as the content of the protest: it is the 
form of the manifestation itself which confers the seal of Republicanism onto such public 
events. 
   Virginie/Frigide’s tenure at the helm of La Manif Pour Tous was decisive in setting up the 
demonstration as a particularly ‘orderly’ protest. It was she who decreed, as early as the 
autumn of 2012, that the resistance to ‘Marriage for All’ would not be religious but would be 
conducted exclusively in universalist Republican terms and within the bounds of Republican 
‘public order’ (Tellenne 2014; Béraud & Portier 2015a: 92).  
   While ‘Frigide Barjot’ did not hide her Catholic faith, she was not otherwise affiliated with 
the Church – which tried to sustain a neutral position29 by refusing to explicitly endorse La 
 
28 Chronotopes are spatiotemporal assemblages governed by formal and informal rules, which in turn shape 
possible and expected behaviours and relationships (Bakhtin 1981: 84; in Valverde 2015: 10). They can be used 
as analytical frames to explore mutually-constitutive ‘logics of space’ (Abélès 1991: 262; Iteanu 2013) and 
‘logics of time’ (Thorkelson 2016). Marina Valverde suggests that their use as a tool is particularly interesting 
when heterogeneous or contradictory spatiotemporal assemblages coexist (2015: 22) – when it seems that matter 
is ‘out of place’ or ‘out of time’ (Douglas 1966). 
29  The Conference of Catholic Bishops published a number of think-pieces in response to the proposed 
‘Marriage for All’ law, but refused to issue an official call for French Catholics to protest or accept the law. This 
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Manif – or other civil Catholic structures. By contrast, the other key leaders of La Manif Pour 
Tous all had ties to powerful lay Catholic associations: among them was the president of the 
Catholic Familial Associations (Associations familiales catholiques), and boardmembers of 
the Fondation Jérôme-Lejeune, a charity supporting children with disabilities, and of Alliance 
VITA, the main pro-life association in France. None of the leaders claimed to protest by virtue 
of their Catholic faith – either ‘as’ or qua Catholics in the terms of Jacques Maritain (1927; cf. 
Thesis Introduction). The fact remained that Frigide alone defied the image of ‘traditional 
Catholicism’, not least because she paired her Catholic medals with ostensible rainbow 
bandanas to signify her attachment to LGBT+ communities. 
   Frigide’s contribution to this organising team, among other things, was her discursive 
virtuosity in presenting this largely-Catholic leadership in a positive, unifying light: in TV 
interviews, she insisted on the goodwill and logistical efforts made by all these leaders to 
coordinate their respective associations into a smoothly-organised collective (Raison du 
Cleuziou 2019: 204-205). The Manif, she insisted, was bon-enfant, or ‘good-natured’, and it 
was run en bonne intelligence, ‘in good sense’. She foregrounded the coordination and 
harmony resulting from the ‘selfless efforts’ made by each of its constituent associations to 
coalesce into a single force with a shared national purpose. 
   Under her impetus, La Manif Pour Tous was launched in the public eye with simultaneous 
manifestations in Paris and Lyon on 17th November 2012. It upped the ante with a ‘montée à 
Paris’ – a call to ‘go up to Paris’ from across France – on 13th January 2013 which gathered 
340,000 to 800,000 protesters. It reached its paroxysm with the demonstration of 24th March 
2013 in Paris, gathering 300 000 protesters according to the police but 1.4 million according 
to the organisers. Throughout, Manif leaders insisted repeatedly in TV broadcasts on the 
orderly, law-abiding character of the demonstration, stressing the polite and ‘well-mannered’ 
nature of their activism. My Lyonnais interlocutors, in 2017, recalled this aspect of the Manif 
fondly. Many of them stated that they had never protested before and had, at first, been 
intimidated at the prospect of marching in the streets – but once they were satisfied that La 
Manif was more ‘tranquil’ (tranquille) and ‘tidy’ or ‘ordered’ (rangé) than other protests they 
had seen on television previously, they were reassured. Not only did they return for the 
following gatherings, they also encouraged friends and family members to participate. 
 
neutral stance was complicated on the one hand by the attitude of a number of bishops who, in their own names, 
rallied in favour of La Manif Pour Tous, and on the other hand by some prominent Catholic news outlets, who 
repeatedly called for the Church to take a stance. 
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   Part of the order of the demonstration was achieved through the use of clear Republican 
symbols. Many mayors and elected representatives from across France ‘went up to Paris’ to 
protest: they wore their red-white-and-blue tricolore sashes as they walked, arranged in neat 
rows spaced throughout the procession. Additional homogeneous lines were formed at 
intervals by young women dressed in the white toga and red phrygian bonnet of the 
Republican allegory ‘Marianne’. By curating itself as a particularly orderly series of 
manifestations, La Manif insisted, in the public eye, on the fact that it followed a legitimate 
and even paradigmatic template for democratic dissent, dating as far back as the Third 
Republic. 
   However, this insistence on the ‘orderly’ nature of the protest backfired as soon as internal 
disagreements within the leadership group became visible. A few days before the 
demonstration planned for the 24th of March 2013 in Paris, Béatrice Bourges30, the president 
of a pro-life collective and the most explicitly far-right leader of La Manif Pour Tous, 
encouraged her supporters to abandon the planned demonstration route and instead march 
down the Avenue des Champs-Élysées (Béraud & Portier 2015b: 74). Les Champs-Élysées 
symbolise ‘France’ as a whole: the only events which take place on this iconic avenue – until 
the recent Gilets Jaunes protests – are State events such as the national parade on the 14th of 
July. Bourges’s call to abandon the planned route of the Manif and walk down the Champs-
Élysées therefore held paradoxical symbolic meaning. On the one hand, it aimed to claim a 
particularly French and Republican symbol, Les Champs-Élysées, for itself. On the other 
hand, this was such a subversion of the usual place of Les Champs-Élysées in the national 
imaginary that it failed to convince, and came across as abusive. 
   Moreover, Bourges’s call threatened the moral high-ground which had so far been 
maintained through La Manif’s ‘ordered’ temporality and spatial route. Historically, the 
wilfulness of going off-course from approved demonstration routes is typical of the 
‘revolutionary right’, that is, the anti-Republican far-right (Valence 2011: 120-127). 
Bourges’s call to such wilful disorder led to an immediate crackdown on the part of the other 
Manif leaders, and she was relieved of her duties overnight. Frigide Barjot, still at the helm of 
the Manif at this stage, entrenched this separation by releasing statements indicating that ‘all 
the actions of La Manif take place within legal and Republican bounds and observe the 
decisions of the Police Prefect’ (Béraud & Portier 2015a: 92). 
 
30 Béatrice Bourges is a public figure and is not anonymised here. 
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   However, the bait had been cast: mainstream media shifted their focus from La Manif onto 
Bourges’s retaliation. Within a few days, she created her own movement, Le Printemps 
Français (‘the French Spring’), a tongue-in-cheek reference to the rejections of authority 
which had taken place during the Arab Spring a few years prior. On March 24th, Printemps 
Français supporters exited the official route, drawing most of the media coverage to their 
face-off with riot police on the Champs-Élysées (HuffPost 24/03/2013; RTL 25/03/2013). 
   In 2017, a few of my interlocutors shared that they still held bitter grudges against 
acquaintances whom they knew to have followed Bourges onto the Champs-Élysées. By 
participating in the débordements – the conflictual ‘excess’ – of Bourges’s mini-putsch, they 
had allowed La Manif to be portrayed in the media as a ‘risk’ to public order, overturning its 
previous image as an orderly protest. The narrative of risk entailed two levels of analysis: the 
actual incivilities committed on the Champs-Élysées threatened the literal order of the public 
sphere, and more fundamentally, the affiliation with the anti-Republican far-right threatened 
the symbolic order of a protest which had otherwise made efforts to remain universal and 
Republican. 
 
Manif memories #2: A bourgeois protest? 
The majority of manifestations in France are organised by left-wing syndicates and parties. 
The rarer right-wing manifs, however, tend to gather larger crowds, and to remain particularly 
memorable. Their larger number of protesters is due to the recurring theme of la montée à 
Paris, ‘going up to Paris’: in the rare occasions that right-wing manifs have occurred, they 
have drawn demonstrators from across France. During the pro-De Gaulle protest at the end of 
the May 1968 cultural revolution (Bourg 2007), distinctive regional clothing was encouraged 
by organisers with the aim of representing the ‘true’ and entire French population (Valence 
2011: 121-122). In Louis Dumont’s words, there exists a widespread perception in France of 
the ‘empirical power’ or numerical superiority of the Right in counterpoint to the ideological 
preeminence of the Left since the Revolution (1977: 259). Dumont suggests that left-wing 
politics, inheritors of the Revolution, are widely perceived as the incarnation of ‘Progress’, 
while right-wing politics are linked to tradition and ‘Order’ (1977: 258). This is a slightly 
different nuance of ‘order’ than in the previous section: whereas the orderly performance of a 
manif’ allows a symbolic evocation of the Republic – that is, the top-down, abstract state – 
evocations of right-wing ‘order’ hint towards ‘real’ French people, ‘from the ground up’ and 
across time. 
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   In 2012-2013, Manif demonstrators called upon the implicit codes of this symbolic vision of 
‘French order’: not only did they call forth a long-term past, they also warned of a long-term 
ability to sustain La Manif into the future. In early 2012, François Hollande’s presidential 
campaign slogan – ‘change comes now’ – had been symptomatic of the Socialist Party’s bid 
to place its presidential term under the sign of progress and of ‘creative instantaneity’ 
(Brustier 2014: 52). La Manif, in direct response later that year, chanted on ne lache rien, ‘we 
won’t drop it’, ‘we won’t let anything go’. 
   My Lyonnais interlocutors recalled that one subset of La Manif had been especially 
evocative in this respect. In the later months of the protest, wishing to amplify the visibility of 
their resistance to the ‘Marriage for All’ law beyond the scheduled manifestations, protesters 
in Paris borrowed from the panoply of Occupy protests and began to hold day-and-night 
‘standing vigils’ on the Place Vendôme, facing the Ministry of Justice. This new group first 
called itself Les Veilleurs Debout31, or ‘standing vigils/watchmen’, before settling on the 
name Les Sentinelles, ‘the sentinels’. It is nominally forbidden to congregate on the Place 
Vendôme: by standing immobile in aligned rows, spaced out from one another by a metre or 
two, Les Sentinelles complied with, yet subverted, the legislation preventing unapproved 
public ‘gatherings’. Groups were formed throughout France, holding vigils in front of Town 
Halls and tribunals to continue expressing resistance to the ‘Marriage for All’ reform – they 
carried on after the law was passed, and did not ‘drop it’, or ‘let anything go’, until late-2018. 
   Les Sentinelles brought a new political chronotope to bear on the wider stage of La Manif 
Pour Tous. Like occupation movements elsewhere, my interlocutors explained, the non-stop, 
night-and-day duration of the vigils aimed at showcasing determination (Taylor 1997, Day & 
Goddard 2010: 142; Corsín Jiménez & Estalella 2017); and the specific location of the Place 
Vendôme was crucial in two ways. During the daytime, it targeted the Minister of Justice, 
Christiane Taubira, who had proposed the ‘Marriage for All’ law and would encounter the 
protesters when entering or leaving the building. Les Sentinelles also remained at night, when 
the Ministry of Justice is closed and empty of bureaucrats. My Lyonnais interlocutors, several 
of whom had travelled to Paris to take part in these vigils, explained that their night-time 
presence alluded to the abstract entity of ‘Justice’, which is not only permanent, but also 
impartial and blind in its treatment of citizens over the territory of France. Through the 
spatialisation and temporalisation of this form of protest, therefore, Les Sentinelles made 
 
31 Not to be confused with Les Veilleurs, discussed in Chapter Three. 
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implicit reference to the wider, all-encompassing chronotope of French citizenship across 
territory and time (Bowen 2007). 
   A fruitful comparison can be drawn with the political form of the ronda performed by the 
Argentinean Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo from the late-1970s to the mid-2000s32. The 
Mothers established the ronda, their unending protest against the government, by circling the 
Plaza de Mayo in twos and threes in silence. Eli Thorkelson suggests that this circular form, 
later borrowed in France by the Ronde des Obstinés protest in 2006, produces political 
momentum by ‘enacting a temporal impasse’ (2016: 495; Guyer 2007) – instead of walking 
from point A to point B as a traditional manif does, they follow a circle with no beginning nor 
end. For Thorkelson, the circular demonstration of the Obstinés refuses the linear temporality 
of changes desired by the French government, and therefore desperately sustains the political 
actors’ desired futurity, which the proposed law would otherwise foreclose upon. 
   If the Argentinean Mothers or the 2006 French Obstinés tried to keep their desired future 
alive by pacing, Les Sentinelles, for their part, tried to keep a specific unwanted future from 
advening. My interlocutors explained, in 2017, that their immobility with Les Sentinelles had 
symbolised their refusal of ‘going ahead’ with legal reforms (avancer dans la réforme). In 
Thorkelson’s terms, their refusal of movement and of change can be seen to ‘foreclose on the 
foreclosure’ of their vision of time, humanity, and the law. Les Sentinelles stood to signify the 
continuation of an a-historical, universal model of the couple, the family, and the Nation 
(Robcis 2013), threatened of rupture, in their view, by same-sex marriage, medically-assisted 
procreation, and especially surrogate pregnancy. Even detractors of the Manif acknowledged 
at the time that, ‘in a world marked by the ephemeral nature of media information’, Les 
Sentinelles offered a public embodiment of sustained commitment (Béraud & Portier 2015a: 
109). 
   Les Sentinelles evade usual definitions of progressive left-wing militants whose activism 
becomes an identity as ‘experts of social change’ (‘Anonymous’ 1999), such as the ‘Soixante-
Huitard’ generation of May 1968 (Bourg 2007). Nonetheless, the participants of La Manif did 
nurture a newfound identity: not as experts in change but as gatekeepers of ‘Order’, of 
traditional beliefs and values showcased in this ‘conservative spring’ (Brustier 2014: 139). 
 
32 Bearing in mind the substantial difference between the physical violence which had been mobilised by the 
Argentinean dictatorship against the Mothers’ families, and the merely symbolic violence against the ‘order of 
the family’ denounced by Manif protesters (Taylor 1997, Day & Goddard 2010: 142). 
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   However, because this vision of long-term ‘Order’ is traditionally associated with the Right, 
it too proved susceptible to critique and backlash. Ever since the rise of televised media, right-
wing protests have attempted to resist being ‘boxed symbolically within a bourgeois 
sociology, and thereby lose the incarnation of “the real France”’ (Valence 2011: 127). In 
1998-1999, the organisers of the anti-PACS marches had insisted that demonstrators should 
come in casual clothes, and specifically ‘trainers’ (ibid.). In 2012-2013, Frigide Barjot 
masterminded the distribution of thousands of identical pink sweatshirts bearing the Manif 
logo – a cartoon family composed of a father, mother, son, and daughter – to erase visible 
social denominators. Nonetheless, a close fieldwork interlocutor described his awareness of, 
and discomfort with, intense class-based scrutiny while he took part in the silent, lined-up, 
spaced-out vigils of Les Sentinelles: 
Because we were all so spread out, it was like being alone. Especially at the start of Les 
Sentinelles, the police (les forces de l’ordre)33 would amass around us in the evenings, 
surrounding us with vans and flashing lights. ‘Forces of order’! as if we weren’t already 
in order, in our little lines34! And they outnumbered us and they were in uniform, like a 
bloc, so the only thing I could think of was the Burberry lining on the collar of my coat 
and how obvious we all were, and Agnès with her scarf35, and I hoped not too many 
people would recognise my face on TV at home. 
   Indeed, media coverage counteracted Les Sentinelles’ desired image of collective 
immutability by making use of the individualistic aspect of their distribution in spaced-out 
rows. By calling attention to recognisable items of bourgeois clothing such as silk scarves (Le 
Wita 1994: 58-59, 62-68), by interviewing individual Sentinelles and highlighting their 
personal background and motivations, the private persona of Manif participants was brought 
to the fore. Day & Goddard describe how the Argentinean Mothers’ depiction as ‘the mad 
women of the Plaza de Mayo’ declared them to be unsuited to either private or public 
responsibilities (2010: 141) – in the case of Les Sentinelles, there was no need to call them 
‘mad’. By illustrating their individual lives, the coverage overlaid the protesters’ visibility 
with a filter of particularistic, bourgeois matter limiting La Manif’s ability to symbolise the 
‘entirety’ of the French people in the public sphere. 
 
33 Police forces are called les forces de l’ordre, the ‘forces of order'. 
34 Rangs d’oignons, literally ‘onion lines’. 
35 Foulard, light – often silk – women’s scarves associated with elderly generations or with the conservative 
Catholic bourgeoisie (Le Wita 1994).  
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Manif memories #3: A Catholic protest? 
Prior to La Manif Pour Tous, only two large-scale public demonstrations had been known as 
‘Catholic protests’ – and both had been deliberate protests qua Catholics, contrary to La 
Manif. The giant ‘Free School’ demonstration (manifestation géante pour l’école libre) of 24th 
June 1984 was the first. The government intended to dissolve private confessional schools – 
most of which are Catholic36 – and huge swathes of urban and rural, upper- and lower-class, 
left- and right-wing Catholics all converged onto Paris to defend their local schools, forming 
an unprecedented procession of 850 000 to 2 million37 protesters. They secured the continued 
existence of private schools alongside the public school system – and returned home, to their 
‘invisible’ presence in the ‘background’ of the French public sphere (Oliphant 2019; Thesis 
Introduction), for fifteen years before rising again en masse to protest against the PACS on 7th 
November 1998 and 31st January 1999. In 2017, my interlocutors told me to keep an ear out 
for a key phrase, les cathos sont dans la rue, ‘Catholics are down in the streets’, as a marker 
of the paroxysmic importance of certain political events. Much like right-wing protesters tend 
to insist that they represent the ‘real’ France by opposition with ‘progressive’ left-wing 
governments (Valence 2011), it has been argued that Catholic demonstrations evoke the 
rupture of some fundamental aspect of ‘normal’, ‘everyday’ French life and values (Fourquet 
2018: 54). 
   By breaking away from the general quiescence of Catholics on the French political scene in 
the second half of the 20th century, the rare Catholic demonstrations between the 1960s and 
2013 drew collective attention to whatever had awoken sleeping giants from their 
‘background’ longue-durée. In each case, the matter at hand concerned family: the education 
of children, and the formation of family units. In both the 1984 ‘Free School’ and 1998-99 
PACS protests, Catholics became public political actors qua Catholics in the process of 
defending the family from (what they saw as) the interference of the State. In short, it is by 
attempting to keep the family private that Catholics conversely became public political actors. 
 
36 I return to the topic of private Catholic schools in Chapter Two. 
37 As mentioned earlier, there are always two head-counts for manifestations: the head-count according to the 
police, and that according to organisers (Denigot 2011). Here, even the official, police-issued head-count of 
850,000 protesters was record-breaking. 
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   The same dynamic occurred in 2013, despite La Manif’s aspirational self-representation as 
an a-confessional, universalist protest. In this case, the label of ‘Catholicism’ was imposed 
externally instead of being foregrounded by the protesters themselves – but once again, the 
‘public Catholicism’ of the protest hinged on the central place of the private family. One 
event in particular crystallised the shift from depictions of the Manif as a ‘bourgeois’ protest, 
to depictions of the Manif as a crucially Catholic one. 
   This event was once again the intrusion by the far-right Printemps Français onto the 
Avenue des Champs-Élysées, described earlier. In addition to drawing attention to the 
disorderly ‘excesses’ (débordements) of the protest, it prompted particular media focus onto 
the presence of children at the Manif. In a video which went viral online, a protester can be 
heard attracting children to the Champs-Élysées, where they were met by riot police and tear 
gas. ‘We’re taking the kids to the front!’, he shouts, in an unwitting and twisted parody of the 
longstanding watchword of ‘children first’ in French debates around same-sex parenthood 
(Bloche & Pécresse 2006; Cousseau 2013). These protesters were lambasted in the press, 
characterised not only as a ‘danger to public order’ but also as ‘highly naïve’ individuals, 
whose headstrong fixation on the Champs-Élysées was ‘unsurprising’ proof of their lack of 
tactical and political experience (Clanché 2014: 53). After the uproar over the 
instrumentalisation of children on the front lines of the Champs-Élysées, media commentators 
drew attention to children as a matter of course. ‘They show up with their eight kids!’, was a 
common exclamation and press title (Brustier 2014: 49), and one which my interlocutors still 
recalled angrily in 2017. 
   Indeed, this coverage discursively embedded Manif protesters within the sociology of large 
Catholic families, whose ‘eight kids’ index a religiously-motivated refusal of contraception38. 
In other words, by focusing not only on children but on ‘eight’ of them, the media coverage 
operated a subtle shift from highlighting the Catholic culture of protesters – conservative and 
bourgeois, visible in their clothing – to indexing Catholic faith properly speaking (cf. 
Oliphant 2015). Against protesters’ efforts to present themselves as a ‘moral majority’ 
through the use of Republican and right-wing symbols of order, visible signs of strict 
doctrinal observance recast them as a ‘religious minority’ (Favret-Saada 2017). My Lyonnais 
interlocutors who remembered these incendiary press titles  
 
38 References to conservative sexual morals have also been used to question the Republican integration of 
French Muslims (Bowen 2007: 208-241; Fernando 2014: 185-220). 
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were particularly alert about this move because it served to disaggregate Catholics from each 
other as well. They recalled debating, with friends and family, whether any of them were 
protesting as Catholics (en catholiques, Maritain 1927), that is, whether they squarely placed 
faith and doctrine at the foundation of their political participation. Most of my Lyonnais 
interlocutors did not consider their opposition to same-sex marriage to be a doctrinal one, 
although a few did – but, as one woman put it, she resented that discussions among her 
friends had turned to question ‘what of kind of Catholics are we’, as opposed to ‘what kind of 
citizens’. 
 
Conclusion: ‘Matter out of place’? A secular stalemate. 
Anthropologists of France have long argued that religious presences in the French public 
sphere highlight the points of friction in the public-private binary, a key element of the French 
notion of secularism or laïcité (Asad 2006b; Bowen 2007). Nominally, political and religious 
powers are respectively assigned to the public sphere of laïcité and to the private sphere of 
individual sovereignty. However, rather than being a clear-cut domain, ‘the public’ is 
polysemic, and somewhat ubiquitous. ‘The public’ ‘has to do with the State’ (Bowen 2007 : 
14) – therefore administrative buildings, State-sponsored schools, and the staff thereof are 
‘public’ – but it also refers to the visibility and accessibility of ‘public spaces’ like streets or 
parks (ibid.). Because these diverse definitions of ‘the public’ intersect awkwardly, Talal 
Asad has shown that the Republic, far from never ‘recognising’ religion, instead obtains 
power over the exercise of religious activity within what it chooses to consider ‘public’. For 
example, the 2004 ‘affair of the veil’ has been presented by French government officials as an 
attempt to protect the guiding Republican value of (gender) equality in the ‘public’ space of 
schools (Iteanu 2013; Fernando 2014). In this perspective, legal steps taken to remove 
religious signs from the public sphere are but one case, among others, of the Republican 
readiness to restrict fundamental individual rights for the sake of the primacy of ‘public order’ 
(Gervier 2014; Boyer 2005). 
   In March 2013, by calling attention to the protesters’ large families with ‘eight children’, 
the media were therefore tapping into a longer history of considering religion as an irruption 
of ‘private matter’. From a Republican standpoint, the question in such cases is whether the 
irruptive matter can be shifted back into the private sphere at all, in order to return the public 
sphere to its protected, universalist, Republican character (Boyer 2005). Asad makes the case 
that Islamic veils have been considered ‘displaceable’ religious signs in this way: insofar as 
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they are wearables, a 2004 governmental ruling decreed that headscarves are indeed ‘signs’ 
which can be removed without threatening the faith of Muslim women (Asad 2006b: 96). 
This application of laïcité was underpinned by a particular definition of faith: a Christian, and 
more specifically post-Reformation, understanding of religion as an internal, individual 
practice (Asad 1993). From this39 Republican perspective, ‘public order’ is restored when 
Muslim girls and women leave their headscarves in the private sphere and go forth into public 
spaces unveiled, without any ostentatious sign of their faith. However, John Bowen has 
shown that a number of French Muslim women have argued that headscarves are not a ‘sign’ 
but, to the contrary, an integral part of their religious identity (2007: 187) – and therefore that 
their ‘whole’ selves, headscarf included, ought to have full access to citizenship and visibility 
in the public sphere. While Bowen points out that this stance was not shared universally 
among French Muslims in the early-2000s, the point remains that a ‘Republican’ narrative can 
be employed to make a case for the inclusion of visible markers of religion as part of an 
integral public identity, against the arbitrary consideration that Muslim women are equally 
‘whole’ citizens without their scarves. 
   But this was not part of my Lyonnais interlocutors’ own political project. The conception of 
faith held by my Catholic interlocutors coincides with the post-Reformation understanding of 
‘internal’ belief which, Asad has argued, allows the assumption that religion can at all be held 
separate and private (2003). Frigide/Virginie addresses this head-on in the autobiographies 
she devoted to her experience of La Manif: despite her public proclamations of her faith in the 
past, she has always ‘[envisaged] no other definition of faith than an individualist one’ 
(Tellenne 2014: 121; 2015). As far as Virginie and my other Catholic interlocutors in 2017 
were concerned, the seat of their Catholic identity was internal; their faith was a personal 
matter which could not be ‘seen’ from the outside if they did not choose for it to be.  
   From their perspective, their faith was therefore entirely compatible with the secular public 
sphere: it could remain ‘private’ even as they participated publicly as political agents. It is for 
this reason that Pierre-Marie Delorme, introduced earlier in this chapter, found Muslim 
leaders’ explicit references to faith-based motivations so distateful and so politically 
unskilled: in his own view, faith is something one chooses to show, not something one has to 
show, especially in the public sphere. The apocryphal ‘eight children’ were, by the same 
 
39 It is worth restating here that ‘Republicanim’ can be used to support multiple stances, and there is no such 
thing as a single Republican perspective (Bowen 2007: 11-13). 
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token, a particularly effective symbolic weapon on the part of Manif detractors: they were a 
visible, non-‘displaceable’ ‘sign’ (Asad 2006b) of Catholicism as a faithful minority rather 
than as a cultural ‘moral majority’ (Favret-Saada 2017). Insofar as the ‘eight’ children 
indexed religious observance, they could be wielded symbolically to portray the protest as 
‘matter out of place’ (Douglas 1966) in the secular Republican public sphere. My 
interlocutors in Lyon, especially the younger ones who had never participated in politics 
before, recalled this symbolic battle, and the loss of control over their own public image, as an 
unexpectedly painful experience. 
   But notwithstanding the understandably negative affect shared by my Lyonnais 
interlocutors who had felt unjustly thwarted in their public participation as citizens, the 
overall picture painted by these retrospective accounts of La Manif is one in which 
conservative French Catholics appear on the public scene as undeniable agents. Their ability 
to discursively wield Republican narratives, to symbolically draw on long-term histories of 
the French nation, and to deliberately modulate their ‘visible’ persona in the public sphere, 
resulted in a massively-mediated protest gathering above a million participants (or arguably 
300 000), which successfully influenced the law insofar as several clauses widening access to 
reproductive technologies were struck from the draft for the time being. The contestations 
about the legitimacy of Manif protesters in the public sphere took place on the level of 
symbols – not of law, as during the ‘affair of the veil’ which resulted in the tangible, 
enforceable ban of headscarves on the basis that they were private ‘matter out of place’ in the 
public setting of schools (Asad 2006b). 
   In fact, many of the incidents which spurred passionate public debate over the course of the 
six months of La Manif Pour Tous came down to deliberate provocations on the part of the 
far-right fringes of the movement. The Front National, and the far-right Manif offshoot called 
Le Printemps Français (the ‘French Spring’), promote an ethnonationalist vision of the 
French nation-state and dispute the civic nationalism which underpins the Republic (Stolcke 
1995). In this sense, the events which were pointed out in the press as ‘risks’ to public order 
had been carried out wilfully by anti-Republican demonstrators (Cousseau 2013; Clanché 
2014: 53); while the remainder of the manifestation proved relatively unimpeachable and 
symbolically associated itself with several modes of ‘French order’ in compelling ways.  
   These representations of ‘French order’ and of the ‘whole’ France did not rely on religious 
narratives themselves. In this sense, Jeanne Favret-Saada’s (2017) binary description of 
French Catholics’ shift in status from the French ‘moral majority’ to an ‘offended religious 
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minority’ in the final decades of the 20th century can be inflected: conservative French 
Catholics, during La Manif, were still able to self-portray as a ‘moral majority’, albeit an 
(equivocally) ‘secular’ one. The long-term narrative of right-wing French ‘Order’, ultimately, 
yielded secular affordances which left-wing Catholics quite possibly would not have been 
able to claim – to this extent, analyses of the asymmetrical ways in which French laïcité 
intersects with different religious traditions and communities (Bowen 2007; Iteanu 2013; 
Fernando 2014) can be further complicated by attending to the multivalent political factions 
within those traditions as well. 
   Although many of my own interlocutors from the Lyonnais cathosphère knew Front 
National voters, in their families or friendship groups, they were for the most part40 affiliated 
with conservative but Republican right-wing parties themselves. From their perspective, their 
efforts to curate the world of the nation-state ‘as’ Catholics entailed two compatible premises: 
keeping their private faith private, and respecting the secular nature of the public sphere more 
broadly. The combination of the two required managing, as best they could – and this chapter 
has shown that this was neither always easy nor always successful – the extent to which they 
could be labelled qua Catholics. In the process of defending their vision of the family during 
La Manif Pour Tous, they had therefore occupied ambiguous, but politically efficacious, 
positions which were ‘Not Private and Not Not Private’, to paraphrase Rane Willerslev (2004) 
– and also ‘Not Catholic and Not Not Catholic’, ‘Not Secular and Not Not Secular’. One 
identity only was entirely unambiguous, in their minds or in the public eye of the press: they 
were French. 
   In the next chapter, I continue the exploration of conservative French Catholics’ place in the 
nation-state, this time focusing more directly on the question of this cultural and national(ist) 
evocation of Frenchness. Beforehand, however, one final vignette showcases the fact that 
conservative French Catholics’ aspirational constitution as a ‘political force’ proved as 
problematic in the private sphere in 2017, as it had done on the public stage in 2013. 
 
 
40 The association explored in Part Two, Les AlterCathos, differ in this respect, as I discuss in Chapter Three. 
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Coda.  
Problematic politics at home: An ‘apartment meeting’ 
A few weeks after arriving in Lyon, I am invited to a political meeting hosted by Pierre-Marie 
Delorme and his brother Thomas, held in the living room of Pierre-Marie and his wife 
Priscille’s home. 
   Unsure of the etiquette of this event – Virginie called it un meeting d’appartement, an 
‘apartment meeting’, which I figure to be an abstract concept since this is patently not a block 
of flats – I hover at 7.30pm on the doorstep of the large, elegant house in the heights above 
the River Saône, in the upmarket north-west of Lyon. Before I can knock, a slight but smiling 
elderly woman opens the door and props it open with a cast-iron umbrella stand. ‘Priscille is 
in the kitchen,’ she says, ‘so I’ll play hostess – come in, have we met?’ I introduce myself and 
my research project, quickly mentioning that I have been invited by Virginie – my hostess is 
surprised, but makes no comment, and directs me to Virginie herself, who is setting up a 
projector and screen in a well-proportioned sitting/living room covering most of the ground 
floor of the house. I make my way towards her, weaving between refined armchairs and 
delicate end-tables interspersed with fold-away wooden chairs which must have been added 
specifically for this event. 
   The chairs catch my attention because they elicit a very different atmosphere from that of 
the municipal rooms where I have already seen several of Virginie’s presentations. In the 
rented municipal rooms, we sit on plastic chairs – at the end of each evening, I fold them, 
stack them, and carry them into a storage room, with the other items provided by the 
municipality to the various users of the space. The folding plastic chairs are ubiquitous to 
French neighbourhood halls; a sign that although our presence is temporary, it joins a long 
line of other short-term public events, including other conferences and political gatherings. 
We are momentarily part of a longer tradition of debate, but the audience is simply an 
audience, and tomorrow the chairs might seat the spectators of a sporting event. At the 
Delormes’, however, the folding chairs are much nicer, with wooden slats, and clearly rented 
from a caterer – the wooden folding seats interspersed between the Louis XV armchairs give 
the still-empty room a unique, ‘one-off’ feeling, more akin to the wedding Priscille might one 
day host at home for her daughter. It strikes me then that I do not yet know the Delorme 
brothers very well, and Priscille even less, but I am a family guest here, not a stanger or a 
spectator like in the municipal halls. 
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   When I reach Virginie and greet her, she points with a nod of her head towards my elderly 
hostess, who has retreated back to the front door. Virginie whispers: ‘That’s Madame 
Delorme, Thomas and Pierre-Marie’s mother, but she was born a Blanc-Gérin, you know, 
she’s one of the younger sisters’. 
   Although the name itself rings no bells, the tone used to mention it alerts me. ‘Les grandes 
familles lyonnaises’, the great Lyonnais families, are a series of dynastic families who rose to 
prominence during Lyon’s industrial expansion – like me, most Lyonnais inhabitants would 
recognise the implication of being ‘one of the younger sisters’ of one such family, while 
remaining in the dark about the exact names, relationships, and responsibilities of these 
members of the haute bourgeoisie. 
   The audience for the evening, clustering on the terrace with a glass of red wine and a 
cigarette, all seem to know each other, and are introduced to me as members of the wider 
Delorme family, current work colleagues, or long-time family acquaintances and business 
partners. Some are the directors of large local companies (les grands patrons41), and a few are 
elected officials serving as municipal or regional delegates for various right-wing parties. 
Most are in their thirties, forties and early fifties, with the exception of the older parents of 
Thomas and Pierre-Marie. There is also the brothers’ grandfather, a diminutive, shrunken 
presence whose wheelchair has been positioned in a ray of sun on the terrace, turning his 
wispy hair into a glowing halo. 
   My presence is accepted gracefully despite the private nature of the event – several 
participants nevertheless verify that I am not an undercover journalist. ‘You’re not with 
Médiapart?’, I am asked a few times, and hasten to confirm that my anthropological project is 
in no way affiliated with the notorious left-wing investigative magazine. This suspicion, 
which at first I take for humour and, upon being asked again, start taking more seriously, is 
mirrored when the meeting starts for good. 
   As the guests troop into the living room, Priscille Delorme calls for someone at the back to 
close the French windows. ‘We’re all catho, here, we can speak frankly,’ Virginie offers as an 
opening gambit. The audience rustles. ‘Well you see what I mean, we’re not going to hide our 
 
41 Les grands patrons are the directors or ‘great bosses’ of the grandes familles’ traditional companies or their 
offshoots. Often this label distinguishes them from the rest of the local business leaders, some of whom wield 
more local economic power but are not part of these traditional dynasties. 
 71 
faces42 here,’ she paces the small cleared area in front of the room, ‘we all did La Manif and 
we all want to make sure the election goes our way’. But her audience resists, muttering and 
shifting in their seats. I am surprised by the unease physically displayed by the audience – 
especially by contrast with their camaraderie minutes earlier over appetizers and drinks. It is 
also a wholly different reaction from the apathy exhibited by the smattering of attendees a few 
weeks earlier, when Virginie screened the same PowerPoint at a municipal hall. This 
audience’s response makes Virginie’s claims, for all that they are obviously true, seem brash 
and inappropriate, although I cannot at first understand why – if anything, it seems to me that 
Virginie’s attempts to unite the room into a common purpose should have far more traction in 
this context, where the guests are already linked by familial and business ties. However, the 
acknowledgement of these pre-existing relationships, re-framed by Virginie into a politicised 
‘we cathos’ purpose, elicits a tension which was not felt in other, more public settings. 
   At the back of the room, the Grandfather Delorme grumbles: ‘Your biological filiation thing 
is all well and good, but can you guarantee that if I vote Fillon in the first round, and then if 
he wins the second round, he’ll abrogate the gay mariage law, and also the abortion law?’ The 
tension ratchets further, but is now turned inward on the Grandfather rather than on Virginie. 
The young woman next to me, otherwise rigidly polite, coughs out an insult at the 
Grandfather under her breath; and this finally clarifies what is bothering the audience.  
   The issue lies with Virginie’s grandiloquent insistence on all Catholics as a single political 
lobby. It is unclear whether she is attempting to call forth a doctrinal, pious unity ‘as’ 
Catholics, suggesting that there is only one way to vote as Catholics – something her 
audience would dispute – or whether her purpose is more performative, in which case her 
audience considers that their public image qua Catholics is not hers to collate, and their vote 
is not hers to dictate. There are deep-rooted divisions between French Catholics, including 
among spheres which might appear relatively closely grouped on the right-wing and far-right 
spectrum. Specifically, only a minority of Catholics, the most intransigent fringe of far-right 
‘Identitarian’43 movements, still insist on the abrogation of the Loi Veil allowing abortion. 
The Grandfather Delorme is clearly of this persuasion; and looking around the room, I start to 
recognise a handful of political figures who had, in March 2013, been associated with 
 
42 ‘Oui enfin vous voyez ce que je veux dire! On va pas se voiler la face ici’. The expression se voiler la face 
means being deliberately obtuse, but literally evokes someone veiling or hiding their own face. 
43 I return to the topic of ‘identitarianism’ in Chapter Two. 
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Béatrice Bourges’ far-right breakaway movement, Le Printemps Français, as well as its even 
more radically identitarian pro-life offshoot Les Survivants (‘the Survivors’).  
   But it seems that a large proportion of the audience is not comfortable with this stance. By 
piping up at this juncture, the Grandfather Delorme has highlighted the central issue: French 
Catholics have never coalesced into a community of opinion – one which might draw on its 
faith as Catholics for sine qua non conditions (such as, here, ‘natural’ filiation) transcending 
the usual political considerations of social and economic policy or foreign affairs. Remarks 
such as the Grandfather Delorme’s occurred during the public versions of Virginie’s talks as 
well, but in municipal halls, the rejection of those comments simply involved a dissociation of 
strangers – ‘Oh! non, you go too far!’, other audience members would cry. At the Delormes’, 
the borderline-identitarian interjection occurred in front of friends and family. The difficulty 
of politely taking distance from a distateful point of view expressed by one’s elderly host 
reinforced the sentiment of inextricable relatedness of all parties involved. It undercut 
audience members’ clear wish to disavow the very notion of political homogeneity among 




















French Culture Générale, Integration or Integralism? 




This chapter addresses the French Catholic bourgeoisie’s efforts to protect the transmission of 
French culture générale, or ‘general culture’, through networks of philosophical conference 
centres. It argues that the Catholic élite who attend these conferences see themselves as 
preventing the ‘death’ of ‘French culture’, and maintaining its Christian ‘roots’, not for their 
own sake but for the sake of the entire French people – despite finding themselves at odds, in 
this respect, with governmental and Republican conceptions of culture and the nation. A 
contribution to anthropological discussions of ‘cultural Catholicism’ and a complementary 
angle into the longstanding question of French Republicanism, this chapter concludes the 
argument of Part One of this thesis: by focusing on the domain of national culture, it shows 
how Catholics in Republican France negotiate the paradoxical situation of being marginal in 
some respects and yet able to claim that they are the ‘real France’. 
 
Introduction 
‘Le Collège Supérieur’ and ‘Les Alternatives Catholiques’ are two Lyon-based conference 
centres. Their logos share an aesthetic: founded in 1999, Le Collège Supérieur is represented 
by a line drawing of a woman’s head and shoulders, red on a white background. In a few bold 
penstrokes reminiscent of post-Impressionism, the logo sketches an allegory of sophía, or 
theoretical wisdom: the woman’s long nose and straight brows evoke Greek statuary, her hair 
is only hinted at by a few short curls which could equally be laurels, and her hands, free-
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floating near the line of her neck and shoulders, hold up to her face a pen and a sheaf of paper. 
Les Alternatives Catholiques, for their part, have two logos, both of which echo this theme. 
Their first logo dates back to their creation in 2011; it is a line drawing in the same style, 
outlining the silhouette of Auguste Rodin’s Thinker – in orange on a white background, or 
white on an orange background, variably. The second, additional logo was introduced in 
2016, when Les Alternatives Catholiques inaugurated a new space in which to host their 
conferences: this logo is based on a black-and-white photograph rather than a sketch, but it 
reprises the image of a woman’s head and shoulders. Her main features are her short, curly 
bob of hair, round glasses, and half-smile as she glances to the left of the logo, encircled in a 
bold yellow frame. Rather than an allegory, this woman is identifiable as Simone Weil, a 
French philosopher whose main work was completed in the 1930s and early-40s: she is the 
namesake of Le Simone, the café-cum-conference-centre run by Les AlterCathos in which I 
conducted the majority of my fieldwork throughout 2017.  
   All three logos signal that Le Collège Supérieur and Les Alternatives Catholiques are 
centrally concerned with philosophy; and tie together two conference centres whose names 
would otherwise indicate no relation. The name ‘Alternatives Catholiques’ does not carry any 
implicit symbolism and can be straightforwardly translated as ‘Catholic Alternatives’ – 
straightforward with the caveat that it is unclear, from their name, how Les AlterCathos are 
alternative or to what. On the other hand, there is a wealth of complex allusions in the name 
‘Collège Supérieur’. In everyday speech, the word collège means secondary school, from 
ages 11 to 15, but a capitalized Collège refers more archaically to a collegial gathering of 
peers, and to elite higher education and research institutes such as the Collège de France in 
Paris. The superlative ‘supérieur’ doubles down on this educational connotation: as a noun, 
‘le supérieur’ designates higher education as a whole, and the adjective ‘supérieur/e’ is 
included in the names of the most elite publicly-funded higher education institutes in France, 
such as the archetypal École Normale Supérieure. Our two conference centres are united in 
their philosophical logos, but divergent in their names: one strongly aligns itself with the elite, 
national, and therefore secular French education system, while the other asserts its Catholic 
roots and claims to offer an alternative to something – possibly to a long-term and well-
established tradition such as the one professed by the former. 
   Les AlterCathos will be the core ethnographic focus of Part Two of this thesis, but they 
feature peripherally in this chapter insofar that they are rooted, along with Le Collège 
Supérieur, in a single, expansive network of conference centres run by the intellectual and 
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educational leaders of the Lyonnais Catholic bourgeoisie. ‘Conference-going’ is a common 
practice among what is known as la cathosphère lyonnaise – my ‘field’, a diffuse population 
definable primarily by its ties to an interlocking grid of private Catholic schools (Caille 2017: 
179-181; Association diocésaine de Lyon 2017). 
   The content of these conferences is advertised as philosophical in style and concerned with 
topics of ‘general culture’. Practically-speaking, la culture générale refers to the broad 
swathes of history, literature, art, popular sciences, and politics which would be included 
under the umbrella of ‘general knowledge’ in the English language. But as I will detail below, 
in the French context la culture générale also carries the sociological inferences of ‘high 
culture’ along with the political implications of ‘national culture’ (Durkheim 1895: 126). 
Inherited from the Humanist perspective on education (Rabelais 1955 [1534]) and reinforced 
after the Revolution, la culture générale is still a key aspect of French education – it is, for 
instance, the object of specific entrance or final examinations for some higher-education 
institutions44 – as well as French public life. ‘Cultural’ talkshows on television or on radio are 
as ubiquitous as ‘philosophy’ magazines and the figure of the public intellectual: if ‘general 
culture’ is a content, its usual frame is the particularly French paradigm of philosophy, which 
refers less to the disciplinary application of logic, metaphysics, or morals (Durkheim 1895: 
125) than to the figure of the philosopher as an urbane, free-thinking, academic-cum-popular 
intellectual (Bourdieu 2010 [1984]: 498; Fabiani 2010: 32, 43-90).  
   Like La Manif Pour Tous, explored in Chapter One, conference centres run by Catholic 
intellectuals and concerned with national ‘general culture’ cross-cut public and private 
concerns (Asad 2006b) – they invoke both the secular, Republican conception of ‘the nation’, 
and the contested place of French Catholics in its constitution. With reference to the Parisian 
Collège des Bernardins, Elayne Oliphant has argued that French Catholics’ conference 
centres are not ‘simply’ religious spaces, but are more intricately presented as public spaces 
of culture and sociality (2015). In this chapter, I will go further to argue that by virtue of their 
concern for ‘general culture’ and philosophy, French Catholics’ conference centres serve 
epistemic projects with political implications. I will show that by addressing French ‘general 
culture’ as essential knowledge, but knowledge which the state-run National Education 
 
44 Until June 2013, for instance, SciencesPo Paris required prospective students to sit a ‘general culture’ 
selection exam. 
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system fails to fully provide, conferences hosted by conservative, bourgeois Lyonnais lead 
them to confront what they see as inadequacies in the government’s nation-building efforts.  
   The stakes of this contestation over ‘general culture’ are hightened in the contemporary 
public climate of France, which has been marked by a fear of religious communalism 
(communautarisme) since the early-2000s (Bowen 2007). French Catholics had not been the 
primary target of this national worry – and indeed they still receive less public scrutiny than 
French Muslims (Fernando 2014) – but their public visibility during La Manif Pour Tous in 
2013 raised the spectre of putative Catholic ‘identitarianism’ or ‘integralism’ (Holmes 2000). 
The underlying questions – Do conservative French Catholics think of their Catholicism as a 
more fundamental identity than their French-ness? Do they imagine themselves to be in any 
way separate from the Nation? – are critical in the French Republican context, as Mayanthi 
Fernando has shown with reference to the ‘Muslim French’ (2014: 13). 
   In this chapter, I therefore aim to explore the ‘epistemic and social bodies’ (Corsín Jiménez 
& Estalella 2017: 112) which are practically and discursively constituted in the space of 
Catholic conferences on ‘general culture’. I understand the phrase ‘epistemic and social 
bodies’ – used by Alberto Corsín Jiménez and Adolfo Estalella to describe the 2011 Occupy 
movement in Madrid – to index a more complex variation of the analytical theme of 
‘imagined communities’ initially developed by Benedict Anderson to address the rise of 
nationalism (1983). Like ‘imagined communities’, ‘epistemic and social bodies’ are imagined 
conceptions of (real constructions of) collective identity and belonging; but the phrase itself – 
‘epistemic and social’ – calls attention to the contingent justifications and arguments which 
underlie the ‘imagination’ of these bodies. It also indexes the self-reflexive aspect of this 
constitution as a community: the Madrilene Occupy protesters described by Corsín Jiménez 
and Estalella know they are forming a new social body, and are aware of its political valence. 
   In Chapter One, I showed that conservative French Catholics draw in complex ways on 
symbolic evocations of French ‘order’ so as to represent themselves as embodiments of the 
‘real’ or ‘whole’ France. This was already a case of discursive and aspirational construction 
of the ‘epistemic and social body’ of conservative French Catholics; imagined to be broadly 
coterminous with the community of the entire French nation. In this chapter, the intellectual 
setting of the philosophical conferences renders these constructions even more self-conscious. 
As I will show below, the conferences are ‘prescribed spaces for coming together’ (Brown et 
al 2017: 10) which offer a ‘window into complexity’ (Candea 2007: 179) on my conservative 
Catholic interlocutors’ conceptions of the French Nation, and of themselves as a cathosphère. 
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   I will argue that, in the space of the conference centres and over the course of the 
philosophical conferences, highly-educated bourgeois Catholics both mediate the presence of 
the cathosphère as a ‘Catholic’ cultural world (Oliphant 2015), and aspirationally claim to 
defend the ‘whole’ of ‘French culture’. The two endeavours are not seamlessly compatible, as 
I will show, and Catholic intellectuals must engage with competing interpretations of ‘French 
culture’ articulated by the government in the context of its National Education curricula. 
Overall, I will argue that conservative French Catholics ‘square the circle’ of their dual 
cultural aspiration to ‘Christian roots’ and ‘Frenchness’ through a unifying discourse of 
‘rootedness’ and ‘transmission’ – two modes through which they can (continue to) curate the 
world of French ‘high culture’. 
   A note on structure: This chapter emerges in a traditional French form of academic 
argument, the plan dialectique en trois parties (‘dialectical plan in three parts’). This was not 
a conscious choice while drafting this chapter, and it has not oriented its claims: instead, it is 
at later stages of editing that it appeared, post-hoc, that the argument held a subjacent 
dialectical tension. The plan en trois parties is well-known to all French high-school and 
higher education students: a central question, the problématique, is addressed by confronting 
two contraposed stances, the thèse (an initial ‘thesis’ or theory) and the antithèse, its seeming 
opposite. The stages of the thèse and antithèse progressively reveal the stakes of the initial 
problem, and contribute elements of resolution even as they show the limits of this overly-
categorical binary confrontation. The final stage of the structure is the synthèse: by shifting 
perspectives, this ‘synthesis’ both answers the original problématique and aims to go beyond 
it. Having once been a French high-schooler myself, I find it hard to escape the plan en trois 
parties – it is ingrained in my analytical outlook, and I usually endeavour to mitigate its 
influence on my work. In this case, however, there are two reasons which, from an 
anthropological perspective, prompted me to render this structure apparent after I noticed it 
lurking in the background of the draft. The first is methodological: our field does not shy 
away from ‘both... and’ arguments (Benedict 1946: 2) insofar as they reveal ethnographic 
complexity. The second reason is, precisely, ethnographic. A defining feature of my fieldwork 
among highly-educated, bourgeois Lyonnais Catholics was the prevalence of academic 
debate, intellectual discussion, and argumentative writing in the field, as my interlocutors 
reflexively thought about their actions in the world, and thought about their thoughts 
(Foucault 1997: 117; Laidlaw 2014: 102). To the extent that this chapter structure can offer a 
glimpse into the way that my interlocutors habitually construct their arguments, it is, even if 
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only allusively, an ethnographic nugget in and of itself within a chapter devoted to French 
Catholic intellectuals’ conferences. 
 
I. Thèse: Catholic conferences mediate a particularly Catholic world 
 
 I.1 The stakes of ‘Christian roots’ 
There has been a significant rise, since the year 2013, of discussions about Catholicism as an 
‘identity’ (Mayblin et al 2017: 18) in the literary publications and quotidian debates held by 
French Catholics in and beyond my ‘field’ of the Lyonnais cathosphère. Catholic solicitor-
turned-journalist Erwan Le Morhedec45 (2017), a public figure whose editorials are followed 
closely by my Lyonnais interlocutors, points out that the contemporary focus on Catholicism 
as an ‘identity’ contrasts with the internal debates between French Catholics prior to La Manif 
Pour Tous: those focused mainly on whether extreme or fundamentalist Catholic fringes 
‘count’ as Catholic, defining the ‘boundaries’ of Catholicism by deliberating in theological 
and faith-centred terms. By contrast, since the controversy over whether La Manif Pour Tous 
could legitimately be labelled ‘Catholic’ by external commentators in the government and 
media, Catholic authors and thinkers – and the audiences who follow their work – have had to 
grapple internally with the question of whether ‘Catholic’ should be a defining sociocultural 
identity, and if so, what its core features ought to be (ibid.; Cuchet 2018; de Plunkett 2018; 
Chapter One). 
   Le Morhedec’s own contribution to this debate, largely relayed among my interlocutors, is a 
warning: in attempting to define the core values and traditions of a singular Catholic 
‘identity’, he fears, segments of the French Catholic population risk veering into 
‘identitarianism’ (l’identitarisme), which is the sort of ideological community-building that 
provokes moral panic on the French public stage – as evidenced by regular outcries over the 
alleged Muslim Islamosphère, or the far-right fachosphère. Indeed, a number of books 
published by Catholic authors46 during this period question the relationship that Catholics 
ought to have with France and the Republic. 
 
45 Not anonymised here. 
46 As mentioned in the Thesis Introduction, many of my Lyonnais interlocutors are published authors and public 
figures. It is therefore difficult to discuss their work while guaranteeing their anonymity. As a result, I do not 
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   One volume, for example, is illustrated with a church spire topped by a weathervane shaped 
like a Gallic rooster, and is titled ‘French Christians or Christian Frenchmen?’47 (Polony, 
Hadjadj & Préaux 2017). Another book, entitled L’âme de fond – a pun on ‘deep soul’ and 
‘groundswell’ (lame de fond) – has a starker white cover, with a simple red-white-and-blue 
ribbon reminiscent of mayors’ tricolore scarves. The blurb on the back cover, more 
imperative than truly questioning, asks: ‘Are not the stakes, nowadays, to re-enchant the soul 
of France by awakening its religious subconscience?’ (Souchard 2016). By evoking ‘our 
national identity, a soul which owes much to Christianity’, this book and many others call 
upon a longer term debate about the historical and cultural ‘Christian roots’ of France and 
Europe. 
   The question of ‘Christian roots’ garnered public interest in 2000 when a reference to the 
‘religious’ inheritance of Europe was removed from the draft of the Charter of fundamental 
rights of the European Union48 under the influence of the French Prime Minister; a move 
which puzzled Christians throughout Europe and angered a number of French Catholics 
(Leclerc 23/12/2000; Raison du Cleuziou 2017: 188). At the same time as French politicians 
were combatting references to ‘Christian roots’ on the basis of European secular democracy 
(Kerry 2007), far-right Identitaires (‘Identitarian’) activists within France were employing the 
same terms to demand immigration control and cultural arbitration on the basis of an alleged 
ethnocultural French identity (Cahuzac & François 2013: 284; François 2017). In these far-
right discourses, the narrative of the ‘Christian roots of France’ was rarely used to promote 
Catholicism, but rather served as a way to reject Islam – such as when Front National leader 
Marine Le Pen judged, in 2009, that Islam not only threatened French secularism, but also did 
not participate, like Judaeo-Christian religions, to the ‘identity of France’ (Mestre & Monnot 
 
attempt to clarify here who among the authors cited are close interlocutors, more distant figures in my field, 
‘second-degree’ acquaintances of my own interlocutors, or simply public figures whose work I have heard 
discussed. However, I do not cite any authors who fall ‘further afield’ than these four categories – i.e. public 
figures whose work I have not heard explicitly discussed in Lyon. 
47 Chrétiens français ou français chrétiens. This interrogation echoes Mayanthi Fernando’s reference to her 
interlocutors as ‘Muslim French’ – ‘women and men committed to practicing Islam as French citizens and to 
practicing French citizenship as pious Muslims’ (2014: 13) – rather than ‘French Muslims’, a term which 
indexes a much wider population with significant internal divergences. 
48 Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union, 2000, available online:  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf 
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01/12/2009). To my Lyonnais interlocutors across the board, the far-right’s narrative was 
extreme – but equally extreme, to their mind, was the secularized stance taken by French 
governmental representatives on the European stage, who decried references to European 
Christianity in favour of neo-Kantian liberal understandings of nation-building, whereby 
rational commitment to democratic institutions suffices to bind a people (Habermas 1998). 
What binds a people is more than that, argue all the books published by Catholic authors after 
La Manif Pour Tous – as well as the majority of the conferences addressed in this chapter – 
and has to do with history, culture, and roots. But they settle on a variety of definitions of 
what constitutes the ‘roots’ and the boundaries of the French people; a diversity which is 
already showcased in the two books mentioned above.  
   The first book questions whether ‘faith should merge with national boundaries’ (Polony et 
al 2017) and operates a distinction between the large scale of French ‘society’ and its internal 
contingent of ‘the faithful’, whose primary identities as either ‘Christian Frenchmen’ or 
‘French Christians’ are debated by its three authors. The book proceeds from a conference 
held in Paris in late 2016, and is published in the form of a round-table conversation between 
a journalist, a philosopher, and a priest, who express divergent opinions and do not claim to 
represent or speak for any wider segments of the French Catholic population. But the second 
book claims that Christianity is part of the ‘soul’ of France, and that this dormant religiosity 
must be re-awakened in order for France to become whole once more (Souchard 2016). This 
position operates a shift: instead of asking whether and to what extent the history of French 
and European Christianity forms part of a definable present-day cultural identity – as 
European lawmakers, Marine Le Pen, and the trio of authors of the first book all asked in their 
own ways – this volume is centrally concerned with the future, and with the re-
christianization of France. Its main objective is a ‘christianization of culture’, a  
‘reformulation of social relations, cultural meanings, and personal experience in terms of 
putatively Christian ideals’ (Hefner 1993: 3-4) such as that described in the anthropology of 
Pentacostal and Evangelical communities across the world (Marshall 2009; Elisha 2011).  
   But whereas the ‘christianization of culture’ operated for example in Tennessee by 
Evangelical megachurches starts with individual moral commitments and progresses through 
an expanding evangelisation of adjacent communities – ‘They all aimed to become better 
Christians through social outreach, to make other churchgoers better Christians through 
outreach mobilization, and to spread the gospel by “sharing the love of Christ” with cultural 
strangers and disadvantaged people’ (Elisha 2011: 119) – the call to ‘re-enchant the soul of 
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France by awakening its religious subconscience’ (Souchard 2016) is more concerned with its 
in-built national scale than with individual believers. Its call is not so much to become ‘better 
Christians’ as ‘better Frenchmen’. The place of personal faith in such debates must therefore 
be questioned rather than taken for granted: even in explicit calls for a ‘re-christianization’ of 
France, it is never obvious whether ‘Christianity’ primarily indexes faith or, more widely, a 
set of social values and cultural references which are seen to be tied to this faith in one way or 
another (Mayblin et al 2017: 18). 
   The stakes of contemporary discourses about ‘Christian roots’ held among French Catholics 
are therefore both ‘epistemic’ – do they entail a ‘christianization’ in a spiritual, cultural, 
and/or discursive sense? – and ‘social’ (cf. Corsín Jiménez & Estalella 2017): do they concern 
‘French Catholics’ considered as a bounded, separat(ist) ‘religious minority’ (Favret-Saada 
2017) or are they imagined to entail larger scales, such as French society at large? 
 
 I.2 Catholic schools and Catholic conference centres 
The Catholic conferencing scene in Lyon is an extension of the broader French form of 
‘conferencing’ – the lexicon for these ‘prescribed spaces for coming together’ (Brown et al 
2017: 10) is the following. If a ‘conference’ in English often brings to mind a lengthy event 
involving several panels or talks, and perhaps lasting several days, une conférence in French 
simply refers to an hour-long or ninety-minute public talk given to an unparticipating 
audience. A ‘conference’ may be given by a single individual, or by a panel of representatives 
from a same association; a ‘round table’ (table ronde) designates a panel of speakers from a 
variety of provenances; and finally a ‘debate’ (débat) has the same format49 as a ‘round table’, 
but the name forewarns the audience of the more controversial nature of the themes under 
discussion. The whole genre, including round tables and debates, is most often simply 
referred to as ‘conferences’, or the shorthand conf’. A ‘conference cycle’ (un cycle de 
conférences) indicates that several talks, most often spread out over weekly or bi-weekly 
intervals, are united by a common theme. A ‘conference circle’ (un cercle de conférences) 
refers not to the talks themselves, but to an organising body which specializes in running such 
events. Finally, a ‘conference centre’ (un centre de conférences) is not only a place, but also a 
coordinating team: in this sense, mentions of Le Collège Supérieur as a ‘conference centre’ 
 
49 The débats are a discussion around a given theme; their aim is not to debate in the strictest sense, that is, they 
do not seek to arbitrate in favour or against a statement or proposition. 
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can mean either its physical auditorium or its organising committee. Les AlterCathos, whose 
two logos I described above, are more distinctly divided: their café-cum-conference locale, Le 
Simone, can only ever be called a ‘centre’ since this is the only spatial label; while the 
association who runs the space, i.e. Les AlterCathos, can be called a ‘circle’ or a ‘centre’ 
interchangeably. 
   While I would be hard-pressed to estimate the prevalence of conferencing – beyond 
academia – in France in general, it is common to find Catholic conference centres 
administered by lay associations or the dioceses of the largest French cities; indeed, one such 
centre has already been the object of anthropological scrutiny. Elayne Oliphant describes the 
2008 re-opening of the Collège des Bernardins, in Paris; a medieval monastery repurposed by 
the Archdiocese as ‘a site devoted to contemporary art exhibitions, intellectual debates and 
colloquia, a research centre, and a space for a seminary and theology school’, where ‘mankind 
is explored in all its dimensions: spiritual, intellectual, and [sensory (sensible)]’ (2015 : 355). 
While her work focuses more directly on the art exhibitions, Oliphant recurringly refers to the 
Collège’s offering of ‘conferences, debates, or theology lectures’ (2015: 362). As the second-
largest metropolis and home of one of the most ancient, prestigious, and active Catholic 
dioceses in France (Gadille et al 1983 ; Mas 2007), it is unsurprising that Lyon should, like 
Paris, possess spaces enabling the intellectual convergence of academics of Catholicism, the 
clergy, and laypersons. The Lyonnais conference network is, in fact, particularly prominent: it 
is almost ‘unavoidable’. Far from only attracting audiences who specifically go in search of a 
centre for intellectual debate, it is encountered as a matter of course at key nodes of the wider 
cathosphère, namely its schools. 
   Private schools hold a crucial position within the Lyonnais cathosphère as a meeting place 
for like-minded families, allowing the cross-fertilisation of after-school children’s 
associations as well as permitting parents to advertise the various organisations they might 
volunteer in50. Overall, private Catholic primary and high schools add up to over 80,000 
students in the diocese of Lyon (data from 2011-2012, Lanfrey 2016: 168). Three schools in 
particular are among the most well-known and successful establishments in the city: Les 
Chartreux, Les Lazaristes, and Sainte-Marie are all located in the central and well-to-do 
neighbourhoods (arrondissements) of Lyon. Sainte-Marie is usually known as ‘Les Maristes’, 
conforming to the pattern of calling schools by the name of the religious congregation which 
 
50 On Catholic schools’ place among bourgeois networks, see also Le Wita (1994: 82-117). 
 83 
originally founded them – they, along with the fast-growing Université catholique de Lyon 
(UCLy, ‘Catholic University of Lyon’, Moulinet 2016), form the backbone of the network of 
public conferences discussed here. 
   Les Chartreux, Les Lazaristes, and Les Maristes, who are well-known for the high standard 
of their primary and secondary schooling, share the peculiarity of also offering selective 
higher education curricula. The classes préparatoires aux Grandes Écoles, abbreviated as 
CPGE or prépas, are intensive two-year courses after the Baccalauréat which, as their name 
suggests, ‘prepare’ students for the hugely demanding nationwide contests granting access to 
the highly selective Masters-track Grandes Écoles. These ‘Great Schools’ have their roots in 
the 18th and 19th centuries and constitute a parallel, and more prestigious, education system 
from the national public university; they train researchers, engineers, business executives, 
magistrates, civil servants, or public administrators (Bourdieu 1996 [1989]: 133-135; Power 
17/09/2003). The conferences hosted in the evenings or weekends by Les Maristes or 
l’Université catholique de Lyon (UCLy) are therefore open to the general public, but with the 
tacit understanding that they are calibrated to be even more intellectually stimulating than the 
already high-intensity environment of the courses followed by students or the research 
environment of the University. The topics under discussion here are, as in Elayne Oliphant’s 
ethnography of the Parisian Collège des Bernardins, exclusively ‘high culture’ (2015: 354) 
and geared at an ‘elite public’ (ibid. 368; Bourdieu 2010 [1984]). 
   The schools and l’UCLy possess several essential elements for the organisation of 
successful conferences: large auditoriums, ‘in-built’ advertising targets – students and their 
families –, and therefore reliable audiences. Professors from each school are in charge of 
organising their respective establishment’s conference cycles, and because they are top-tier 
academics in their own right, they are also regularly invited to contribute to the other circles 
as speakers or respondants. This lineup is occasionally complemented by notable speakers 
attracted from across the region and the country by the schools’ and conference centres’ 
cultural capital. Rather than competing against one another, the diverse conference organisers 
distribute each others’ yearly programmes and leaflets, occasionally co-host events, or rent 
their auditoriums to one another, resulting in an overwhelming impression, at the structural 
level, of cooperation and collaboration. In 1999, Gérard Leval51, a philosophy professor at 
Sainte-Marie, opened an external conference centre, separate from the school but with its 
 
51 ‘Gérard Leval’ is a public thinker but has been anonymised because I do not discuss his published work here. 
 84 
financial support, as well as that of the diocese’s cultural fund, the Fondation Saint-Irénée. 
This conference centre, Le Collège Supérieur, is now a critical node in the cathosphère’s 
intellectual and cultural scene; it is run by a team of twenty experts in philosophy, several of 
whom are also theologians, historians, economists, or have experience in business, medicine, 
and the law. While national and international personalities are invited for one-off ‘special 
encounters’ (rencontre spéciale) – most notably during my fieldwork, theologian William 
Cavanaugh was flown in from Chicago to discuss ‘eucharistic anarchism’ – the bulk of the 
conferences is given by Le Collège Supérieur’s local team, whose collective expertise is 
indubitable. The vast majority of this team are volunteers or receive little remuneration for 
their participation in these events. They are, for the most part, employed as professors at 
Sainte-Marie – although nominally the conference centre is now independent from Les 
Maristes – or other elite schools, or as researchers at UCLy. 
   Les Alternatives Catholiques, who will feature more prominently in Part Two, are entwined 
in the same network: most the founders were once students at Sainte-Marie; most met during 
their literary classe préparatoire but a few had already been pupils there throughout high 
school. During the prépa, they were taught philosophy by Gérard Leval, and they attended 
Leval’s conferences at Le Collège Supérieur both before, and during, the creation of their own 
association, which occurred in the later years of their Master’s degree at the École Normale 
Supérieure de Lyon. Their immersion in these existing spheres of intellectual conversation, 
vouched for by Leval, was essential not only in 2011 when they set up Les AlterCathos, but 
also in 2015-2016, while fundraising in the build-up to opening their café/conference space Le 
Simone. Les AlterCathos are built on the same economic foundations as the other centres: 
they secured an initial monetary donation from the Fondation Saint-Irénée, the cultural fund 
of the diocese, as well as a donation by Le Collège Supérieur itself – their conferences are 
now run through audience subscriptions 52 . Consequently, while Les AlterCathos’s 
conferences are technically independent from the Catholic private-school system, they rely on 
the same ‘Cathosphere’ network. During my fieldwork in 2017, the directing team were now 
in their late-twenties: most were employed as philosophy, literature, theology, or classics 
 
52 For comparison, Le Collège Supérieur, which boasts a very dense conference schedule, offers 50€ passes for 
6 conferences, reduced to 25€ for students, or a 120€ unlimited yearly pass (60€ for students). Les AlterCathos, 
who are not yet as established within this network, are more obvious in their attempts to prod new members into 
regular attendance: in 2017-2018, a single conference cost 10€, or 5€ for students, pensioners, and the 
unemployed, but a year-long unlimited subscription only cost 35€, or 25€ according to the same criteria. 
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teachers in and around Lyon, and were not remunerated for their ‘extra-curricular’ 
commitment to the conference centre. In fact, one of the founders of Les AlterCathos was, by 
then, also part of the team of volunteer experts who provide conferences for Le Collège 
Supérieur; closing the loop in this singular, powerful, and intrinsically education-related 
network – or ‘social body’ – of Catholic conference centres. 
 
 I.3 Philosophy and ‘general culture’ among Catholic audiences 
While I cannot say whether the same connection also exists in Paris, it is important to 
understand, in Lyon, why the conferences proliferated so specifically around the network of 
private Catholic schools. Initially, the conferences aimed only to benefit the schools’ pupils, 
and were part of their preparation for a number of nationwide exams requiring excellent 
essay-writing skills in literary disciplines. One of the peculiarities of the French high-school 
system is that all students, including those specialising in scientific disciplines, must study 
philosophy during their final year. Consequently, even students who have elected to reduce 
their focus on literature or history must be proficient in the overall ‘general culture’ (culture 
générale) necessary to sit the philosophy exam of the Baccalauréat, which lasts 4 hours and is 
devoted to a single long essay (dissertation; Fabiani 2010: 31-32). While the ‘Bac de Philo’ is 
something of a rite of passage (ibid.), it pales in comparison to the 6- or 7-hours-long essay-
based philosophy exams the same pupils might encounter in subsequent years in elite higher 
education courses.  
   Philosophy exams, or the culture générale exams still present in the entrance selection of 
certain Grandes Écoles, rely on notoriously terse prompts – in the years leading up to my 
fieldwork, schools had variously required students to discuss, in 7 hours, topics such as 
‘norms’, ‘the search for truth’, ‘inhabiting the world’, or ‘language and reality’. Such exams 
therefore test not only the scope of students’ knowledge, but primarily their ability to produce 
remarquable arguments about the intellectual stakes of the topic, and novel resolutions for 
these stakes. 
   Geared towards high-school, undergraduate, or prépa-level students preparing philosophy 
or culture générale exams, evening and weekend conferences run by schools or Le Collège 
Supérieur therefore aim to give students an edge; not by imparting knowledge – the province 
of daytime classes – but by offering new angles of approach to possible essay prompts. This is 
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often done through the lens of ‘religious culture’53. For example, I attended a conference run 
by Le Collège Supérieur and hosted in the auditorium of Les Chartreux for the sake of their 
prépa students, on the theme of la parole, or speech. A good essay on ‘speech’, the speaker 
explained, would discuss the notion of performative speech, which turns words into action 
(Austin 1962); a great essay would go further, and consider the Christian ‘Parole’ with an 
uppercase P – the Word of God, also called le Verbe, ‘the verb’, one of the names for Jesus – 
the notion of divinity sublimated into speech, and word turned into flesh. Leading the 
audience in reading the Prologue to Saint John’s Gospel, the speaker admonished us that ‘the 
Bible is an indispensable reference in culture générale, whatever the syllabus may say’. His 
comment was meant as a strategic suggestion: the Grandes Écoles selections are contest-
based and ranked, so he encouraged his audience to capitalise on the fact that competing 
students elsewhere might not be well-versed in the ‘indispensable’ Christian references in 
culture générale – by practicing their ability to think nimbly with such references, his own 
students had greater chances of turning in stand-out scripts. 
   Such conferences are not explicitly aimed at – even less reserved to – Catholics. 
Nevertheless, the most obvious giveaway of the fact that the audience of such conferences is, 
indeed, largely Catholic is the high number of young men and women wearing engraved gold 
baptism medals (médailles de baptême) featuring the Virgin Mary or infant Jesus. Those are 
gifted to newly-baptised children by their godparents, and are more reflective of those kin ties 
than of personal faith. Simple crosses or medallions dedicated to patron saints, or bearing the 
sigil of monastic congregations one might visit on a retreat, while less prevalent, signal faith 
and practice more clearly. Another indicator of the audience’s belonging to the traditional 
Catholic bourgeoisie is their fairly homogeneous clothing style, referred to as ‘BCBG’ – an 
abbreviation of bon chic bon genre, or ‘the right chic and the right style’, a definition which 
in itself highlights a distinction of ‘those who know from those who do not’ (Hantoux 1985; 
in Le Wita 1994: 85n). More concretely, a BCBG style is supposed to balance discretion with 
sophistication; high-quality woollens and cottons in neutral colours abound, perhaps spruced 
up by a weave or pattern. Men of all ages wear slacks, button-up shirts, crew-neck jumpers; 
jeans, t-shirts or hoodies are the exception rather than the rule. Women wear dresses, skirts, 
and slacks; mainly in pastel or dark tones but occasionally more colourful: although they 
 
53 The Diocesan Direction of Catholic Schooling, or DDEC (Direction diocésaine de l’enseignement catholique) 
had notably inscribed ‘the attention to the religious dimension of culture’ into its list of priorities during the 
‘Horizon 2020’ congress held from 2000-2007 (Lanfrey 2016: 181, my translation). 
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never wear high-street logos, they do wear blouses and cardigans in vivid colours, or add the 
personal touch of a printed silk scarf worn at the throat, as a headband, or occasionally as a 
belt. The same attention to balance guides their attitude towards cosmetics and jewellery: 
discreet makeup is offset by large earrings, which may be precious heirlooms or instead 
colourful feathers and brassy metal alloy, the one concession made to current mainstream 
fashion. 
   It was once pointed out to me that the ‘most Catholic girls’ (les filles les plus catho) are 
those wearing clip-on earrings, to avoid body modifications – this rejoins the widespread 
preference for nude makeup, au naturel, which is intended to look as though none is worn at 
all. But the interlocutor who drew my attention to the absence of body modifications, 
although a practicing – and clip-on earring’ed – Catholic herself, shrugged it off as ‘probably 
an Old Testament thing, and definitly an old-fashioned thing’54. The Old Testament does 
indeed include the quote: ‘You shall not make any cuttings in your flesh for the dead, nor 
tattoo any marks on you: I am the Lord’ (Leviticus 19: 28). But my interlocutor’s nonchalant 
reference to this Old Testament prescription, and comparatively assertive mention of ‘old-
fashioned’ traditionalism, suggests that her initial appraisal of clip-on earrings as signalling 
‘the most Catholic girls’ requires unpacking. Over time, it became clear that her 
characterisation of the clip-on earrings as an ‘old-fashioned thing’ was accurate: they were 
worn by women of all ages from particularly traditionalist families – a minority often 
correlated with the old aristocracy – rather than by women whom I knew to be very devout, 
but who belonged to other subsets of the wider conservative Catholic bourgeoisie. Clip-on 
earrings do not index personal piety55, then – and neither do they index genuine reflexive 
literalism in the application of Biblical imperatives (Harding 2001). As far as the 
interpretation of ‘religious signs’ go, therefore, the rejection of ear-piercings signify a social 
class – heirloom clip-ons can be remarkably elaborate pieces of jewellery with precious 
metals and stones – and a traditional cultural milieu (Le Wita 1994: 58-59, 62-68) more than a 
personal commitment to faith. Nonetheless, the recognisable fashion of the traditional middle- 
 
54 ‘Probablement un truc de l’Ancien Testament, et en tous cas carrément vieux-jeu’. The avoidance of body 
modifications was never explicitly linked, by my interlocutors, to the defense of ‘natural’ humanity during La 
Manif Pour Tous (Chapter One) and the development of écologie humaine or écologie intégrale (Chapters Three 
ff.). 
55 Elsewhere in the world, piety may be expressed through body modifications: e.g. votive tattoos of saints and 
Catholic objects among Italian-American men in Brooklyn (Maldonado-Estrada 2020). 
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to upper-classes are often held as a ‘sign’ of Catholicism in France, as Chapter One has 
explored. 
   In general, the conferences exude a studious atmosphere; Le Collège Supérieur’s 
auditorium, in particular, is excessively classroom-like. It is a white box, wider than it is deep, 
with only a narrow band of clerestory windows at the very top of one of the walls; as soon as 
dusk falls, the room feels enclosed in a neon glare – the whole room is lit, rather than just the 
stage, in order to allow the audience to take notes. There is a raised dais at the front of the 
room, concrete painted white, with a table awaiting the speaker; the rest of the room is 
arranged in long rows of black metal desks and chairs bolted to one another and the floor, 
with two aisles cutting through. Since the conferences are open to all paying members of the 
public, the audience is clearly split into two – the majority are higher-education students, who 
lay out pens, writing paper, and audio recorders on their tables before the speaker arrives, and 
who spend the duration of the talk frantically scribbling; but there are always also a number of 
middle-aged couples, who walk in leisurely, arm-in-arm, well-dressed in understated trench 
coats or barbours 56 . For the students, developing one’s culture générale is a matter of 
academic necessity in order to stand out in examinations; for the older generation, whose 
children are grown and whose evenings are freed, ‘general culture’ or ‘the exploration of the 
philosophical stakes of’ a theme at hand, as Le Collège Supérieur advertises on its website, 
are a regular indulgence for the benefit of one’s own intellectual stimulation – and perhaps a 
nostalgic reminder of their own past as prépa students. 
   We therefore come to the end of the first ‘third’ of our plan en trois parties, or essay plan 
‘in three parts’. Based on the overarching structural and social homogeneity of the Catholic 
conference centres in Lyon, it seems possible to advance a thèse – a first argumentative stance 
– tentatively suggesting that the Lyonnais cathosphère is a bounded ‘social body’ attempting 
to ‘re-christianize’ ‘culture’ (cf. Elisha 2011). On the face of it, the conferences hold both an 
‘inner cultural logic’ (2000: 3) and ‘praxis of belonging’ (Borneman 1992: 339n, in ibid.), 
two of the characteristics listed by Douglas Holmes regarding ‘integralist’ separatism in 
Europe. But a good plan en trois parties acknowledges, by the end of the first part, that this 
provisionary thèse has largely been established by collecting ‘surface data’ – it is based on 
doxa, ‘what seems to appear’, and must yet be complemented with more rigorous episteme. 
 
56 Au naturel style is reinforced in these middle-aged and elderly women’s hairstyles: they may be permed, but 
greying hair may only be dyed as long as this is unobtrusive and not a noticeably ‘unnatural’ shade. 
 89 
The end of the first part therefore always relies on a transition: a new direction for the 
investigation of the following part, which will complicate the analytical picture. 
   If conference-going is a recognised and regular practice among certain classes of Catholics 
across France, for the Lyonnais an essential element of the ‘social body’ of conference-goers 
is the presence of students. It intrinsically positions audience members at the intersection of 
narratives surrounding education and culture, crosscut by the respective requirements of the 
Republican school system and of the Catholic private schools applying – and exceeding – the 
official curricula. Elayne Oliphant has previously suggested that a Paris-based Catholic 
conference centre, Le Collège des Bernardins, is an ideal locus for anthropological 
explorations of notions of national French culture: its curators produce secularising narratives 
which recast the architecture and art of the Catholic Church as latent elements of the wider 
cultural and intellectual projects which drove the historical development of secular Paris57 
(2015: 353). Here, the exploration of national cultural narratives gains another strand of 
complexity: in addition to the contested binary between religious and secular culture present 
in Oliphant’s Parisian case-study, Lyonnais conference centres draw in the third factor of 
education. Indeed, the role of the National Education system in the epistemic and social 
construction of the French nation has been the focus of much anthropological discussion since 
the last quarter of the 20th century. 
 
II. Antithèse: Catholic conferences articulate a ‘whole’ ‘French culture’ 
 
 II.1 The stakes of Republican education 
Education, according to the French Republican ideal, is a matter for the State, more so than a 
familial concern; indeed, the role of the school is to extirpate children from the particularisms 
learnt at home, in order to provide them with a collective, and homogeneous, citizen’s 
 
57 The political and media responses to the fire at Notre-Dame de Paris Cathedral on April 15th, 2019 reflect this 
ambiguity – for some, Notre-Dame is primarily a religious site, while for others it is a symbol of the French 
nation and of its claims to worldwide influence in secular cultural, literary, philosophical and political spheres. 
This dichotomy returns to the question of the place of the Catholic religion within the construction of the French 
nation: see Elkaïm (26/07/2018) for a chronological recapitulation of the interactions between the successive 
political forms of the French State with Notre-Dame, or Prazel (26/04/2019) for a far more partisan account of 
the ‘erasure’ of Catholic believers from the governmental responses to the 2019 fire. 
 90 
education (Reed-Danahay 1996: 2-3; Bowen 2007: 11-13). In this perspective, the school is 
understood as a unique locus where regional – and, from the late 19th century onward, 
religious – differences are expunged, turning ‘peasants into Frenchmen’ (Weber 1976; 
Hobsbawm 1992 [1983]; Green 1990). One essential stage in the development of this 
Republican vision of national education was the secularization of primary schooling, 
entrusted to Republican schoolteachers (J.Ozouf 1967) by the Loi Ferry, or ‘Ferry law’, 
named after the Education Minister who proposed it, wresting control away from the Catholic 
clergy in the early 1880s (Stock-Morton 1988; Reed-Danahay 1996: 110). This ban from 
primary schools was later compounded by 1904 laws forbidding the clergy from teaching at 
all – including at secondary level – in the public school system, confining religious teachers to 
the diminishing private sector (ibid. 127). Further stages in the drawn-out contest between 
State and Church over education include the Loi Debré of 1959, wherein the State conceded 
that private – mainly Catholic – schools would receive government aid if they adhered to a 
number of guidelines and regulations; and the Loi Savary of 1984, which proposed to 
dismantle the private school system altogether but was ultimately aborted due to the ‘giant’ 
‘free school’ demonstration mentioned in Chapter One. 
   The stakes of the second part of our plan en trois parties therefore emerge: it is not possible 
to explore the internal articulations of Lyonnais Catholic conference centres ‘in a vacuum’ 
from the broader articulations of French Republican education, which in turn defines French 
citizenship and the Nation. To what extent do the ‘social and epistemic bodies’ of the 
cathosphère and of the Republican Nation intersect, coincide, or reject one another? 
   Today, the prominence and excellence of Catholic schools are broadly accepted features in 
Lyon (Lanfrey 2016), and do not any longer provoke the fervent ideological divisions 
between secular ‘reds’ and religious ‘white’ partisans of ‘free schools’, described in the 
second half of the 20th century in regional strongholds of Catholicism such as Brittany 
(McDonald 1989). However, the age-old conflict between State and Church in education is 
but one aspect of the wider issues sapping the foundations of the ‘mythology of the Third 
Republic’ in which ‘the school, free, secular and compulsory, is a neutral space offered to all, 
to guarantee an equal start and meritocratic justice among citizens’ (Bellamy 2014: 85), and 
which the conferences discussed here must necessarily face when they address ‘general 
culture’. 
   Indeed, although the Éducation Nationale is meant to productively link French language, 
culture, and civism together in order not only to educate children but also to turn them into an 
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equal, unified nation of citizens (M.Ozouf 1985), this has been challenged by social scientists 
as an ‘officializing’ discourse (Bourdieu 1977 [1972]: 40) rather than an actual success. In 
The Inheritors (1964), Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron highlighted the French 
school system’s intrinsic reliance on elite culture, its favouring of students from upper-class 
backgrounds with prior mastery of the codes of this culture – the ‘inheritors’ designated by 
the title – and, overall, the school system’s perpetuation of social hierarchies. By 1970, in 
Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture, Bourdieu and Passeron had given up on their 
earlier hopes for a reformed multicultural and relativist education system, concluding that 
‘pedagogic authority will remain based on the arbitrary imposition of certain preferences, and 
the resulting exclusions’ (Bellamy 2014: 101). Through this cultural arbitration, they argued, 
the school system maintains a monopoly on legitimate symbolic violence, and intrinsically 
betrays its own goal of equality (ibid. 104). The impact of Bourdieu’s work has since resulted 
in greater concern among educational institutions about the place of ‘culture’ in determining 
the bounds of ‘French identities’, and more crucially about the responsibility of the State in 
the construction of these identities among new generations of Republican citizens. 
 
 II.2 A Catholic defense of ‘general culture’ 
Prominent philosophers and classes préparatoires professors across France – including many 
from the most elite private schools, which are often Catholic – have protested against the 
French State’s newfound tentativeness in matters of cultural education, which they termed the 
‘death of transmission’ (ibid.). Reflecting on his own experience as a young professor in 
Versailles, Catholic philosopher François-Xavier Bellamy – a regular guest speaker in Le 
Collège Supérieur – considers that the Ministry of National Education placed teachers in a 
paradoxical position: 
... we became in our own eyes the accomplices of social inequality. By giving classes, we 
reproduced the false legitimacy of relationships of domination. By transmitting 
knowledge, we imposed a habitus. [...] An example among many others, witnessed during 
my first year as a teacher: in December 2009, during the polemics around the entrance 
contest to the Grandes Écoles, a Minister for Higher Education declared, in an official 
bulletin, that general culture (la culture générale) was ‘discriminatory’. (Bellamy 2014: 
105-106) 
Polemics around ‘general culture’ have flared up regularly in the past decade and given rise to 
two paradoxical situations: on the one hand, the Ministry of Education, which is historically 
 92 
meant to integrate children into the French nation through the propagation of a shared culture, 
is now partly staffed by civil servants who view this project as intrinsically flawed and 
discriminatory. On the other hand, Catholic professors from the private school system find 
themselves defending the public Republican ideal – the very school from which they had been 
so systematically cast out in the Third Republic – against Bourdieusian radical sociology. 
Continued references to ‘general culture’ in private schools’ and Le Collège Supérieur’s 
conferences during my fieldwork in 2017 therefore went against the grain of the Ministry of 
Education itself, which had been attempting to limit the use of the notion and exerting 
pressure against higher education institutes to abolish the ‘general culture’ section from their 
entrance exams. References to la culture générale in Lyon are therefore not the result of 
passively following a national curriculum, but instead are the wilful choice to continue to 
posit a necessary cultural content which French students – and citizens – must acquire.  
   This content is extremely wide-ranging: for example, in 2017, one conference centre alone 
offered a cycle of 8 conferences on philosophers’ conceptions of God (including Plato, 
Aristotle, Augustine, Descartes, Pascal, Kierkegaard, Kant, Leibniz, Hegel, Heidegger, and 
more); a cycle on the stakes of artificial intelligence; a cycle on ‘identity’ (in 4 conferences, 
relating it to gender, adolescence, memory, and personality troubles); a cycle on law in a 
globalised world; two cycles on European history and economic crises; and a cycle on 
‘servitude and submission’ in literary works from Montesquieu to Ibsen, among others. 
Above, I cited a conference speaker who insisted that ‘the Bible is an indispensable reference 
in general culture, whatever the syllabus may say’ – this short anecdote highlights two 
critiques of the Éducation Nationale’s approach to cultural education which I have found to 
be prevalent among the Catholic populations of Lyon; namely, that it generally underplays the 
‘full’ scope of French culture and must be supplemented in one’s own time, and moreover 
that it deliberately downplays the cultural significance of Christianity.  
   In this sense, while highly-educated Lyonnais Catholics consider themselves to be among 
the victims of the Éducation Nationale’s symbolic violence, they also signal that all French 
schoolchildren are being stripped of one facet of the ‘general culture’ they are all entitled to. 
The long conference cycle about the place of God in major philosophers’ work, mentioned 
above, bears witness to the underlying sentiment that key elements of interest to all students 
of philosophy, history, or literature, are at best insufficiently covered by the official 
curriculum, and at worst deliberately downplayed due to their religious character. For the 
conference speakers of Le Collège Supérieur and the Catholic schools, it is indisputable that 
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the historical, literary, and philosophical contributions of Christianity are intrinsic to ‘general 
culture’, and that the Ministry is at fault for promoting an overly-secularised, and therefore 
incomplete, syllabus.  
   This is never dwellt on at length; rather, conferences dealing with religious material may 
include a brief acknowledgment that this is ‘not on the syllabus’ (hors-programme), 
simultaneously reinforcing the notion that it is nevertheless essential content for ‘general 
culture’ and suggesting that its exclusion from the nationwide programme is an intentional, 
partisan decision. If such decisions are partisan, in turn, they are considered to be temporary: 
while the Lyonnais Catholic networks denigrate the Ministry of Education’s choices of 
curriculum or syllabus, they nevertheless defend the long-term prestige of the Grandes Écoles 
entrance contests – which most of the conference organisers have sat – by holding them to 
‘better’ or ‘truer’ high standards than those of the contests’ governmental examiners. 
   Despite their explicit stance as a last line of defense against the ‘death of transmission’ 
(Bellamy 2014: 104) and their implicit reintroduction of Catholic elements into ‘general 
culture’, the Lyonnais conference networks never go so far as to argue explicitly that 
Catholicism forms the ‘roots’ of ‘Western culture and civilization’ – an otherwise relatively 
common narrative across Europe, shared prominently by Pope Benedict XVI on the occasion 
of the reopening of the Parisian Collège des Bernardins in 2008 (Oliphant 2015: 369). 
Nevertheless, they do suggest that the cultural influence of Catholicism weaves one tradition 
among others, which, for the sake of all French citizens’ mastery of their own national 
heritage, should not be uprooted lightly. In this sense, just like Les Bernardins’s art 
exhibitions, they defend the vision of ‘an irrefutable cultural and public (i.e. not just religious 
and, therefore, private) space for Catholicism in the French public sphere’ (ibid.) – a place 
which is not sufficient to ground all of ‘general culture’, but which is at least necessary to 
complete an elite education and obtain the qualifications of national administrators and civil 
servants (Bourdieu 1996 [1989]: 133-135; Power 17/09/2003).  
 
 II.3 Equivocal ‘epistemic and social bodies’ 
In a recent special issue of JRAI on ‘meetings’ (Brown, Reed, and Yarrow 2017), Alberto 
Corsín Jiménez and Adolfo Estalella argue that ‘novel epistemic and social bodies’ may be 
produced during certains kinds of meetings, for example the Madrid street assemblies of 
2011-2012. For Corsín Jiménez and Estalella, the political weight of the street protest and the 
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‘epistemic credibility’ (ibid. 117) of the specific themes of the 15M/Occupy movement relied 
upon the gathering of undifferentiated ‘witnesses’. It is through the experimental format of the 
street meetings, involving very lengthy and tiresome discussions, they argue, that pre-existing 
political forms were exhausted and the assembled participants recast as a community of 
vecinos, ‘neighbours’ (2017: 120-121).  
   Corsín Jiménez and Estalella’s focus was on the assemblies per se rather than on the 
participants’ diverse backgrounds – but they point out that in other contexts of developing 
assemblies, political or otherwise, the background of participants may be critical to 
establishing a similar epistemic credibility. They refer, in particular, to the early-modern 
emergence and articulation of scientific ‘societies of experiment’ in seventeenth-century 
England (Shapin & Schaffer 1985; Shapin 1996; Strathern 2014: 11). In this case, the specific 
social background of members served as a warranty of the trustworthiness of the emerging 
body: it was upon the character of the virtuous ‘gentleman’, free from economic stress or 
personal bias, that the social reputation and the epistemic validation of the ‘house of 
experiments’ rested (Shapin 1988; 1994).  
   Corsín Jiménez and Estalella’s work draws attention not only to the explicit aims of 
meetings, but also to the extent to which the background and particularities of participants 
may ‘count’ or not in the proper unfolding of a meeting and the achievement of its aims. If the 
street assemblies of vecinos in Madrid can be analysed as a form of meeting which both 
creates an ontological body and gives it a political force (ibid. 117), then the classic vision of 
the Republican schoolroom (and, in Chapter One, ‘the street’ during manifestations) is a 
similar locus which in theory performs the ontological and political construction of the French 
nation (M.Ozouf 1985). Like the Madrid assemblies, the success of the Republican 
schoolroom is predicated upon the ‘undifferentiation’ of its participants: the pupils must shed 
their home-grown regional and religious particularisms, much as the Madrid vecinos’ extreme 
boredom and exhaustion wiped away their individual particularisms and created an equal 
political footing. 
   But theory and practice may yield different results. If, in abstract terms, Lyonnais 
conference centres’ insistance on culture générale indexes an integrating and equalizing 
‘epistemic and social body’ on the scale of the Nation, in practice, the backgrounds of 
participants take on a greater relevance when they set themselves up as ‘defenders’ against the 
‘death of transmission’ (Bellamy 2014: 104). By denouncing the disappearance of a ‘cultural 
logic’ (Holmes 2000: 3) at the national level, vocal professors – often from well-to-do 
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backgrounds and affiliated to private Catholic schools – implicitly suggest that this cultural 
logic nevertheless still exists somewhere, and they are partaking in it themselves. Against the 
backdrop of the Nation, patchy spaces where transmission is ‘not dead’ appear like a negative 
image. In this light, the conferences start to resemble the seventeenth-century ‘houses of 
experiment’ populated by hand-picked ‘gentlemen’ (Shapin 1988) rather more than the 
Madrid street assemblies with their undifferentiated ‘neighbours’. 
   By this point in the ethnographic investigation – and the originally-unintended but apt plan 
en trois parties – we have brought to light complexities which had remained hidden in the 
first instance. These serve to course-correct some flawed initial assumptions: crucially, the 
Lyonnais Catholic conference centres’ positioning vis-à-vis the ‘general culture’ of the Nation 
establishes that they are neither separatist communalists (communautaristes, Bowen 2007), 
nor that they are integralist ‘identitarians’ (Holmes 2000). Indeed, they consider that their 
defense of culture générale serves an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983) beyond the 
small and culturally-homogeneous scale of the Lyonnais cathosphère: it is oriented towards 
the scale of the nation-state. In turn, this engagement with the scale of the secular Republic 
suggests that a Catholic ‘identity’ is not considered to be a sine qua non condition of 
engagement with the ‘cultural logic’ at hand (Holmes 2000: 3).  
   However, the explorations conducted here, for all that they were initially framed as an 
‘opposition to’ or a ‘departure from’ the first part, ultimately confirm and entrench some of its 
initial assessments. The ethnographic observation of the socio-cultural homogeneity of 
conference audiences has not been destabilised by any of the new material put forward – on 
the contrary, it has been solidified through the lens of Bourdieu and Passeron’s concept of 
cultural ‘inheritors’ (1964; 1970). The ‘epistemic and social bodies’ constructed in the space 
of the culture générale conferences therefore not only entail negotiations on religious, 
political, and cultural grounds, but also crucially in terms of ‘being élite’ – the conferences 
are ‘meetings’ (Brown et al 2017) which rely on this particular aspect of their audiences’ 
background for epistemic and social credibility (Shapin 1988). 
   This is confirmed in a roundabout manner by the decoration of Le Collège Supérieur. The 
white-walled auditorium and smaller entrance hall are bare but for a series of black-and-white 
photographic portraits. None are labelled, and the reason for the selection is left to the 
spectator’s guess. I could only name a few: philosopher and author Albert Camus, 
recognizable by his trench-coat and cigarette; historian and philosopher of social sciences 
René Girard, with his distinctive eyebrows; and the bowl-cut and straggly beard of Russian 
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novelist, philosopher, and political thinker Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. The latter’s inclusion 
suggested the selection was based neither on Frenchness, nor on Catholicism. After Googling 
cross-references between these three familiar faces, it appeared that the selection was a 
compilation of Nobels Prizewinners in Literature and members of the Académie Française. In 
prompting this ‘homework’ about the most elite accolades a French writer and thinker can 
aspire to, the selection of portraits was therefore a case in point of Le Collège Supérieur’s 
continuous promotion of a vision, not only of ‘French culture’, but of French intellectual 
excellence. 
   In short, the narrative of culture générale sustained in the Lyonnais Catholic conference 
centres elicits the imagination of epistemic and social bodies which prove to be ‘equivocal’: 
that is, which ‘hold at the same time views that are so divergent as to verge on self-
contradiction’ (Holbraad 2014:382 in Heywood 2015: 865). They are simultaneously Catholic 
and Republican, and geared towards universal integration into the Nation while being elite. 
These internal contradictions appear at times and disappear at others, but are particularly 
evoked on the occasion of disagreements with the Ministry of National Education – whether 
these disagreements take place on the national public stage, or in conference speakers’ casual 
caveats that something is hors-programme, ‘not on the curriculum’. 
 
III. Synthèse: Catholic conferences curate ‘transmission’ and ‘rootedness’ 
 
 III.1 Familiar content rather than new 
It is 9.30pm on a Wednesday night in October 2017, and a talk about philosopher Simone 
Weil’s conception of labour has just ended; it is the third and final installment in a series of 
weekly talks hosted by Les Alternatives Catholiques58 on ‘work’ (le travail). The theme of 
‘work’ fits perfectly within the tradition of ‘general culture’ conferences – a single, terse 
prompt, which can be grasped in a multitude of ways by a well-read and intellectually-agile 
student. Likewise, the speaker for the evening, a philosopher and well-known expert on 
Simone Weil’s work, is a typical participant in the Catholic conference network; in fact, he is 
the Dean of the Catholic University of Lyon (UCLy). The conference takes place in Les 
 
58 I will explore in the next chapter the relationship between Les AlterCathos and the rest of the cathosphère. For 
the purposes of this chapter, what matters is the shared format of their conferences. 
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AlterCathos’s café-cum-conference space, named Le Simone in homage to Weil, and which is 
located just a street away from l’UCLy – in the daytime, UCLy students and teachers drop by 
the café for lunch and a coffee, and they return in the evenings for conferences. 
   I am sitting against the wall, at the very end of a row of chairs, and will have to wait for the 
chairs’ occupants to exit from the other side before I can follow them away. My direct 
neighbours, two women in their late-sixties or seventies, stay seated rather than joining in the 
general shuffle, and turn to address me. ‘Vous êtes coinçée,’ one of them points out, ‘you are 
stuck’. Far from innocuous, these three words frame the bounds of any upcoming interaction 
with my elderly, patrician neighbours – they are, on her part, an initial performance of our 
respective social positions. I am younger, they are my elders; I am alone, they are two; by 
addressing me first, she implicitly authorises me to engage with them – but this is not a 
conversation, or she would have led with ‘good evening’. The wording is equally revealing. It 
is both a polite acknowledgment of the situation that the three of us find ourselves in – polite 
in the use of the formal ‘vous’ rather than ‘tu’ despite our age difference – and a skillful 
evasion of any form of apology for the woman’s own role in rendering me ‘stuck’, coinçée, a 
colloquial term which minimises my predicament. I can have only one response – ‘non non, je 
vous en prie’, or roughly ‘not at all, you’re welcome’ – to complete the scene-setting she 
initiated. From now on, it is implicitly agreed that I would be the one bothering them, rather 
than the other way around, if I were to attempt to leave my seat by navigating around their 
knees. Elegantly and implacably, they have handled the situation to their advantage, 
showcasing the politeness, poise, and privilege ingrained in high-society ladies of a certain 
age. 
   Resigned to my fate, I observe the post-conference ballet taking place around us while I 
remain ‘stuck’. Because these evening events take place in what is normally a café, as soon as 
the speaker has finished, the organisers busy themselves stacking the chairs – roughly aligned 
in six shaky rows of seven or eight white plastic seats – in order to clear the space for 
audience members to mingle awhile. My two neighbours keep track of the chair-stacking 
process – ‘Les jeunes, the young people, will come and free us’, one notes with satisfaction. 
As I help my neighbours collect their walking canes, stashed underneath their chairs for the 
duration of the talk, I take the liberty of asking them if this was their first visit to Le Simone, 
which had opened eighteen months earlier.  
   They reply in the affirmative, the first one saying that they came ‘on a whim’ tonight, and 
the other elaborating further: ‘We had no plans for the evening, so Marguerite suggested that 
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we might as well “have ourselves a little conference”’. The turn of her phrase – on n’a qu’à se 
faire une petite conf’ – is informal in the extreme. Replacing the word conférence by the 
shorter conf’, she broadcasts an easy familiarity with such a setting, further explaining that 
Marguerite59 and herself had browsed through the paper programmes of a few conference 
series, and selected this talk on Simone Weil, whose work they were both well acquainted 
with. ‘You had Les AlterCathos’s yearly programme at home?’, I repeat, but Marguerite’s 
companion – her sister or longtime friend, I assume – cannot remember where she collected 
the leaflet; it may have been ‘at Church’, ‘at another conf’ somewhere’, or maybe one of her 
sons dropped it off. Regardless, this year’s programme has only been released since late-
August; it has made its way into her reference pile of leaflets within two months. 
   Marguerite and her sister/friend are rather typical of cathosphère conference-goers. Their 
description of the whimsical impulse which had led them to spontaneously attend an evening 
talk – ‘on va se faire une petite conf’’, ‘we’ll “have ourselves” a little conf’’ – uses colloquial 
language framing conference-going as a consumption, a one-off, short-term binge of what is 
‘being had’. It is also vulgar and predatory language, associated with mobs or bullies who 
identify a victim to ‘have themselves’, and master it to the point of destruction. In other 
words, the two women knew in advance exactly what they were going to be ‘having 
themselves’. In the short conversation they had with me on this occasion, they found it 
important to mention that they had chosen this conference on ‘Labour (le travail) according to 
Simone Weil’ because they had both read Weil already, and attended other talks given by the 
Dean of the Catholic University. They chose the conference based on the expectation of 
familiar content, rather than new. 
 
 III.2 The philosophical method against ‘postmodern derision’ 
Marguerite and her sister/friend’s voracious attitude towards cultural content they already 
know brings into relief an implicit but key feature of the wider network of school-affiliated 
‘general culture’ conferences – one which has not yet been a point of direct focus. When these 
 
59 I continue to refer to ‘Marguerite’ with her (anonymised) first name because she was not formally introduced 
during this first meeting – otherwise, the polite form of address would have been ‘Madame + Family name’. In 
fact, it was surprising for Marguerite’s companion to refer to her so casually in front of a stranger. It denoted 
intimacy between the two women, who, if they had been more distant acquaintances, would have designated one 
another as ‘Madame Something-or-Other’ when telling me about each other. 
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conferences claim that they aim to give students an edge in nationwide examinations by 
investigating ‘the philosophical stakes’60 of an event, a text, a belief or notion, it is expected 
that the audience already knows, at least passably, about the topic at hand. To return to the 
conference topics mentioned earlier: it is only because the audience already knows Plato, 
Aristotle, Augustine, Descartes, Pascal, etc, that a conference cycle can compare their 
conceptions of God. It is only because the audience is already familiar with the literary works 
of Montesquieu, La Boëtie, and Ibsen, that a conference cycle can address themes of 
‘servitude and submission’ in their work. It is only because the audience knows both Austin’s 
notion of ‘performative speech’ and the biblical incarnation of the ‘Word’ of God, that a 
conference can tie them into a discussion of the agency and materiality of la parole.  
   In other words, the audience does not attend philosophical conferences in order to gain 
‘general culture’, but must already possess it, as Bourdieu and Passeron argued (1964): the 
practice of philosophy, in France, necessitates conceptual and factual bases (les bases) and at 
the very least a strong grasp of the history of ideas (Fabiani 2010: 25). What the conferences 
operate is a sublimation of compiled elements of culture into a broader landscape from which 
‘stakes’ emerge through the ‘particularly intense critical spirit’ (ibid. 32) of the speakers. In 
turn, the identification of these stakes allows philosophers and their audiences to zoom back 
in and analyse a piece of literature, a segment of history, a facet of collective life, or a current 
event, in light of these stakes. 
   The claim that culture générale conferences prevent the ‘death of transmission’ (Bellamy 
2014: 104) therefore takes on a strange cast at second glance: the conferences do not, in fact, 
seem to prioritise transmitting the cultural content considered crucial by highly-educated 
Lyonnais Catholics. 
   But this seeming paradox can be resolved in light of one particularly memorable conference 
held in Le Collège Supérieur. The speaker that evening, Chantal Delsol61, is a renowned 
philosopher and conservative political thinker. She is also known for belonging to two 
influential local right-wing Catholic families – by birth the daughter of a Lyonnais academic 
and by marriage the wife of Charles Millon, long-time President of the Rhône-Alpes Regional 
 
60 This phrase, les enjeux philosophiques, is used on the website of Le Collège Supérieur and features almost 
systematically in the director’s brief introduction of speakers at the start of conferences. 
61 Not anonymised here. 
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Council (Paoli 06/03/2008). She is here to present her latest book, ominously titled ‘The 
hatred of the world: totalitarianisms and postmodernity’ (Delsol 2016, all translations mine).  
   Alluding to Hannah Arendt’s work (with which she assumes the audience is familiar), 
Delsol argues that the totalitarian project remains alive, having simply changed its mode of 
action since the mid-20th century. The postmodern imperative of emancipation, she explains, 
perpetuates ‘homelessness on an unprecedented scale, rootlessness to an unprecedented 
depth’ (Arendt 1979[1951]: vii). Postmodern society, Delsol tells us, ‘does not accept the 
world as it is’, and discredits reality through derision, by considering all roots – ‘the past, old 
principles, beliefs, and customs’ – to be ‘trifling’. La bagatellisation, the term she coins to 
denote the act of rendering everything trifling62, is a totalitarian project because it inexorably 
levels communities into competing, and lonely, atomised and individualised masses (Arendt 
1979[1951]: 318) who ‘feel at home’ in postmodernity, unaware that it is a metaphysically 
rootless ‘lying world of consistency’ (ibid. 353). Delsol’s description of the postmodern 
project therefore draws out deeper stakes to the ‘death of transmission’ (Bellamy: 2014). 
What is at stake is not only, as it could initially be assumed, the death of content – of specific 
‘old principles, beliefs, and customs’, or of high-culture knowledge in nationwide school 
programmes. It is the death of the desire for, and value of, having cultural roots at all. 
   The students in the audience nod furiously as they take notes, seemingly wholeheartedly 
applauding her analysis. When, during the later Q&A session, an audience member asks if 
‘our Christian roots’ are the least-‘trifling’ he can draw on, she answers tangentially by 
pointing out that ‘the rational roots of the Enlightenment and democratic roots of the 
Revolution have also contributed much metaphysical meaning and direction (le sens) to the 
Nation in recent centuries’. In other words, she implicitly agrees that ‘Christian roots’ are not 
trifling and have contributed some ‘metaphysical meaning and direction’ to the French nation, 
but she also highlights other non-trifling ways of being ‘rooted’ in Frenchness. 
   From Delsol’s standpoint, beneath the socio-cultural homogeneity of the Lyonnais Catholic 
audience, it is primarily their agreement with her defense of the purpose of roots that proves 
they are a community of privileged ‘inheritors’, cast against the backdrop of ‘atomised 
postmoderns’. The present-day faultline of ‘distinction’ (Bourdieu 1984) highlighted by 
 
62 One example of bagatellisation, for Delsol, is the refusal of sexual difference, which she considers to be the 
continuation of a long-term process of ‘in-differentiation’ – the dismissal and disregard of natural particularisms 
and social classifications – which had already included the rejection of social classes (2016 : 103-106). In this 
way she rejoins the discussions of ‘universal’ and ‘natural’ sexual complementarity in Chapter One. 
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Delsol and other conservative French Catholic philosophers no longer lies between kinds of 
culture – ‘high-culture’ versus low-culture, religious culture versus secular (Oliphant 2015). 
Instead, it falls between, on the one hand, any community who values shared cultural logics 
and ‘rootedness’ at all, and on the other, the rest of the emancipated postmodern world who 
lets culture ‘die of ingratitude’ (Bellamy 2014: 202). 
   The line of interrogation followed throughout this chapter – Do the conferences 
aspirationally or effectively undertake a ‘re-christianization’ of Catholic and/or French 
‘epistemic and social bodies’? (Elisha 2011; Souchard 2018) – could therefore only partially 
contemplate what my interlocutors themselves see as a central purpose of the conferences. By 
framing the question in terms of an opposition between Catholic and Republican roots, and 
between civic French integration and a putative ethnocultural ‘identitarianism’, a broader 
order of debate was kept out of view. In other words, to return to the dialectic analysis of a 
plan en trois parties, it is by transcending the terms of the initial question (la problématique) 
that it can be resolved. 
    
Conclusion 
At length, two traits of the Lyonnais cathosphère’s conferencing network emerge. By 
insisting on the value of ‘rootedness’ (l’enracinement) among a majoritarily Catholic 
audience, the conferences rejoin the art exhibitions described by Oliphant in the Parisian 
Collège des Bernardins, in that they are intrinsically tailored to ‘“remind” [an elite public] of 
their Catholic “heritage”’ (2015: 368). Many of the conference speakers jump on the 
opportunity to include Christian literature or art: as professors strategically advise their 
students, ‘since we have it, we might as well use it’ in preparation for nationwide exams. 
   But the second notable trait is that this heritage is evoked not from a bounded proprietary 
standpoint, but from the bird’s-eye view of philosophy and ‘general culture’. This is why the 
speakers are not called ‘philosophy teachers’ but ‘philosophers’: rather than preventing the 
‘death of transmission’ by perpetually teaching a given content, they prevent the death of 
transmission – the very process of it – by perpetuating, recursively, the epistemics of 
rootedness and of general culture. 
   When conference speakers employ the pronoun ‘we’ in their talks, it is the majestic plural 
used across academic discourse in France – the plural which aspirationally recasts entire 
audiences, and the universal French public, as legitimate ‘inheritors’ of the ‘general culture’ 
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of the nation. And yet, that ‘we’ is plural in and of itself: the academic ‘we’ oscillates with 
‘we bourgeois Catholics’, ‘we Lyonnais intellectuals’, ‘we the elite’, ‘we the French’. 
Likewise, if the Catholic conference centres open up a space of ‘rootedness’ (enracinement), 
it is an equivocal space indeed: one which allows audiences to draw on, and reinvest in, 
several epistemic attachments to Catholicism, conservatism, academia, ‘elite-ness’, National 
Education, and Republicanism. These multiple roots do not all coincide easily; yet they are 
negotiated and coalesced by my bourgeois Catholic interlocutors in Lyon into a single 
overarching claim to ‘Frenchness’. 
   To return to the terms of contemporary debates in the anthropology of Christianity, 
Lyonnais professors’ inclusion of religious culture into philosophical conferences affiliated 
with the secular education system does performs a ‘re-christianization’ of French culture 
(Elisha 2011), but this neither straightforwardly indexes personal faith, nor predicates a 
necessary coterminous relationship between present-day Christianity and the French Nation. 
Instead, it offers Christianity as culture, and moreover as a cultural ‘root’ in a postmodern 
world: a less-prescriptive articulation of national history than ethnic jus sanguini, yet a more 
‘affective’ ‘shared identity’ (Abizadeh 2002: 496-497) than the abstract rationality of jus soli 
(Lyčka 2007; Stolcke 1997). 
   Overall, Part One has argued that conservative, bourgeois French Catholics hold a 
paradoxical place in the secular French Republic – marginal by virtue of their religious 
identity, yet able not only to negotiate the visible ‘religiosity’ of this identity, but also to lay 
claims to cultural and political Frenchness more widely. In doing so, they curate the world of 
French politics – especially as regards the family – and of ‘French culture’: in other words, 









































































In Part One of this thesis, I showed that French Catholics hold a paradoxical place in the 
public politics and national culture of the French Republic, in that they are marginal in some 
respects and yet are able to claim in compelling ways that they are not only French but the 
French. Part Two focuses on the rise, amid the Catholic bourgeoisie, of an association called 
Les Alternatives Catholiques, and argues that they spearhead the development of a new 
political theology: a differently imagined and scaled ‘good world’ which is both continuous 
with and transformative of the vision of politics held by Catholics in this setting. This chapter 
begins by addressing the early development of the paradigm of écologie intégrale, or ‘integral 
ecology’, in the course of Les AlterCathos’s initially ‘prefigurative’ explorations into Catholic 
political epistemology. Offering a new, political addition to anthropological accounts of 
cultural change and religious transformation, this chapter argues that écologie intégrale 
challenges the pre-existing political practices of bourgeois Catholics and yet crucially retains 
and celebrates an attachment to ‘roots’. 
 
Introduction 
When conducting preliminary research about Catholic spheres in Lyon, I had been told to 
seek out a relatively new youth-led association called Les Alternatives Catholiques, or 
‘Catholic Alternatives’. The main reason for this recommendation was pragmatic: most other 
Catholic organisations, such as the conference centre Le Collège Supérieur described in 
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Chapter Two, gathered regularly but did not run full-time; while Catholic spaces which did 
host ongoing activities – in particular the offices of the diocese – were not accessible to the 
general public. By contrast, Les AlterCathos were just about to open a café: the main purpose 
of their street-front space was to host conferences in the evenings, but the daytime 
transformation into a café/bar served the dual function of financing the association and 
advertising it to passersby. In Les AlterCathos’s café, I was told, I would be welcome anytime 
and would be able to develop day-to-day relationships with association members as well as 
visitors and customers from across the ‘cathosphère’ (cf. Thesis Introduction). When I 
received this piece of advice from a Lyonnais acquaintance who acted as my gatekeeper to the 
field, the café hadn’t opened yet – it was undergoing interior remodelling, mainly done by 
hand by members of Les AlterCathos’s organising Committee. It was due to be inaugurated in 
the Spring of 2016: long enough before my own prospective arrival in late-2016 for routines 
and a customer-base to be established, my gatekeeper assured me, but still recent enough that 
the arrival of an anthropologist would be taken in stride as part of the new developments. It 
would be a perfect conduit into the elite, bourgeois Catholic networks described throughout 
Part One; a meeting-ground where members of Catholic schools, associations, and parishes 
across Lyon would undoubtedly congregate. 
   At the time, I did not notice the paradox in the fact that an association purporting to be 
‘alternative’ – Les Alternatives Catholiques – was hailed as a entrypoint into all the traditional 
Catholic networks in town. My gatekeeper, Anne-Sophie, had been a member of Les 
AlterCathos herself between 2011 and 2012 while she prepared her agrégation, the 
competitive nationwide examination which grants civil servant status to elite young 
professors, at the École Normale Supérieure de Lyon. I met Anne-Sophie a few years later 
while she held a year-long teaching post at Cambridge; I knew her as a devout Catholic and a 
very conservative young woman, who only ever wore skirts and dresses rather than trousers in 
accordance with her family’s traditionalist stance on appropriate feminine attire. I assumed 
that Anne-Sophie must be representative of the members of Les AlterCathos, since she had 
been one of their founding members in 2011 – this also coincided with her claim that the 
association had ties to the traditional Catholic networks of Lyon – and I did not think too 
much about the ‘alternatives’ in their name. It was only much later that I realised I had 
misjudged Anne-Sophie by viewing her as ‘traditionalist’ by my standards rather than her 
own. Compared to my experience of Catholicism, limited to attending Mass at Christmas and 
Easter, Anne-Sophie had seemed very observant not only in her ritual practice but also in her 
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upholding of certain social and cultural strictures. However, from her family’s point of view, 
Anne-Sophie was accruing a reputation as a non-conformist with every passing year: the 
second-youngest of eight siblings, she was the first to pursue a year abroad, and she 
conspicuously lacked a fiancé aged 23 while all her elder brothers and sisters, employed in the 
military or as primary-school teachers along gendered lines, had already married and had 
children at that age. Anne-Sophie envisioned her future along the same lines of matrimony, 
motherhood, and employment in education as her sisters, but she wanted each step to be a 
fully matured decision, and did not intend to settle down before having pushed her studies in 
Modernist Literature to the full extent of a doctoral thesis. In short, Anne-Sophie was willing, 
and even eager, to make minute shifts, even if only delays, to the life-templates of her 
upbringing. To the extent that she insisted on control over her life-choices – that she 
considered alternatives – she already was ‘alternative’ among her family. And it is in this 
sense that Anne-Sophie turned out to be representative of Les Alternatives Catholiques after 
all: not because she was a devout or traditionalist Catholic, but because she was self-aware 
about her sociocultural background and invested in speaking back to it with the insights 
gained from taking a bird’s-eye view of her own life-course. 
   Anne-Sophie introduced me to Les Alternatives Catholiques, and in turn her story is a fitting 
introduction to Part Two of this thesis, which focuses on Les AlterCathos’s development of a 
new Catholic political theology they call écologie intégrale, or ‘integral ecology’. The 
relationship of Anne-Sophie to her family is mirrored in the relationship between Les 
AlterCathos and the cathosphère of Lyon – which encompasses the Manif Pour Tous 
demonstrators, the grandes familles lyonnaises, and the elite schools and conference centres 
introduced in Part One. Like Anne-Sophie, Les AlterCathos indubitably belong among their 
Catholic background yet stand out due to their reflexive gaze which yields a balance of self-
acceptance and self-critique. Consequently, Part Two of this thesis both proceeds from Part 
One and up-ends it: it continues Part One’s exploration of Lyonnais Catholics’ investments in 
politics, public life, and the nation, but it does so through the case study of Les AlterCathos’s 
efforts to instill change among their broader sociocultural background. As a result, the broad 
frameworks and themes of the first two chapters – Catholic experiences of public protest, 
traditional visions of the family and mankind, and efforts to protect the transmission of 
‘general culture’ – all apply to Les AlterCathos, but the reverse is not true: the following three 
chapters concern Les AlterCathos alone and showcase the extent to which their efforts to ‘be 
political as Catholics’ through écologie intégrale branch out from the templates of Part One. 
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   Joel Robbins, drawing on Dumontian structuralism, argues that ‘the motives for cultural 
change must originally be given in the terms of the culture that is changing, and this despite 
the fact that the changes those motives initiate may quickly render the motives themselves 
obsolete’ (2004: 2). This was very much the case throughout the gradual development of the 
paradigm of écologie intégrale by Les AlterCathos since 2011. As this chapter demonstrates, 
the impetus for Les AlterCathos’s initial efforts to devise a new way of ‘being political as 
Catholics’ was solidly grounded in the terms described throughout Part One of this thesis: the 
creation and early development of Les AlterCathos owes much to its founding members’ 
personal experience of La Manif Pour Tous (Chapter One) and involvement in elite schools 
and Catholic conference networks (Chapter Two). I will show in this chapter that it is through 
a growing reflexivity about their own largely right-wing and bourgeois background that Les 
AlterCathos consolidated the terms of écologie intégrale: a new paradigm for ‘being political 
as Catholics’ that is non-partisan, social, and green.  
   In this chapter, I will argue that écologie intégrale challenges the pre-existing socio-political 
practices of bourgeois Catholics and yet crucially retains and celebrates an attachment to 
‘roots’ – in other words, écologie intégrale paradoxically values the sociocultural milieu 
undergoing transformation even as it renders it obsolete. It does so, I will show, precisely by 
viewing this milieu in terms of ‘roots’: undeniable yet not all-encompassing matter, matter 
which informs but does not dictate the conduct of my interlocutors’ (social, political, and 
ethical) lives. To return to Dumont’s theoretical language, écologie intégrale is, I will argue 
throughout Part Two, a ‘hierarchical encompassment’ of potentially-contradictory values 
(L.Dumont 1986: 525; 1980 [1970]: 240; Robbins 2009, 2013b; Haynes & Hickel 2016), but 
centrally, it is self-conscious about this aspect of its own conceptual make-up. Rather than 
experiencing the moral torment suffered by Joel Robbins’s Urapmin interlocutors as they face 
contradictions between old and new value systems (2004), Les AlterCathos are reflexive 
about the ways in which their new paradigm allows the continued existance of remnants of 
the old, and are alert to the ways in which their longstanding habitus (to which they refer in 
exactly such Bourdieusian terms) can be accommodated.  
   If Part Two is overall concerned with the praxis of ‘integral ecology’, its first chapter –
Chapter Three – focuses on the formulation of this paradigm concomitant to the development 
of Les Alternatives Catholiques, from their creation in 2011 to the ‘ethnographic present’ of 
late-2016 and 2017. During my fieldwork, Les AlterCathos made two layered claims: that 
they aimed to live in accordance with écologie intégrale, and that this, in turn, was in line 
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with Pope Francis’s recently-published encyclical letter Laudato Si’: On Care for Our 
Common Home (2015). This chapter’s goal, therefore, is to introduce the key tenets of 
écologie intégrale and Laudato Si’ while exploring what is indexed by these claims – is this 
an instance of growing anti-modern religious fundamentalism, a ‘literalism’ (Harding 2001) 
oriented towards a Papal encyclical rather than the Bible? Or is it something else? My inquiry 
cross-cuts two familiar lines of investigation in the anthropology of religion: on the one hand, 
recent work on religious ‘grand schemes’, which employs the notion of ‘everyday ethics’ to 
account for ‘the complex duality of religion as an everyday practice and a normative doctrine’ 
(Schielke & Debevec 2012: 1), and on the other hand, the more longstanding interest in forms 
of observant religious practice under political modernity (Casanova 1994; Orsi 2012). In this 
chapter, by tracing the development of écologie intégrale after the creation of Les AlterCathos 
in 2011 – before the publication of Laudato Si’ in 2015 – I aim to highlight several stages in 
the consolidation of this paradigm: I argue that it was established as a new Catholic political 
epistemology, and only later were its central tenets solidified to map onto the concerns of 
Laudato Si’. Furthermore, it is at this later stage that the element of ethical injunction to ‘live 
in accordance with’ or ‘follow’ écologie intégrale arose – previously, its main purpose had 
been as a ‘grid of analysis’ to understand contemporary socio-political issues. This chapter 
therefore launches Part Two’s investigation of the religious paradigm of écologie intégrale 
through two angles which do not often take centre stage in anthropological studies of religious 
‘grand schemes’ and ‘everyday practices’: the angle of politics, and the angle of ‘elite’ lay 
actors. 
 
‘Grand schemes’ in/and action in the anthropologies of religion and politics 
Les Alternatives Catholiques, through their name, make two bold claims: that they are 
alternative, and that they are Catholic. However, the association’s founders are relatively 
happy to admit that at its inception in 2011, it was not entirely clear what they wanted to be 
alternative to, or how; nor how they intended to be ‘Catholic’, particularly as far as ritual 
practice and prayer went63. Raphaël Saônat64, one of the Vice-Presidents of the association, 
once summarised the situation by stating that the existence of Les AlterCathos far predated its 
 
63 The question of faith and piety in Les AlterCathos’s practices is the focus of the following chapter. 
64 Unless otherwise indicated, all names are pseudonyms, as is the case for Raphaël. 
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essence. The phenomenological axiom that ‘existence preceeds essence’ is well-known in 
gender studies through the work of Simone de Beauvoir (1949) and later of Judith Butler 
(1988), but here Raphaël was making more direct – and ironic – reference to the atheistic 
grounds of Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialist humanism. For Sartre, no God ordains Man’s 
essence, and therefore Man’s freedom is also a condemnation to suffer the weight of one’s 
own responsibility in the absence of externally-dictated direction (1945). As Raphaël 
describes it, the joint freedom and responsibility – in other words, the lack of direction – in 
the early days of Les AlterCathos was an unavoidable stage in the creation of their project, 
which was predicated precisely on ‘newness’ (Krøijer 2015: 12). Within a few short years, 
however, guiding principles were articulated by Les AlterCathos’s Committee of founding 
members, with the intention of steering the assocation’s further development. By the time I 
conducted my fieldwork throughout the year 2017, Les AlterCathos evoked, relatively 
interchangeably, the notion of écologie intégrale and Pope Francis’s recently-published 
encyclical Laudato Si’ (2015) as ‘inspirations’, ‘guides’, and ‘driving forces’ (notre moteur). 
   In order to understand what is at stake in Les AlterCathos’s development of the paradigm of 
écologie intégrale and their reading of Laudato Si’, this chapter must keep several seemingly 
contradictory elements in view simultaneously. Firstly, there seems to be a conflict of 
intentions: Les AlterCathos profess to follow a Papal encyclical – an affirmation which 
suggests doctrinal obedience and deference to the institutions of the Church – but they also 
self-define as an ‘alternative’ association. This chapter must therefore clarify how Les 
AlterCathos intend to both conform and be different. Secondly, there seems to be a 
chronological and conceptual ambiguity in the way that Les AlterCathos cite both ‘écologie 
intégrale’ and ‘Laudato Si’’ as inspirations. When prompted, Les AlterCathos clarify that 
their interest in Laudato Si’ rests primarily on the fact that it employs the notion of ‘integral 
ecology’ – indeed one of its six chapters is entitled ‘Integral Ecology’ (Pope Francis 2015: 
§137-§162) – but they simultaneously affirm that they had independently articulated their 
own paradigm called écologie intégrale before the publication of the encyclical. This chapter 
must therefore explore what was meant by ‘écologie intégrale’ in the early years of the 
association (2011-2015), and how this paradigm came to intermingle with Pope Francis’s own 
homonymous notion. In order to approach Les AlterCathos’s ‘essence’ – their desire to be 
‘alternative’, expressed in an initial indeterminacy and later in a contrastingly precise, rather 
normative intentional language inspired by religious texts – preliminary theoretical roadmaps 
can be drawn from the anthropology of politics and its familiarity with ‘alternative’ projects 
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(Krøijer 2015), and from the anthropology of religion and its treatment of doctrine and ‘grand 
schemes’ (Schielke & Debevec 2012).  
   Most obviously, my interlocutors’ claims that they ‘follow’ écologie intégrale and Laudato 
Si’ relate to the anthropological literature on ethnographic evocations of Christian doctrine 
(Harding 2001; Bielo 2009; Engelke 2007, 2013; Mayblin 2017). One of the core puzzles in 
the anthropology of religion has long been the awareness that religious actors often lead their 
lives in ways which are only partially or ambiguously observant of the normative religious 
doctrines that they simultaneously advocate (Schielke & Debevec 2012). This observation 
initially led anthropologists to evaluate ethnographic case studies according to how ‘pure’ or 
‘popular’ an expression of religion they showcased – this resulted in the use of conceptual 
binaries separating doctrine from practice, institutional religious elites from laypersons, 
‘great’ from ‘little’ traditions (Redfield 1960; Gellner 1981), ‘high church’ from folk or 
popular belief, all binaries in which the former term was perceived as more truly religious 
than the latter (McGuire 2008: 45-46). Such an analytical stance views doctrine as something 
to be ‘applied’; it asks whether the faithful are doing so, and gauges the extent to which 
syncretism with local culture may have developed. But Catholic encyclicals complicate this 
approach by introducing a novel timeframe and equivocal normative character into the study 
of Christian doctrine and its ‘applicability’. 
   By contrast to the longue durée which is often taken for granted in discussions of the Bible, 
Roman Catholic encyclicals or ‘circular letters’ constitute an ever-rejuvenated canon. 
Encyclicals are the second-highest ranking documents issued by the Pope, a status which in 
practice introduces a measure of ambiguity around their significance: while it is clear that 
encyclicals are potent expressions of the Pope’s will and authority, they are nonetheless not 
meant to promulgate laws and definitive teachings around doctrine and the faith. Encyclicals 
are not considered expressions of ‘Papal infallibility’ unless explicitly stated, and afford a 
degree of latitude to their recipients65. Historically, they were ‘letters’ in the commonsense 
understanding of the term, relatively short documents addressed regularly to bishops around 
the world or in a given area, corresponding on matters of varying importance. In recent 
decades, however, encyclicals have grown rarer and longer: they target fewer topics, but do so 
more in-depth, and have resultingly acquired a more sensational character (Hoenes del Pinal 
 
65 A caveat confirmed by Pope Pius XII: ‘Nor must it be thought that what is expounded in Encyclical Letters 
does not of itself demand consent, since in writing such Letters the Popes do not exercise the supreme power of 
their Teaching Authority. For these matters are taught with the ordinary teaching authority’ (1950: §20). 
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2019: 293). Newly-elected Popes’ first encyclicals – such as Pope Francis’s Laudato Si’66 – 
are eagerly-awaited and viewed as touchstones for the new pontiff’s priorities. A growing 
impetus for lay Catholics to engage with these documents directly (ibid.), eschewing 
intermediary institutional exegesis, further complicates understandings of their (partially) 
normative character and of the extent and manner in which the Pope’s wishes must be put into 
practice. 
   I suggest that the study of Catholic encyclicals – and, here, of the notion of écologie 
intégrale, partly drawn from Laudato Si’ – is best served by following recent work focusing 
on ‘everyday religion’; an approach inspired by the anthropology of ethics which has sought 
to avoid analyses based on ‘pure’/‘popular’ hierarchical binaries (Schielke & Debevec 2012; 
de Certeau 1984, 1998; Jackson 1989, 1996; see also Fadil & Fernando 2015). The first 
premise of this approach is that any form of religion must be considered ‘truly religious’ on 
the same terms, abandoning the preconception that ‘pure’ textual doctrine should serve as a 
benchmark of our interlocutors’ religiosity (Stewart & Shaw 1994). Its second premise is that 
anthropologists should define religious ‘grand schemes’ according to what our interlocutors 
themselves make of them (Schielke & Debevec 2012). From this perspective, the fact that 
normative doctrines and grand schemes are ‘granted some kind of independent existence 
outside and above’ the persons living (more or less) by their tenets is a matter of analytical 
interest in and of itself (ibid. 7), rather than a precondition for the study of religion. Drawing 
on Humphrey and Laidlaw’s theory of ritual (1994), Schielke and Debevec suggest that 
[The] apparent perfection and factuality of grand schemes turns into a pragmatic 
condition of action. By being granted coherence and objective power, they become things 
that people approach, use and do. (2012: 7) 
In short, the first question which must be asked is not how Laudato Si’ is applied, but how it 
becomes an applicable – and desirable – ‘grand scheme’ in my interlocutors’ minds in the first 
place67. This is why, in this chapter, I am primarily interested in Les AlterCathos’s early years 
 
66 Laudato Si’ is technically Pope Francis’s second encyclical, but it is well-known that his first publication, 
Lumen fidei (2013), had been drafted by his predecessor Pope Benedict XVI before the latter’s retirement. 
Consequently, Laudato Si’ is viewed as the first indicator of Francis’s own concerns. 
67  Eric Hoenes del Pinal’s study of ‘Reading Laudato Si’ in the Verapaz’ skirts the line in this respect, 
questioning the reception of Laudato Si’ but framing it as a straightforward pronouncement: ‘It behooves us, 
then, to think about how these theological pronouncements are being taken up by Roman Catholics around the 
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before the publication of Laudato Si’ – the initial indeterminacy surrounding the creation of 
the association in 2011, and the development of the paradigm of écologie intégrale as a way 
of being ‘alternative’, as these frame their subsequent reception of the encyclical. 
    Les Alternatives Catholiques – ‘Catholic Alternatives’ – were founded in 2011 by a small 
group of postgraduate philosophy students at the elite and State-run École Normale 
Supérieure de Lyon. When AlterCathos members reminisce about their early days, they insist 
on this context, more often than on the purpose, of the birth of their association – how Les 
AlterCathos came to be, almost irresistibly produced by a pell-mell set of circumstances, 
rather than why they were created. In the midst of this initial indeterminacy, only one element 
provided some direction: the name of the association and its claim to ‘alternativeness’. In 
order to explore this period of Les AlterCathos’s existence, I draw on the anthropology of 
politics, rather than religion. Alternative activist movements whose protests, marches, and 
communes aim to ‘build a new society in the shell of the old’ (Graeber 2009) experience a 
similar duality between everyday practice and normative ideology to that described earlier 
with reference to religious doctrine, but they also include an element of deliberate 
transformation which is not often present in the anthropology of religion (with the exception 
of Robbins 2004). Recent work on ‘prefigurative politics’ (Boggs 1977) – a term which refers 
to leftist movements who embody, albeit on a small scale, the change they want to see in the 
world68 – has disproved the assumption that such movements are underpinned by pre-existing, 
explicit, detailed ideological templates. Instead, Marianne Maeckelbergh (2011) and Stine 
Krøijer (2015) suggest that activist collectives’ experimental efforts are simply based on 
broad shared values, such as anti-capitalism and the rejection of the state; and therefore that 
everyday actions define the gradual constitution of these transformative new politics. In this 
sense, the analytical setup of the literature on prefigurative politics allows the study of 
‘alternative’ projects without knowing ahead of time what form those alternatives will take or 
where they intend to lead; it is more open-ended than Joel Robbins’s account of religious 
change among the Urapmin of Papua New Guinea, which relies to a larger extent on 
foreknowledge of the intentional ‘end-point’ for the Urapmins’ conversion, namely 
charismatic Christianity (2004). Following Krøijer (2015), therefore, I aim in this chapter to 
describe the intentional core of Les AlterCathos – its essence – as an emergent rather than 
 
world. To what extent do they see the theological pronouncements disseminated from the Vatican as relevant to 
their daily lives qua Catholics?’ (2019 : 293) 
68 By contrast with the Marxist insistence on total revolution (Krøijer 2015: 4). 
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primordial element, through a chronological exploration of the association’s development and 
concomitant articulation of the paradigm of écologie intégrale. 
 
‘Renovating society, not the Church’ 
The principal instigator of Les AlterCathos is called David Coureau. Born and raised in a mid-
sized town of the region of Berry in central France, he moved to Lyon after high school to 
attend a prestigious and selective two-year ‘preparatory class’ in literature, classics, and the 
humanities (hypokhâgne/khâgne) at the private and Catholic École Sainte-Marie, also known 
as Les Maristes. There, David met fellow students Marie Sève and Raphaël Saônat, who were 
both originally from Lyon. Their philosophy class was taught by Gérard Leval, a well-
known69 philosopher in Lyonnais Catholic spheres, who encouraged them to go beyond the 
curriculum of the classe préparatoire and introduced them to his external conference centre, 
Le Collège Supérieur. Leval’s influence was decisive, as both David and Raphaël decided to 
specialise in philosophy for the subsequent three years of the Master’s-track Grandes Écoles, 
or ‘Great Schools’70. 
   Access to the Grandes Écoles is regulated by a nationwide contest (concours), which 
students across France sit at the end of their two-year classe préparatoire. The École Normale 
Supérieure, which both David and Raphaël qualified for, is the most elite, but neither David 
nor Raphaël ranked high enough to obtain the coveted few places in philosophy at the 
Parisian campus (‘Ulm’) of the ENS. Prioritising academic subject over prestige, they both 
chose to attend the second-best campus of the ENS, in Lyon, where they were guaranteed a 
place on the philosophy course. For her part, Marie’s priority was first and foremost to remain 
in Lyon, near her family. She joined the Institut d’Urbanisme (Institute of Urban 
Development), which is situated further down the same street as the ENS Lyon, where her 
boyfriend at the time was reading History in the same cohort as David and Raphaël. 
   At the ENS, David became friends, and later housemates, with Hilaire Broie de Bugey, who 
was studying modern literature. A newcomer to Lyon, Hilaire had grown up in Bourgogne, 
not overly far from David’s own hometown; and like David, Hilaire’s family background was 
 
69 But anonymised here! 
70 See Chapter Two for an introduction to, and discussion of, the context of these elite Catholic schools and 
conference centres. 
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one of provincial Catholic petite bourgeoisie. While neither family had substantial financial 
resources, both had longstanding roots in their respective towns, and in particular in their 
parish communities. Hilaire’s father worked in the wood-based energy sector and his mother 
was a psycho-motor therapist; David’s father, for his part, had worked for fourteen years at 
the local broadcasting station Radio Chrétienne Francophone (RCF), a network of Catholic 
community radios run associatively by a mix of volunteers and employees across France and 
Belgium. The ENS represented new ground for David and Hilaire in one major respect: it was 
their first foray into the State-run secular education system, after having attended private 
Catholic schools in high school and throughout the classe préparatoire. 
   During David and Hilaire’s time at the ENS, the school hosted a small, poorly-funded 
Catholic Chaplaincy, which has since been closed down by the school board in an effort to 
further secularize its premises. It is in reaction to the Chaplaincy’s paltry intellectual and 
spiritual offerings – as well as in reaction to the awareness that even this little amount of 
Catholicism within the secular ENS was a matter of controversy – that David and Hilaire 
initially formulated the project of founding an external reflection group for the sake of their 
Catholic friends. David, in particular, was instrumental in contacting his erstwhile classmates 
from Les Maristes and gathering those who had, after the unpredictable lottery of the Grandes 
Écoles contest, ended up remaining in Lyon. When Marie remembers the early days of Les 
AlterCathos, she tends to laughingly shrug off her own involvement, and to portray herself 
primarily as a happenstance bystander to David’s single-minded, self-appointed mission to 
launch the ‘Catholic Alternatives’, a name he had already chosen before anyone else joined 
him in the venture.  
   Marie recalls that the name puzzled David’s interlocutors, who worried that he was setting 
up some sort of ‘heretic project’, in her words – that his aim was to ‘be Catholic otherwise’ in 
the face of the disappointing Chaplaincy. David had to clear up this confusion: what the name 
‘AlterCathos’ indexed, he claimed, was instead a desire to ‘be alternative as Catholics’. His 
catchphrase of the time, Marie and David both reminisced, was ‘renovating society, not the 
Church’ (rénover la société, pas l’Église), though the details of how this would be envisaged 
and practiced were yet to be determined. David’s as-yet nebulous desire to be ‘alternative’, 
predicated on resistance to (a vision of) mainstream society, therefore rejoins the literature on 
radical activism: Stine Krøijer argues that ‘intentionality and political ideologies are possible 
effects’, rather than ‘the motivating factors’, of participation in alterglobalization movements 
(2015: 4-5). Indeed, Hilaire, Raphaël, and Marie, who nowadays are all credited as founders 
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and have been the association’s Vice-Presidents since its creation in 2011, often downplay 
their own initial involvement as an ‘absorption’ (ibid.: 5) into a common activity, rather than 
an intentional decision. 
   Krøijer recommends not taking for granted that participants in radical activism must hold an 
a priori conception of ‘a shared identity or a single vision of social change’ (ibid.: 4; 
Maeckelbergh 2009: 6-7; Eschle 2011). In the case of Les AlterCathos, however, it is quite 
clear that the association was initially envisaged as a ‘project of collective identity’ (Eschle 
2011: 373) relying on participants’ shared Catholicism. To this extent, the creation of Les 
AlterCathos could seem closer to the identity politics of feminist or indigenous movements 
described by New Social Movement theorists (Melucci 1996, 2003: 42; contra Krøijer 2015). 
But the divergence from Krøijer’s model is a matter of scale, insofar as Les AlterCathos 
initially – and still so recently – boiled down to David as a one-man project. David has always 
been the undisputed President of the association because he alone comported himself as an 
undeniable ‘primordially existing actor’ (Krøijer 2015: 25, Melucci 1996), while the rest of 
the association predominantly constituted an ‘affinity group’ gathered on the basis of their 
‘social life outside of political action’ (2015: 10-11, 22) rather than on the basis of an explicit, 
shared ‘vision of social change’ (ibid. 4). 
   At this stage, however, the association was only labelled ‘alternative’ – it was not yet 
defined as a political project, although this followed shortly thereafter. In the following 
sections, I follow Krøijer’s call to study the form of political movements as ‘mediated 
manifestations of intentionality’ (ibid.: 6): this approach can be employed to explore the 
evolving form of Les AlterCathos in their early years, and through form, their developing 
intentionality. 
 
Catholic alternatives and/as/are modern politics71 
Still trying to attract friends to join him in creating Les AlterCathos, David clarified one 
respect in which he hoped to be ‘alternative’ as a Catholic: by debating the commonplace 
assumption that there are only two possibilities for French Catholics to engage in party 
politics. These two options, on either side of the Left-Right spectrum, were summarized by 
Marie as ‘the stereotypes of pro-life right-wing cathos de droite and left-wing cathos de 
 
71 I paraphrase Ruth Marshall’s chapter title, ‘Pious and/as/is Modern’ (2009: 3). 
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gauche who only care about prisons and migrants’. It is through this explicit reference to 
party politics that David pursued his ‘intensive recruitment efforts’ for Marie to join his 
project, ‘hounding her’ (in her own words) in the ENS cafeteria where she used to spend 
lunchtimes with her boyfriend. Marie was largely unconvinced, not because she adhered to 
one of these ‘stereotypical’ political stances herself, but because she doubted the very premise 
of engaging with party politics from an explicitly Catholic standpoint: 
At the start, it wasn’t very clear what these ‘AlterCathos’ were meant to be, to the point 
that I even heard it called a ‘Catholic party’. But for me, the PCD [Christian Democrats 
Party] and all, it’s not my thing! I’m convinced that something calling itself a ‘Christian 
party’, in politics, isn’t destined to go anywhere. So every time David came and sat at my 
table, at lunchtime, I’d turn him down. 
   A significant stage of the creation of Les AlterCathos therefore involved defining 
boundaries or, to continue using Krøijer’s terms, rejecting possible forms before settling on an 
acceptable one. This is a familiar anthropological trope: boundaries, or markers of what one is 
not, are often more explicitly articulated than what one is (Barth 1969; McDonald 1989). 
What is notable here is not only that Marie and the other founding members rejected possible 
affiliations with either ‘Right-wing’ or ‘Left-wing’ politics, but that they rejected the idea of 
Catholic political parties altogether. Les AlterCathos therefore launched their project of ‘being 
political as Catholics’ outside of the political institutions of the State, implicitly upholding the 
modern view that religion and State politics are – and should be – two separate spheres 
(Casanova 1994; Asad 2003). This is not a negligible point in the context of traditional 
Catholic populations: during my fieldwork in Lyon, I met several families (from the 
aristocratic segments of the cathosphère) who professed the belief that France should still be 
governed by a Catholic, divinely-anointed King. Les AlterCathos, for their part, were not only 
not monarchist, but more widely disagreed with religious identities being used as a basis for 
party politics or public engagements with the State (contrary to the identity-based New Social 
Movements mentioned earlier – and cf. Chapter One). 
   By viewing Marie and the other AlterCathos founders as Catholic ‘moderns’, I do not wish 
to index the sort of reflexive process described elsewhere in the anthropology of religion by 
authors who have striven to counter the longstanding depiction of observant religious 
communities as non-modern or anti-modern (Casanova 1994; Orsi 2012). For example, the 
pious Lebanese Shi‘i women described by Ruth Marshall reflect upon, and advertise, their 
own ‘modernity’: Marshall details their discursive constitution of ‘pious modern’ identities 
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partly inspired by, and partly distinct from, their view of Western modernity (2009). Instead, I 
consider that Les AlterCathos’s early views on the (undesirable) intersection of religion and 
statecraft had little or nothing to do with religious observance72. I argue that my Catholic 
interlocutors are moderns because the secular nature of statecraft is the one thing they never 
questioned during the otherwise intensely reflexive process of building Les AlterCathos as 
both ‘political’ and ‘Catholic’. Emic and etic language are tightly entwined here: my 
interlocutors’ baseline conception of ‘religion’ and ‘politics’ as separate domains of life 
(Casanova 1994; Asad 2003) stems historically from the European Enlightenment; as do the 
Social Sciences, which, in turn, they studied during their classe préparatoire to the equivalent 
of a Bachelor’s degree. 
   In the meantime, David’s efforts to recruit Marie and others to join him in developing a new 
association finally succeeded when he temporarily abandoned the unclear and potentially 
politically inflammatory name – ‘Catholic Alternatives’ – which he had been so set upon at 
first. Marie recalls: 
At one point he showed up and said, “okay, Marie, we’re not quite sure what ‘Les 
AlterCathos’ will turn out to be, but there’s this other thing we’re putting together, with 
the help of our old philosophy teacher”, Gérard Leval, from when we were all studying 
together in khâgne. “And so we’re” – this is still David trying to recruit me – “we’re 
going to start the ‘Montalembert Circle’, as an homage to Montalembert, the 19th-century 
Christian liberal, and it’s going to be super cool and it’ll be a reflection circle”. So I say, 
all right, a reflection circle, why not, I’ll come have a look, and on the other hand for your 
‘AlterCathos’ you can dream on. 
While she was reticent to participate in any kind of Catholic party politics, Marie was 
unopposed to the idea of an intellectual reflection group about historical Catholic figures: this 
proposition, modelled on their philosophy professor’s conference centre Le Collège 
Supérieur, rejoined the trope of elite ‘general culture’ described in Chapter Two. Instead of 
phrasing the association’s aims in terms of ‘religion’ and ‘politics’ – and especially ‘doing 
 
72 It could have done: a number of texts in the Catholic canon urge a separation between piety and politics. My 
interlocutors could have justified their views with reference to doctrine such as the Biblical injunction to ‘render 
unto Caesar what is Caesar’s’, the well-known 2nd-century ‘Epistle to Diognetus’ which explains the absence of 
Christian polities by stating that ‘Christians dwell in the world, yet are not of the world’, or yet the numerous 
Papal encyclicals which have been written to counsel French Catholics on how to engage with the Republic 
(Pius VI 1791; Leo XIII 1884, 1892, 1899; Pius X 1906a, 1906b, 1907, 1910; Pius XI 1924) – but they never 
mentioned any of these texts as inspirations. 
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politics as religious actors’, a perspective which David’s friends were visibly uncomfortable 
with since they refused to join the incipient association – David’s shift to framing the group as 
a ‘reflection circle’ depoliticised the project in their minds (Ferguson 1994; Candea 2011). By 
mimicking the form of culture générale lectures, David’s (temporary) advertisement of the 
‘Montalembert Circle’ project re-labelled Catholic history as more neutral ‘culture’ (Oliphant 
2015), and re-labelled the search for (political) ‘alternatives’ as more neutral ‘education’. This 
was a successful strategic move: it is on the basis of this premise that Marie, along with 
Raphaël and Hilaire (and Anne-Sophie, introduced at the start of this chapter), followed 
David’s lead. 
   The newly-formed discussion group gathered twelve students in their early-twenties, all 
connected to David via either the ENS or Les Maristes, along with Gérard Leval. The group’s 
initial meeting focused on an exploration of the life of Charles de Montalembert, a prolific 
newspaperman and parliamentarian who promoted Catholic liberalism first against the 
anticlerical Second Republic and then against the absolutist Second Empire. After 
Montalembert, the gathered students agreed to move on to discuss other Catholic public 
figures, journalists, lawyers, and philosophers from the 19th century to the present. As Marie 
reflected on in 2017 with a touch of irony, 
I ended up being part of the ‘Catholic Alternatives’ anyway, because it was inherently 
one and the same with the Montalembert Circle: thinking about previous generations’ 
examples of links between faith and politics, in order to reflect on alternatives to today’s 
political landscape in France. 
 
A new Catholic political epistemology 
In 2011, AlterCathos meetings – they gave up on the name ‘Montalembert Circle’ when they 
moved on to discuss other historical figures – took place weekly and systematically started 
with a presentation given by one of the members, by Gérard Leval, or by an invited external 
speaker. Each week addressed a single topic, and the designated speaker’s role was to produce 
‘un topo’, a detailed exposé or rundown lasting twenty minutes or so. Marie highlights the – 
largely incidental – symbolism of this phase: 
I never get bored of joking that there were the twelve of us, with Gérard Leval, the Master 
to us all (notre Maître à tous), who gave us form (de l’ossature) by doing the topos at 
first, but who then let us live our lives as disciples (nos vies de disciples)! 
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   Les AlterCathos chose to rely on two sources of material, which formed the basis of the 
topos and of their accumulating intellectual resources. On the one hand, they explored the 
biographies of Catholic historical figures with an investment in French – and later, 
international – politics. On the other hand, they worked their way through the compendium of 
the Catholic Social Teaching (CST), or Church Social Doctrine (Doctrine Sociale de 
l’Église). The Social Teaching encompasses a collection of texts written by Popes since the 
late-19th century, which address the social responsibilities of Catholics in political contexts 
such as the Industrial Revolution, the Cold War, and the rise of globalisation. The CST offers 
a compact list of doctrinal concepts concerning human dignity and social justice – such as the 
‘principle of subsidiarity’, the ‘dignity of work’, the ‘preferential option for the poor’, or the 
‘universal destination of goods’ – which are intended to serve as normative and value-driven 
guides for Catholics to calibrate their lives in society for the Common Good. For the time 
being, however, Les AlterCathos engaged with the encyclicals of the Catholic Social 
Teaching on the same terms as they did the biographies of Catholic figures, rather than as 
binding doctrinal texts (Engelke 2007; Schielke & Debevec 2012). Les AlterCathos’s two 
lines of investigation were seen as separate insofar as the historical figures chosen did not 
refer to the Catholic Social Teaching themselves, or only did so in very fragmentary ways. 
Indeed, it is only in 2004 that these Papal writings were collated into the compendium that is 
now known as the Social Teaching, on the initiative of the Vatican’s Pontifical Council for 
Justice and Peace. 
   Les AlterCathos thus embarked on a comparative and cross-referential project of political 
analysis. After their initial discovery of the life of Montalembert – their erstwhile namesake – 
they progressed chronologically. One weekend introduced Frédéric Ozanam, an early-19th 
century lawyer and the founder of the now-international Saint Vincent de Paul charity. 
Another meeting focused on turn-of-the-century author and utopian socialist Charles Péguy, 
and several weeks were devoted to Simone Weil, a radical 1930s and early-1940s philosopher 
and anti-fascist revolutionary of Jewish origin whose later life was marked by intense 
Catholic mysticism. Expanding their range of sources to track Catholic ‘roots’ beyond the 
bounds of France, Les AlterCathos included figures such as American anarchist Dorothy Day 
and the Latin American thinkers of Liberation Theology. Les AlterCathos dissected and 
compared these lives: why did Péguy’s Catholicism fuel his nationalism and anti-pacifism 
during World War I, they wondered? On the contrary, why did Weil’s Catholic conversion 
instead develop out of her Marxist and pacifist resistance during the Spanish Civil War and 
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the outbreak of World War II? The very different lives led by these Catholic predecessors 
served to emphasize that, notwithstanding their shared faith, there exists a fundamental 
indeterminacy around how and why the intellectual and spiritual roots of Catholicism come to 
support political projects. This is where Les AlterCathos’s second source of inspiration, the 
Church Social Teaching, came into play. If historical Catholic figures offered too much 
empirical matter and too little theoretical consensus, the reverse was true of the Catholic 
Social Teaching. The central tenets of the CST are clearly exposed in theory, with reference 
to detailed theological underpinnings, but their translation and applicability in daily life are 
left to the reader’s own devices. What does the notion of Catholic ‘human dignity’ add to an 
analysis of past and present inequalities, Les AlterCathos wondered? How, if at all, can the 
‘universal destination of goods’ intersect with industrial production or late-capitalist modes of 
acquisition? And so on and so forth. 
   This stage in Les AlterCathos’s history is once again illuminated by Krøijer’s analytical 
model for the development of Left radical activism: Krøijer’s focus is on ‘political action as 
form’ (2015: 5), and her argument is that by ‘momentarily [giving] determinate form to the 
indeterminate’ (ibid. 12), such forms ‘materialize intentions’ (ibid. 6). Indeed, it is through the 
form of the philosophical meeting, and of the ‘general culture’ conference (Chapter Two), 
that early elements of determinacy appeared in their initially indeterminate project. More 
specifically, it is through their slight adjustment of the usual format of conferences that Les 
AlterCathos manifested their intentions. Contrary to the conferences described in Chapter 
Two – which assume prior knowledge on the part of the audience – AlterCathos meetings 
have always included an element of research and of teaching, insisting on the importance of a 
thorough, personal understanding of core concepts and historical facts. Furthermore, this 
conceptual language was explicitly destined to counter, and eventually replace, the 
participants’ pre-existing use of the ‘Left-Right’ binary as a frame of political analysis. 
During my fieldwork in 2017, David recalled that they ‘used to say that we’re taking a step 
back, we’re putting ourselves on the margins of political parties’ (on se met en marge des 
partis): not only did they stop using the concerns of French political parties as a frame of 
reference, they altogether tried to separate their understanding of ‘politics’ from party politics. 
By doing so, David explained, they clarified that their purpose was not to offer ‘an’ 
alternative or ‘their’ alternative, as a single, unified prescription, but instead to adopt an 
attitude of investigative open-mindedness: 
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What we mean by ‘putting ourselves on the margin’ is that we’re also taking a step back 
from all parties’ hegemonic projects, their way of saying ‘with this campaign program, 
we are going to change everything, we are going to change everything on our own’. 
Instead, our plan is to state what we’re doing, to publish about what we think and do. And 
so in this sense we’re open to the universal (on a une ouverture à l’universel), but beyond 
that we have no pretensions... I mean, I hope we don’t have that boundless (démesurée) 
pretension to change the face of the Earth, or of France, nor even of Lyon. 
   Contrary to usual Catholic conference centres’ purely intellectual pursuits, Les AlterCathos 
saw their own meetings as establishing a continuity between their object of study – empirical 
forms of Catholic politics – and their own lives. By ‘politics’, Les AlterCathos indexed not 
only past Catholics’ engagement in governance, but more widely addressed the ‘political’ 
elements of power, hierarchy, hegemony, or dispute in Catholic figures’ economic and social 
behaviours, embedded in contingent socio-historical contexts. Transcending their earlier 
discomfort with the idea of Catholic engagements in party politics, Les AlterCathos’s 
discussions prompted them to perceive ‘the political’ as a far wider field than only the 
institutions of the State. The historical figures that Les AlterCathos discussed ‘were political 
as Catholics’ everyday and in all of their actions – and so were they, in the contemporary 
context of France. 
   The new epistemological ‘grid of analysis’ (grille d’analyse) they developed, through 
comparisons with historical case studies and with the doctrinal theory of the Church Social 
Teaching, was an applicable frame of reference through which to develop their opinions on 
present-day political, economic, and social matters. During each AlterCathos meeting, the 
thematic exposé of the topo was followed by an in-depth discussion of contemporary French 
and international life. Now, Marie explains, ‘the idea was to make a link between our passion 
for politics and our faith73’ – as actors and not just as academic observers. The focus was no 
longer solely on the contextual conditions from which different Catholic ‘visions of the 
world’ had arisen through time, but shifted to a first-person use of the conceptual tools 
borrowed from history and from the Church Social Teaching, to discuss selected 
 
73 By ‘faith’ (notre foi), here, Marie indexes their efforts to partake of a Catholic culture they saw as their own – 
embodied in the history of Catholic figures and in the concepts of the CST – but also the complex transitions 
which occurred once Les AlterCathos had thoroughly discovered the CST in ‘intellectual’ terms and started 
considering, on an individual and private basis, whether to relate to it in terms of doctrinal obedience and piety 
as well (Engelke 2007; Bielo 2009). 
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contemporary topics such as same-sex marriage, the ‘Uberization’ of labour, or global 
warming. 
 
‘Radical’ recursivity and the ‘provincialisation’ of one’s roots 
Les AlterCathos were hyper-alert, recursively, to the political aspects of their own behaviour: 
in particular, their developing efforts to share their new intellectual framework with others 
were viewed as a central part of their ‘political’ engagement. They opened up their meetings 
to the general public and advertised their talks to growing audiences (it is worth highlighting 
here that when I refer to ‘Les AlterCathos’ in the remainder of this chapter, I continue to mean 
the founding members, who at this point constituted the association’s directing Committee, 
and not audience members who did not influence the further evolution of the association).  
   Les AlterCathos set up a contract with a Lyon-based publishing house, Peuple Libre (‘free 
people’), itself part of a wider umbrella of publishers focused on religion, spirituality, and 
youth; they were given editorial control over the creation of an ‘AlterCathos Collection’. 
They used this platform to increase public awareness of little-known Catholic thinkers: at 
first, they focused on re-publishing the works of Marxist and Catholic mystic Simone Weil, 
mandating a philosopher from the Catholic University of Lyon to edit her work into 
accessible popular content. This endeavour resulted in the publication of two volumes focused 
on Weil’s conception of war (2016) and on her notion of justice and political action (2017). In 
parallel, Les AlterCathos published the proceeds of their conferences on historical forms of 
Catholic engagement with environmentalism; another aspect of Catholic ‘politics’ which they 
found insufficiently available in mainstream literature (de Plunkett 2015; Revol 2015; 
Richard & Rey 2016). 
   Les AlterCathos’s self-consciousness about their own political valence was particularly 
expressed through their gradual emancipation from the guidance of Gérard Leval, and their 
growing insistance on selecting speakers themselves or presenting topos autonomously. From 
an initially passive position as the recipients of the topo’s contents, they started to foreground 
a more dialectic position in the Q&A session after each talk. ‘We received knowledge and 
then we interrogated it,’ David describes, before going even further: ‘We put to the test the 
speakers and their forms of wisdom’ (On met à l’épreuve ces gens qui ont une forme de 
sagesse). Les AlterCathos questioned their invited speakers’ own intellectual and religious 
backgrounds, which might have informed their topo, and pursued a self-aware goal of non-
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partisan critique, unbiased – they hoped – by the social or party-political background of 
speakers. This growing critical attitude towards Leval and invited external speakers, rather 
than fostering a confrontational mindset, rather ‘pacified the debate’, according to Marie, and 
‘opened a space for voluntarily re-creating links between people across difference’. Having 
built up their own ‘grid of analysis’ based on empirical and doctrinal modes in which 
Catholics can be ‘political’, Les AlterCathos gradually expanded the topic of their meetings 
beyond Catholicism, to include empirical politics and political theory more widely. By 
‘inviting speakers or reading authors who have a different vision’ from their own Catholic 
epistemology, Marie describes, ‘we realised and acknowledged that Catholics aren’t correct 
about everything’ (les cathos n’ont pas raison sur tout). Here Marie pauses to mention their 
early grappling with Judith Butler on gender theory – ‘reading Butler pushed us to interrogate 
not only her vision, but also Catholics’ vision of the world’. 
   But this recursive willingness for self-critique had an important outcome: given the range of 
forms of Catholicism they had explored throughout their first year of meetings, Les 
AlterCathos realised that some of their own assumptions, implicitly attributed to 
‘Catholicism’, were instead more contingently derived from their own socio-cultural 
background. Marie describes this phase with a joint sociological and epistemological 
assessment: 
We provincialized ourselves (on s’est décentralisés tous seuls). We realized that every 
time we collectively talked about ‘Catholics’, we really meant Lyonnais Catholics or 
urban Catholics of a particular type – like ourselves – a wholly bourgeois and hyper-
educated sociology, who drown out other Catholic voices.  
This was an uncomfortable realisation, according to Marie, because the association’s very 
early premise – escaping two defined tropes of Catholic engagements in French party politics, 
namely ‘pro-life right-wing cathos de droite and left-wing cathos de gauche who only care 
about prisons and migrants’ – was gradually coming to be replaced by a single hermeneutics 
of suspicion vis-à-vis the right-wing, conservative pole that most AlterCathos members had 
grown up in, and from which they now recognized that they had inherited a particular moral 
tradition. While they never embraced the opposite position of becoming ‘Left-wing Catholics’ 
– since their purpose remained to avoid ‘Left/ Right’ discourses – they acknowledged that 
their political beliefs were becoming less liberal and more social. In particular, they developed 
a marked antipathy towards multinational corporations, especially Amazon, and towards 
large-scale international trade agreements, such as the Canada-Europe Trade Agreement 
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under discussion at the time. Such instances of large-scale profit-seeking, detrimental to 
smaller local businesses, they now saw as incompatible with the Catholic Social Teaching’s 
socio-economic notions of the ‘dignity of work’, ‘universal destination of goods’, and 
‘preferential option for the poor’. 
   At this stage in the association’s life, two of the original twelve members decided to leave 
the association, embrace their pre-existing political habitus, and convert their interest in the 
political into careers as advisers in the parties for which they had previously held an affinity – 
one joined the conservative liberal party UMP, and the other joined the far-right Front 
National. With hindsight in 2017, Marie commented that the remaining ten members’ reaction 
to this episode had been informed by the two men’s respective characters rather than the 
political parties they had joined. One of them (who rejoined the UMP) had praised Les 
AlterCathos for alerting him to the need for reflexivity, which he now hoped to bring to the 
political party for which his family had long voted. His stance was considered legitimate and 
productive by the remaining AlterCathos members despite their own ongoing efforts to 
transcend the sphere of party politics. On the other hand, the second drop-out critiqued Les 
AlterCathos for ‘hiding’ (mettre à couvert) a willful ‘swing to the Left (un tournant à 
gauche)’ under the guise of deconstructing a priori assumptions74. 
   Several years after the creation of Les AlterCathos, one of the founders75  finally wrote and 
published a manifesto articulating the methodological middle-ground which he, and the 
association more widely, had settled on in terms of questioning yet respecting their own 
socio-cultural backgrounds. In the new perspective he describes, there is a productive political 
tension between future and past, and between change and grounding, which allows ‘radical’ 
political engagements in the double sense of ‘new’ and of ‘rooted’ derived from the Latin 
etymology of radix. The book’s cover is illustrated by a drawing of a radish on a celadon 
background, and its title is a pun on radicality and root vegetables: Radicalisons-nous!, ‘let us 
radi(sh)calise ourselves!’ (Bès 2017). Its first pages decry the Islamic ‘radicalism’ which 
 
74 I met this man in 2017: a half-decade after leaving Les AlterCathos, his rancour had grown rather than abated, 
and he regularly posted incendiary commentary about them on Twitter. He once noticed that Marie had 
retweeted a post using gender-neutral language (écriture inclusive), a new form of grammar for the (usually-
gendered) French language which was the focus of a growing moral panic during my fieldwork. He then 
Tweeted that this revealed Marie’s, and Les AlterCathos’s, ‘conversion’ to radical Leftist feminism. 
75 In order to protect the original twelve members’ anonymity, I will not clarify who among them eventually 
published the books I cite here, which by necessity include authors’ real names.  
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underpinned the terrorist attacks of 2015 and 201676; the author instead proposes a different 
vision of the way in which political renewal or ‘radicality’ can be informed by religious and 
socio-cultural ‘roots’: 
We require rootedness to resist the liquefaction of everything that lasts, and radicality to 
stop the petrification of all that evolves. Each of these two political virtues balances the 
other. Without the depth of rootedness, radicality is condemned to a surface action and 
becomes degraded into extremism. Without the vigour of radicality, rootedness is nothing 
but a shrivelling, a ‘stump-ing’ which, without light, leads to atrophy. In an increasingly 
artificial world, reprendre racines, re-claiming roots and re-rooting, is not stepping back 
but continuing to live. (Bès 2017: 16, my translation) 
   Through its reference to ‘roots’, the book is situated within the semantic field of 
conservative (Catholic) spheres 77, yet it exhorts these populations not to essentialise and 
fetishize roots – as Islamic fundamentalists and rising far-right discourses alike were doing in 
2017 (Oliphant 2019). Here, roots are not seen to confer nationalist rights, nor support 
crusading/jihadist universalist projects, but are viewed instead as a check against ‘artificial’ 
lives, a term by which Les AlterCathos express an indictment of the liberal and neoliberal 
economic practices of the wealthy bourgeois spheres they address. 
   Throughout the half-decade between their creation in 2011 and my fieldwork, Les 
AlterCathos had defined the core modalities of their essence: a redefined epistemological 
grasp of intellectual, political, and religious ‘roots’, and a recursive awareness of the 
‘radicality’ of their efforts to be political as Catholics in the French secular context and in the 
neoliberal world. Their mission statement was verbalized in a promise to ‘root the political 
intelligence of the laïety in the social teaching of the Church’78 – the ‘teaching of the Church’, 
here, meaning not only the doctrine of the Vatican, but also the examples and guidance of the 
Church writ large, incarnated in generations of the faithful (Mayblin 2017; 2019). In Marie’s 
 
76 A reference which squarely situates the book within the discursive language of French conservative spheres, 
for whom the terms ‘radical’ and ‘radicalisation’ refered exclusively and obsessively to Islamic fundamentalism, 
rather than to Leftist politics, particularly in the wake of the terror attacks. 
77 Chapter Two discusses the debates about ‘Christian roots’ (racines chrétiennes) which have surrounded 
evocations of rootedness in France since the early-2000s. 
78 AlterCathos programme 2014-2015, available online: 
 https://www.lesalternativescatholiques.fr/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Programme_AlterCathos_2014-2015.pdf 
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words, the group therefore allied the strengths of philosophical reflection with the practicality 
of ‘true rootedness (enracinement) in real life, that of our predecessors and our own’. 
   In many ways then, the ‘alter’ character of Les AlterCathos can be compared with that of 
Left radical activism in substance, in addition to form. Krøijer describes one of the 
foundational aspirations of Left radical activism as ‘the “going to the origin” of widespread 
values about equality, autonomy, popular participation in democracy and social 
“spaciousness”’ (2015: 4). Les AlterCathos also engage in a process of intellectual 
purification of concepts through their practical efforts to live by them. In turn, the forms taken 
by each of their activities – publishing, conference-giving, disengaging from party politics, 
and, as I will discuss below, participating in street protests – are not pre-determined, but 
instead mediate and manifest their intentions (2015: 6). Les AlterCathos’s gradual constitution 
of a Catholic political epistemology enacted and made visible – including to themselves – the 
original members’ desire for a platform where they could investigate the sociological and 
epistemological role of (their own) Catholicism in the elaboration of (their own) political 
beliefs. In turn, this platform allowed them to simultaneously lay claim to and critique their 
own position as ‘Catholics’. 
   In their reflexivity and recursive hermeneutics of suspicion, Les AlterCathos’s meetings are 
therefore substantively different from the ‘philosophical’ Catholic conferences described in 
Chapter Two, despite their close similarities in form once Les AlterCathos started opening 
their meetings to a wider audience. Contrary to Le Collège Supérieur, Les AlterCathos not 
only acknowledge their members’ and audiences’ Catholic background(s), but mobilize it as 
an epistemic tool. Marie once claimed that these differences afford intellectual and political 
‘freedom’ to Les AlterCathos: ‘What a joy to be able to say: goodness, Catholics are such 
idiots about certain things’ (qu’est-ce que les cathos sont cons sur certains trucs). She smiled 
and added a caveat: ‘Of course, we can’t let that develop into a form of scorn or lack of 
charity’. In these few sentences, Marie showcased her simultaneous ability to distance herself 
from, yet remain affiliated to, the ‘Catholics’ she ironically critiqued – here, the bourgeois 
Lyonnais Catholic spheres in which she was born and still lives. Furthermore, she shows her 
abiding commitment to Catholic ‘charity’ not only as a doctrinal imperative, but also as a 
methodological tool for her (self-)critique. 
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La Manif Pour Tous: Écologie intégrale 1.0 
The year 2013 was decisive in the development of Les AlterCathos, who gained visibility 
during La Manif Pour Tous (cf. Chapter One). Like the interlocutors introduced in Chapter 
Two, Les AlterCathos did not oppose the enshrinement in law of same-sex unions but they did 
take issue with several correlates of the proposed law in terms of parenthood, and they were 
especially attracted to the prospect of discovering street protests. Les AlterCathos’s desire to 
witness and participate in ‘French democracy in action’, as Marie later put it, took the form of 
a zealous effort to ‘enrich the debate’ and distinguish themselves from protesters who ‘only’ 
cared about barring the progress of LGBT+ rights. Les AlterCathos's disregard for other 
protesters’ ‘dogmatism’79 stemmed from a genuine rejection of homophobia but almost more 
so from distate at what they saw as the latter’s lack of intellectual exertion. This, they found 
incompatible with the gravitas and responsibility which they considered immanent in any 
participation in governmental or public politics. 
   Individual members were active in coordinating the logistics of transporting hundreds of 
Lyonnais protesters to Paris for each major demonstration, and were interviewed on national 
television coverage of the events 80 . More crucially, several AlterCathos members were 
instrumental in the creation of Les Veilleurs (‘the watchmen’, ‘vigils’ or ‘sentinels’). Having 
been pressed by the police to leave the Esplanade des Invalides after the end of a Manif 
demonstration in Paris, a crowd of protesters spontaneously returned in the evening to sit on 
the plaza by candlelight. Les Veilleurs attracted hundreds of participants and listeners; when 
riot police were sent to supervise their sit-ins, they responded by singing popular French folk 
music and the occasional Scout hymn81. Following the lead of Parisian acquaintances who 
 
79 Referring to these protesters as dogmatique was the more polite version, the other being the use of the label 
bourrin – derived from a pejorative term for horses (the equivalent of ‘nag’) which would best translate as 
‘oafish’. 
80 One AlterCathos founder was on the same team of volunteers as my interlocutors introduced in Chapter One: 
together, they organised coaches for Lyonnais protesters to travel to Paris. January 10th, 2013: ‘Envoyé Spécial: 
La bataille du mariage pour tous’, France 2. 
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3nDCdHaczDM&t=1347s  
81 While the best-known Scouting movements in France are Catholic, not all Scouts are Christian, and indeed 
not all are religious – Scout hymns were chosen because they signalled protesters’ diverse spiritual backgrounds 
and their attachment to nature and community. The songs were nonetheless perceived as ‘Catholic’ by external 
observers unfamiliar with the Scouting world (cf. Chapter One).  
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were also in their mid-twenties and studying philosophy, literature, or the social sciences, 
several AlterCathos members began taking an active public role among Les Veilleurs. During 
the sit-ins, they read out loud from a wide selection of texts ranging from French literature to 
international political culture. Les AlterCathos found, among the Veilleurs sit-ins, a willing 
and plentiful audience for the reflections they had been honing since the creation of their 
association in 2011. As a group, Les Veilleurs professed the aim of going beyond the single 
topic of same-sex marriage and parenthood in order to understand, more generally, the 
political and social contexts in which the ‘Marriage for All’ law proposal had arisen. 
   In short, Les Veilleurs reproduced the investigative approach that Les AlterCathos had 
developed in Lyon, albeit without the latter’s explicit Catholicism and detailed 
epistemological ‘grid of analysis’. However, where Les AlterCathos’s ‘grid of analysis’ was 
designed to continually allow ‘alternative’ analyses of contemporary political situations 
without formulating a single catch-all politics, Les Veilleurs had the broader ambition of 
offering a prescriptive solution to the problem they identified. Honed over the course of 
months of sit-ins and summarized a year later in a book which proved extremely popular 
among young Manif protesters, Les Veilleurs’ analysis adopted a deliberately provocative 
tone and posed the diagnosis that the neoliberal world – particularly under the impetus of the 
academic and tech sectors in the United States82 – had, in the name of progress, stopped 
observing the ‘natural limits’ of the environment and of the human condition. Their argument 
pertained to La Manif insofar as they argued strongly against surrogacy, but they saw their 
own efforts as transcending this protest to make environmental and economic points as well: 
they argued against genetic research, exploitative resource extraction, and generally, any facet 
of what they saw as the global ‘commercialisation of the living’ by profit-seeking, monopoly-
building corporations – what Douglas Holmes has called ‘fast-capitalism’ (2000: 9-13). 
   Les Veilleurs’ book, entitled Our Limits: For An Integral Ecology (Bès, Durano & Rokvam 
2014), instead advocated a ‘radical return to sobriety’ by acknowledging the frailty of nature 
 
82 The United States’ and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom’s neoliberal and multicultural traditions are 
often referred to in France as the ‘Anglo-Saxon model’, by opposition to the ‘French model’ of State 
intervention and Republican universalism (Bowen 2007: 14-15). In this context, there was also a subtext of 
resentment over the perceived hegemonic growth of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ progressivism – the years 2012-2013 were 
marked by a strong rejection of gender studies, la théorie du ‘gender’ (in English in order to reinforce the 
‘foreign’ character of this notion), which the Ministry of Education was attempting to include in reformed 
teaching materials for pre-school children. 
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– both human and environmental. The ‘integral ecology’ they proposed in the title was a call 
for humanity to ‘live simply so that everyone can simply live’; it was an attempt to outline a 
political and moral economy which would combine ‘the absolute respect of human dignity 
and the preservation of biodiversity’ (2014: 11, my translation). But as they set up this overtly 
anti-liberal political and social project based on ‘limits’, they hoped that public opinion would 
distinguish between their form of socio-economic conservatism – virtuous because it was 
intellectually thought-through and designed for the challenges of the 21st century – and the 
unreflexive conservatism of the rest of Manif protesters. In truth, they viewed their own 
project as progressive rather than strictly conservative – while they retained the cultural 
‘roots’ of French traditionalism which are most often associated with the Right, they 
advocated an economic stance of antiliberal degrowth (décroissance) which would seem 
radical to those same populations. Their project was therefore rooted yet radical, as described 
earlier: to their minds, it was ‘progressive’ in the sense of aiming to better the quality of 
human life through Left-leaning social economics; ‘progressive’ in the sense that degrowth 
can be considered a horizon of improvement for the sake of the planet (Rabhi 2010). 
   While their book, and the texts read during Les Veilleurs’ sit-ins more generally, did not 
explicitly draw on Catholic sources or foreground religious morals, the themes raised 
nevertheless implicitly appealed to the – largely Catholic – protesters’ familiarity with 
Christian narratives of respect for human dignity in the context of pro-life movements. Instead 
of having the desired effect of distinguishing Les Veilleurs from other Manif protesters, 
however, the pamphlet Our Limits was read and cited so widely that it blurred those very 
lines. The majority of Manif protesters continued to focus primarily on human bioethics. 
While they followed Les Veilleurs’ impetus to widen the debate beyond the sole topic of 
same-sex marriage and procreation, they took the conversation in the direction of 
‘transhumanism’, borrowing the language of ‘limits’ to reject a vast array of research into 
genomics, human enhancement technologies, and artificial intelligence (Ferry 2016; Hadjadj 
2017; Magnin 2017). 
   Discarding Les Veilleurs’ original notion of ‘integral ecology’ associating human and 
environmental wellbeing, more influential leaders of La Manif Pour Tous latched onto the 
increasingly-popular keyword of ecology to promote a solely anthropocentric vision: coining 
the term écologie humaine or ‘human ecology’ (Gomez 2013; Derville 2016), they argued 
that ‘human nature’ should benefit from the same vigorous conservation efforts that Left-wing 
environmental activists devote to other endangered species. Ultimately, partisans of écologie 
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humaine returned, albeit under a new label, to the themes which are usually associated with 
traditional Catholic advocacy (Ginsburg 1998; Paxson 2004; Elisha 2011): in addition to 
championing male/female biological alterity, the gender binary, and heterosexual procreation, 
écologie humaine came to encompass the rejection of abortion and euthanasia. After Les 
Veilleurs – and through them, Les AlterCathos – had introduced the topic of ecology into the 
debate, it was thus emptied of the environmental and political-economic substance which it 
had originally indexed. Instead of ‘renovating’ the Catholic approach to protest and political 
reflection, the language of ecology allowed traditional actors to consolidate their existing 
stances, and created bitter divisions between proponents of ‘écologie humaine’ and ‘écologie 
intégrale’ – while, on the surface, refracting virtually indistinguishable images of anti-liberal 
and conservative Catholicism. 
   Overall, when looking back to the period of La Manif, it is not helpful to try to distinguish 
how much or how little of Les Veilleurs’s paradigm of écologie intégrale was owed to or 
desired by their few AlterCathos members. What does matter is the way in which Les 
AlterCathos participated in the fusions and fissions taking place among Manif participants 
during the year-long span of the protest (Krøijer 2015: 11, cf. Evans-Pritchard 1940: 147). 
Fusing with Les Veilleurs on the basis of a shared commitment to investigating large-scale 
political theory, and rejecting affiliation with other protesters they found too unreflexive, 
consolidated Les AlterCathos’s reputation among Manif protesters and Lyonnais Catholic 
spheres. More critically, they took a clear stance in the fission between two moral and 
political discourses about ‘ecology’. During this phase, in Marie’s words, Les AlterCathos 
operated ‘une montée en généralité’, a processual notion which is difficult to translate into 
English – they operated a ‘rise to a higher order of generalization’. Drawn from French 
sociologists Boltanski & Thévenot’s theory of ‘justification’ (2006 [1991]), Marie’s use of the 
concept of montée en généralité refers to the crystallization of ideological paradigms, and 
once again offers an emic parallel to Krøijer’s argument that political practice gives 
‘determinate form to the indeterminate’ (2015: 12). The notion of montée en généralité 
indexes the simplification and streamlining of a paradigm in view of, and as a result of, being 
grasped by a larger audience. As Marie sees it, both paradigms of écologie humaine and 
écologie intégrale underwent a crystallization in the latter months of La Manif; two respective 
montées en généralité which were in part driven by their mutual antagonism and ‘denied 
ressemblance’ (cf. Harrison 2003). In other words, whereas Les AlterCathos had, before La 
Manif, been ‘alternative’ primarily in their use of a new Catholic political epistemology to 
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analyse contemporary politics, after La Manif they crystallized not only as a visible actor in 
Catholic spheres, but as an ideologically-marked actor, defined by the prescriptive socio-
economic and environmental ‘grand scheme’ of écologie intégrale (cf. Schielke & Debevec 
2012).  
 
Conclusion: Écologie intégrale 2.0 after Laudato Si’ 
Les AlterCathos’s newfound popularity after La Manif proved problematic for their 
Committee, who doubted their new followers’ comprehension of the association’s aims – in 
2013 or 2014, uninitiated audiences tended to confuse and conflate écologie intégrale and 
écologie humaine, and assumed that Les AlterCathos’s main goal was to continue lobbying 
against same-sex-marriage after the original Manif movement died down. ‘It was a true 
launching moment for us,’ explained Raphaël in 2016, 
but we knew that a lot of people who jumped on the AlterCathos bandwagon actually 
thought that we would be going in a totally different direction from what we truly were 
doing. We figured that those people would shake loose gradually. But it’s frightening, in 
a way: I look at the original Twitter account we opened back then, and out of the 1500 
followers from that period, 1499 are extremist Catholic identitarians two years later (1499 
sont des cathos extrémistes identitaires deux ans plus tard).  
During the year 2014-2015, Les AlterCathos devoted their conference programme to what 
they saw as the basic elements of their thought, in order to instruct their new audiences – by 
doubling down on their ‘teaching’ mission, they further solidified these elements into a fixed 
paradigm rather than only a flexible epistemology. The year started with six conferences on 
‘Political Culture’, split into a first trio of talks asking ‘Can we have faith in party politics?’ 
and another asking ‘Can we have faith in participatory democracy?’. This was followed by 
nine talks on ‘Political thoughts of Catholics’ and nine on ‘The Church Social Teaching for 
dummies’ – the bread and butter of their initial ‘grid of analysis’. Reflecting the association’s 
evolution throughout its contact with Les Veilleurs, the conference programme also included 
four sessions on ecology, introducing the environmental and economic facets of écologie 
intégrale. 
   Mere days after the final conference of the year, mid-June 2015, came the publication of 
Pope Francis’s encyclical Laudato Si’: On Care for Our Common Home. While not all 
encyclicals address social matters, Laudato Si’ was advertised as a new addition to the Church 
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Social Teaching concerning poverty and the environment. David, Marie, and other key 
AlterCathos members read it immediately, given its clear synergies with their existing 
engagement with the CST and ecology. Relating this event to me, they each expressed having 
felt a deep sense of vindication: indeed, Pope Francis’s eagerly-awaited encyclical proved to 
advocate, specifically, an ‘integral ecology’ (original Latin: integra oecologia, French: 
écologie intégrale; 2015: §137-§162). In Laudato Si’, Pope Francis argues that ‘everything is 
connected’; that there exists a synergy between climate change and global inequality, both of 
which are driven and perpetuated by global capitalist systems prioritising technocratic 
expansion and financial profit over the ‘Common Good’. It is a strikingly similar argument to 
that made by Les Veilleurs in their earlier manifesto (Bès et al 2014), albeit with a global 
rather than national scale of analysis, the addition of thorough theological and scientific 
foundations, and an optimistic rather than provocative tone when calling for change going 
forward. The ‘integral ecology’ advocated by Francis in response to climate change and 
global inequality is therefore ‘integral’ in that it takes into account the entirety of the planet 
and its people, and ‘ecological’, rather than merely environmental, in that it addresses the 
links and interconnections between all the parts of this whole.  
   Francis pitches his ‘integral ecology’ against two strands of existing activism: most 
obviously, the biocentric, Malthusian proponents of population control, who prioritise the 
environment over humanity, and more subtly, the tendency of his own Catholic flock to view 
the safekeeping of humanity as merely a matter of pro-life activism, too often without regard 
for social inequalities or the protection of the planet (2015: §49-50) – a firm indictment of the 
champions of écologie humaine, in the minds of Les AlterCathos. To both traditions, Francis 
opposes that ‘we have to realize that a true ecological approach always becomes a social 
approach; it must integrate questions of justice in debates on the environment, so as to hear 
both the cry of the earth and the cry of the poor’ (2015: §49, original emphasis). 
   Les AlterCathos gave a central place to Laudato Si’ in their conference programme for the 
following year (2015-2016), with a series of conferences titled ‘Ecology according to Laudato 
Si’ and another cycle called ‘Responding to the call of Laudato Si’. The talks did not address 
the entirety of Laudato Si’: leaving aside its theological chapters 83 , they referenced the 
sections which more closely aligned with their prior interests – ‘Chapter One: What Is 
 
83  ‘Chapter Two: The Gospel of Creation’ (Pope Francis 2015: §62-§100), and ‘Chapter Six: Ecological 
Education and Spirituality’ (ibid. §202-§246). 
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Happening With Our Common Home’ (§17-§61) which highlights ‘pollution and climate 
change, ‘the issue of water’, the ‘loss of biodiversity’, the ‘decline in the quality of human life 
and the breakdown of society’, and ‘global inequality’; Chapter Two on ‘The Human Roots of 
the Ecological Crisis’ (§101-§136), which critiques globalization and the technocratic 
paradigm; Chapter Three on ‘Integral Ecology’ (§137-§162), and finally the section on 
‘politics and economy in dialogue for human fulfillment’ within ‘Chapter Five: Lines of 
Approach and Action’ (§163-§201). In short, where the year 2014-2015 had been devoted by 
Les AlterCathos to ‘teaching’ conservative Catholic audiences key concepts from the history 
of Catholic politics and from the Church Social Teaching, in order that they may question 
‘how to be political as Catholics’ in the contemporary world, the year 2015-2016 gave the 
answer wholesale: by following écologie intégrale and Laudato Si’. Following the montée en 
généralité – the paradigmatic generalization – by which Les AlterCathos had defined their 
own political-economic version of écologie intégrale up to 2015, the publication of Laudato 
Si’ allowed a second layer of crystallization, this time expressly tying écologie intégrale to 
religion and normative doctrine. 
   I might have started this chapter’s discussion there: asking, like Eric Hoenes del Pinal’s 
study of the reception of Laudato Si’ in the Verapaz, ‘how translocal Roman Catholic 
doctrines become localized in the life-worlds of specific Catholic communities’ (2019: 293). 
But I suggest that in this particular case, the usual direction of the ‘flow’ of Catholic ‘ideas, 
discourses, and symbols’ (ibid.) – from the translocal to the local, from the Church to the 
laiety, from Rome to Lyon – was inverted in my interlocutors’ eyes. Indeed, they saw their 
pre-existing commitment to ecology as a way of ‘doing politics as Catholics’ become a global 
Catholic proposition thanks to Francis’s intervention. They considered that their national 
conflict against the more traditionalist partisans of écologie humaine was ‘resolved’ through 
the – unwitting and coincidental – arbitration of the Pope; and that their local efforts to ‘be 
alternative’ and ‘renovate society’ among their largely Right-wing, bourgeois Catholic 
background was likewise vindicated. Laudato Si’ was hailed across the world as a radically 
new direction on the part of the Papacy, who had never before addressed environmentalism, 
or been so categorical in dispensing political and economic advice – but as far as Les 
AlterCathos were concerned, the contents of Laudato Si’ were a confirmation of their own 
attempts at ‘radicality’ since 2011. 
   Launching Part Two’s exploration of the praxis of écologie intégrale, this chapter has 
shown how the paradigm was developed into a religious ‘grand scheme’ by a particular group 
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of Lyonnais Catholics who granted it epistemological coherence and imbued it with objective 
(Papal) power (cf. Schielke & Debevec 2012: 7). It has argued that écologie intégrale is a 
‘radical’ new Catholic politics: it is supported by a ‘rooted’ Catholic political epistemology, 
and it advocates a non-partisan, social, and green avenue of political action. In so doing, it 
both finds value in the sociological milieu from which Les AlterCathos originate – the 
conservative Catholic bourgeoisie of Lyon remains their ‘roots’ – and challenges this 
population’s previous political practices. This political epistemology is intended to guide 
conservative Catholics through a process of intellectual, cultural, and social change, much 
like the theory of cultural change described by Joel Robbins (2004): taking as its starting 
point French Catholics’ recent rise in interest for politics, epitomised by La Manif Pour Tous, 
it gradually moves away from Right-wing party politics and traditional bioethical 
commitments, towards a vision of politics which no longer prioritizes statecraft, but instead 
promotes green and social action in daily life. The next chapter will now turn precisely to 
action: it will explore how Les AlterCathos put écologie intégrale into practice in their café, 
newly-opened in 2016; and it will address the ways in which Les AlterCathos include lapsed 






























































Putting Écologie Intégrale Into Practice 




This chapter explores how Les Alternatives Catholiques put into practice the paradigm of 
écologie intégrale – their new vision of Catholic politics, elaborated in the previous chapter – 
in the space of their café ‘Le Simone’. It argues that Les AlterCathos’s efforts to instantiate 
écologie intégrale and transmit it to new audiences creates but also manages a tension 
between ‘ethics of efficacy’ and ‘ethics of conviction’ in Le Simone. Contributing to Part 
Two’s investigation of the rise of this new Catholic political theology, this chapter aims to go 
beyond ‘piety’ in the study of religious actors’ imagination and curation of ‘good worlds’. 
 
Introduction 
Les Alternatives Catholiques inaugurated their café on April 1st, 2016. Named Le Simone in 
homage to 1940s philosopher and Catholic mystic Simone Weil, the café was intended as a 
space in which Les AlterCathos could put into application the green and social paradigm of 
écologie intégrale, which had so far remained a more theoretical, esoteric object of discussion 
among the association’s Committee and during the association’s evening conferences84. For 
 
84 See Chapter Three. The paradigm of écologie intégrale was developed by the founders – now Committee 
members – of Les AlterCathos in a bid to ‘be political as Catholics’, albeit in a different manner than their 
largely Right-wing background. Inspired by the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church, by the recently-
published Papal encyclical Laudato Si’, but also by the practical example of historical Catholic figures such as 
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the first six months of the café’s existence, its walls were decorated with large, vividly yellow 
posters detailing Simone Weil’s life: her tenure as a philosophy teacher in France, her 
investment in anti-fascist political activism, her participation in the Anarchist columns during 
the Spanish Civil War, her ecstatic conversion to Catholicism, and finally her relocation to 
London during World War II where she supported the French Resistance while working as a 
factory hand. Although ‘Simone’, as she was affectionately known by the first café regulars, 
had never written about environmentalism or about the Church Social Teaching, she served as 
a mascot representing several of Les AlterCathos’s core aspirations: a strong sense of personal 
engagement, a passion for philosophy and politics, an alertness to the importance of labour 
and community roots, and through it all, an attachment to Catholicism. 
   Le Simone was opened firstly with a practical goal in mind: it serves as a locale for Les 
AlterCathos’s evening conferences, which had until then been held in rooms rented or 
borrowed from Catholic associations and schools across Lyon. Several of these other Catholic 
actors contributed to the initial fundraising85 for the opening of Le Simone: among them were 
the diocese’s cultural fund, the Fondation Saint-Irénée; the Collège Supérieur (Chapter Two); 
and also a collective of donors from the grandes familles lyonnaises and grands patrons, the 
longstanding Catholic high society and entrepreneurs of Lyon (Chapter One). Amid this well-
established, largely conservative Catholic network, Les AlterCathos consider that Le Simone 
has a further, more militant goal beyond hosting their conferences: its aim is to promote 
écologie intégrale on a daily basis within one of the most traditional Catholic neighbourhoods 
in town. Broadly speaking, this is the present chapter’s ethnographic focus: how Les 
AlterCathos put écologie intégrale into practice in Le Simone. 
   To the founding members of Les AlterCathos, putting écologie intégrale into practice can 
only be a bottom-up process driven by a growing number of invested members, rather than 
one coordinated centrally by themselves. As the AlterCathos President, David Coureau, 
summarized it during an ‘open consultation’ event a year after the opening of Le Simone,  
At first, we were an association of intellectuals holding conferences, but we came to 
realise we must lay down concrete actions. Le Simone was imagined as a place which 
 
Simone Weil, the paradigm of écologie intégrale is in equal measures green and social. It associates the welfare 
of the planet with the welfare of mankind. 
85  After this initial fundraising, Le Simone was financially independent – and also independent in its 
development. 
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could incarnate three elements: life, reflection, and labour. Without life, intellectual 
discipline becomes dry, and so does the rigour of labour. We need to ensure that life 
persists, and indeed, there is a vitality in this place, which wasn’t guaranteed when we 
launched. 
In order to sustain the ‘vitality’ of Le Simone, Les AlterCathos welcome participation, in the 
form of ‘life, reflection, and labour’, from all comers – neighbourhood locals, café regulars, 
and members of the traditional Catholic spheres. The daily life of Le Simone is run in a 
decentralised way, whereby the Committee encourage newcomers to host events and activities 
within the space, and do not much police independent initiatives once they have been 
launched: the atmosphere is both ‘do it yourself’ and, with some limits which I will address in 
this chapter, ‘live and let live’. 
   ‘We, the founding members, our specialty is intellectual activity,’ David explained, 
and that’s why we insist on the brisk rhythm of the conferences. Every Wednesday, at the 
very least – when the rhythm disappears, so does the vitality. That’s what we can bring to 
the rest of you; and what you can contribute is perhaps something different. If you have 
an idea, come and tell us “I’m going to do this”. We’re not here to give you permission – 
at worst we’ll tell you it sounds unreasonable. Most of all, we’re not here to run it for 
you. 
Marie Sève, a Vice-President of Les AlterCathos, later explained to me that she heard in 
David’s speech a welcoming attitude, granting audience members the freedom to use Le 
Simone as a ‘laboratory’ (un laboratoire) for the development of initiatives. More familiar 
with the paradigm of écologie intégrale than I, Marie pointed out some of its central tenets 
between the lines of David’s speech: ‘life, reflection, and labour’ are cornerstones of ‘human 
dignity’ and of the ‘dignity of work’ according to the Church Social Teaching (Pope Pius XI 
1931); and David’s foregrounding of ‘collective life’ was a conscious attack both against 
neoliberal individualism and against alienating bureaucratic or corporate organisations. Rather 
than centralising the running of Le Simone into the hands of the AlterCathos Committee, 
therefore, Marie considered that the inclusion of new members into this collective ‘vitality’, 
regardless of their religious, academic, or social background, would create a ‘Common Good’ 
(Bien Commun). This, in turn, corresponds to Les AlterCathos’s conception of political 
engagement, embodied in everyday life as a form of prefigurative politics (Chapter Three; 
Krøijer 2015). 
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   If the previous chapter explored the epistemological set-up of écologie intégrale, this 
chapter follows by addressing its practical instantiation – the ‘everyday practice’ of last 
chapter’s ‘grand scheme’ (cf. Schielke & Debevec 2012). In Chapter Three, I argued that 
écologie intégrale – as an intellectual paradigm – relies on a new vision of the articulation of 
‘roots’ and ‘radicality’, whereby one’s roots, such as Catholic, national, and local traditions, 
are both valued and transcended in service of a new, ‘radical’, social and green outlook. In 
this chapter, I will show that the renewal of roots plays a part in the way newcomers are 
gradually introduced to écologie intégrale in Le Simone, as the décor of the café both draws 
on, and ‘makes strange’, the visual codes of Catholic spaces. I will explore how the 
decentralised ‘vitality’ of Le Simone draws newcomers – both Catholic and not – into the 
efforts of community-building and green practices prescribed by écologie intégrale; albeit 
with two possible stumbling blocks. Indeed, there is a first tension between Les AlterCathos’s 
wish that Le Simone should be run as a decentralised, grassroots operation, and their desire 
that it should nevertheless evolve in a precise direction, that of écologie intégrale. The second 
source of tension is embedded in the first, and concerns the intended audience of Le Simone: 
ostensibly a neighbourhood café, welcoming all newcomers to become invested in the daily 
life of the space, the question eventually arises of whether it matters that participants should 
actually be Catholic. 
   Recent work in the anthropology of ethics has drawn a contrast between ‘world-oriented’ 
and ‘I-oriented’ teleologies (Mattingly 2014). In a ‘world-oriented’ ethical project, ‘the social 
world is neither residual nor ancillary to the self, but is itself the purpose of moral judgement 
and action’ (Piliavsky & Sbriccoli 2016 : 376). I argue that écologie intégrale is one such 
world-oriented project, whose judgment and action are directed towards the care of the planet 
and the care of its people – the ‘care for our common home’, to paraphrase the subtitle of the 
encyclical Laudato Si’ (Pope Francis 2015). As Raphaël Saônat, another Vice-President of 
Les AlterCathos, put it, ‘Écologie intégrale is not dogmatic’: 
Instead of having a set of fixed foundations from which are directly derived actions, there 
is an inversion: Laudato Si’ allows you to think about a social observation, about the goal 
you are searching for, and from there you can backtrack and find in the Social Doctrine 
the guidelines […86] which are most appropriate. 
 
86 Here Raphaël cites ‘subsidiarity’ as one such guideline. Subsidiarity will be the focus of the next chapter. 
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Following the example of one of his Papal predecessors (Pope John XXIII 1963), Pope 
Francis chooses to dedicate Laudato Si’ ‘to the entire Catholic world’ and ‘to all men and 
women of good will’, but even further, Francis writes, ‘I wish to address every person living 
on this planet’ (2015: §3). As an outcome-driven, ‘world-oriented’ project, therefore, Les 
AlterCathos consider that anyone can participate in écologie intégrale. As David Coureau 
sees it, 
If Catholics and non-Catholics agree on the goals they are searching for, which seems to 
me to be the case in Le Simone with regards to climate change and global inequality, then 
Les AlterCathos’s reading of Laudato Si’ offers in answer a Catholic discourse which is 
acceptable to non-Catholics. 
From the perspective of Les AlterCathos’s Committee, putting écologie intégrale into practice 
in Le Simone is not a project of evangelisation, and does not rely on participants’ own 
Catholic faith. These premises support the ‘do it yourself’ atmosphere they foster in Le 
Simone: the Committee’s concern is with the outcomes of new initiatives launched by 
regulars, which should contribute to the green and social character of the café, rather than 
with the initiators’ personal beliefs. However, David or Raphaël’s capacity to discursively 
parse out the place of faith and action in écologie intégrale comes from their own in-depth 
understanding of the logical mechanisms of the paradigm, borne out of years of intellectual 
engagement with it – while newcomers to Le Simone are only just discovering it. As I will 
show in this chapter, the regulars of Le Simone – who include pious, lapsed, and non-
Catholics (cf. Mayblin 2017) – find themselves questioning whether and to what extent 
Catholic faith is a prerequisite to participate in écologie intégrale. 
   I will therefore argue that there exists a tension in the daily running of Le Simone between 
ethics of efficacy (Piliavsky & Sbriccoli 2016) – the idea that ‘getting things done’ (ibid.: 2) 
matters more than underlying reasonings or the virtues of individual actors – and what I will 
call ‘ethics of conviction’, where it matters most that these actions are done for a reason, and 
that individual actors are alert to, articulate about, and committed to the environmental, 
political, and Catholic moral traditions undergirding their actions. In other words, the tension 
– both ethnographic and analytical – lies between two possible understandings of what is 
entailed in ‘putting a Catholic discourse into practice’: an efficacy-oriented view deems the 
whole project to be ‘Catholic’ so long as its desired outcomes are instantiated, while a 
conviction-oriented view holds that one must be Catholic in order to act in a Catholic manner. 
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   This equivocity speaks to a long-standing conundrum in the anthropology of religious 
‘legal, medical and political practices’ (Asad 1993: 124), that Talal Asad identified and 
critiqued as anthropologists’ social-scientific tendency to view our role as ‘identifying what 
part of it is “true religion”’ (ibid.). Indeed, it would be tempting to ask what part of écologie 
intégrale is ‘true’ Catholicism – much as the regulars of Le Simone ask themselves – and to 
answer this question on the basis of Simone members’ piety, lapsedness, or lack of faith. 
Taking on board Asad’s critique, however, I do not highlight Simone members’ diverse 
relationships with the Catholic faith with the intent to emit an assessment of écologie 
intégrale’s true or partial ‘Catholicism’ – my aim is to flip the question around. What 
analytical spaces are opened up if we take as a starting point Les AlterCathos’s and Laudato 
Si’s initial assertion that écologie intégrale is Catholic? It is here that the concern of this 
chapter, namely the practical instantiation of écologie intégrale, rejoins the broader concern 
of this thesis with forms of Catholic political theology. I will argue that viewing écologie 
intégrale, and political theologies more widely, as ‘world-oriented religious ethics’, grants the 
analytical flexibility to address emic negotiations about whether faith and piety matter in 
religious projects – without assuming that a praxis is religious only in proportion to its piety. 
 
Le Simone – a logistical introduction 
Le Simone is situated in the family-oriented and traditionally Catholic district of Ainay, at a 
slight distance from the truly-fashionable and touristy centre of Lyon. Within Ainay, the café 
is itself a few streets removed from the busy but aging neighbourhood high-street, with its 
chain-store clothing retailers, chain-store sandwich bars, and independent but grubby antique 
dealers. The area used to be the home of the Lyonnais aristocracy, and then of the city’s 
grande bourgeoisie in the 19th-century; its main thoroughfare and commercial hub, the rue 
Victor-Hugo, was one of the very first to be pedestrianised in the mid-1970s – marking the 
last significant renovation of the neighbourhood, which has since become gently shabby. The 
areas immediately to the north and south of Ainay along the Presqu’Île – the tapered 
peninsula between the parallel Rhône and Saône rivers – have been the focus of extensive 
development in the past ten years: to the north lies the centre of town with its fast-developing 
luxury and tourist industries, and to the south, a new residential quarter with a giant shopping 
centre is emerging where the old industrial docks used to be. Ainay, in the middle, is much 
more sedate; most Lyonnais only ever transit through it on their way to the train station or the 
Catholic University, which together mark the southernmost boundary of the neighbourhood. 
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But in 2016, the opening of Le Simone joined a nascent wave of community-led rejuvenation. 
Amid the deteriorating fast-fashion and fast-food outlets which had been the neighbourhood’s 
pride back in the early decades of mass-market consumerism, and against the fast-paced 
transformation of the city to the north and south, a younger demographic of Ainay locals 
started launching independent businesses geared towards ‘authentic’, green-minded, 
neighbourly living. It is in the narrow backstreets running parallel to the central rue Victor-
Hugo, hemmed on either side by the two rivers, that local residents now look for newly-
opened cafés and small restaurants, tiny clothing stores and art boutiques, bookshops – 
rejoining the Christian bookstores already peppering the area – artisan boulangeries and 
butchers’, as well as a wholesale, plastic-free grocery store. 
   Le Simone was likewise opened by locals, for locals: Marie Sève lives five minutes away on 
foot, as does David Coureau with his wife and three young children. Le Simone occupies a 
large street-front space, relative to the neighbourhood’s generally small stores: its disused 
premises were renovated by hand by Les AlterCathos to spare costs. They partitioned the lot 
into two spaces: a café and a larger area destined to become a coworking space, a shared 
workplace with monthly desk rentals. The café side of the business guaranteed a stream of 
passersby while the coworking side would allow the consolidation of a core group of daily 
visitors; helping to advertise Les AlterCathos and hopefully attracting new audiences to the 
conferences held after hours in either the café or coworking spaces.  
   When Les AlterCathos first discussed opening a street-front business, they considered how 
the practicalities and logistics of such an undertaking might be made to conform to écologie 
intégrale. It was agreed that the café would serve only locally-sourced and preferably organic 
products; it was decided that prices would be kept low and profit avoided; and more 
profoundly, it was determined that the coworking side should offer an affordable gathering 
space to self-employed or telecommuting young professionals, who might be precarious or 
isolated. In theory therefore, Le Simone would serve the Common Good by being 
environmentally-friendly and promoting ‘human dignity’ – a pillar of the Catholic Social 
Teaching – both by creating a neighbourly space of belonging and by fostering the ‘dignity of 
work’87 – another pillar of the CST and key element of Simone Weil’s philosophy. In practice 
 
87 While the notion of ‘dignity of work’ in the Church Social Doctrine initially concerned the 19th and 20th-
century industrial working classes, Les AlterCathos consider that it also applies today to precarious workers in 
alienating gig economies, including in competitive white-collar service jobs. Pragmatically, Les AlterCathos 
considered that they could not be of much help to blue-collar workers, since the café is located in a central and 
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however, these carefully-reasoned plans were only clearly articulated among, and understood 
by, the philosophers of the AlterCathos Committee. When I first visited Le Simone’s café in 
the winter of 2016, six months after its opening, and gained membership to the coworking 
space in January 2017, the café’s two part-time salaried managers – neither of whom were 
AlterCathos Committee members prior to taking on this executive role – its team of volunteer 
baristas, and its still-developing group of local regulars, were focused on the day-to-day 
logistics of launching a new business, and had only a surface awareness of the ‘green and 
Catholic’ project (écolo catho) underpinning the creation of Le Simone. 
   When I started my fieldwork in Le Simone, large posters on the walls described the life of 
Simone Weil, and explained how her philosophical work and political engagements had 
encouraged Les AlterCathos to open this café. At the time, I did not realise how lucky I was to 
see this spelled out – the posters were taken down shortly thereafter, and the walls of Le 
Simone have since served as gallery space for little-known or local artists to expose their 
work. For the first six months of the café’s existence, curious passersby pushing the door had 
a chance to read about the purpose behind Le Simone – that the café is run by a Catholic 
association committed to environmental action and community-building – but nowadays, 
newcomers are left guessing. The majority of customers are neighbourhood inhabitants – 
middle- to upper-class, largely traditional in their dress and behaviour – as well as students 
and professors from the nearby Catholic University of Lyon (UCLy) and members of the 
wider Lyonnais cathosphère88. A smaller but nonetheless regular proportion of café clients is 
composed of construction workers from the building sites south of Ainay, who pop into Le 
Simone for cheap espressos and quick chats with the friendly baristas. 
   Whether they visit once or daily, Simone customers must sign up as ‘members’: indeed, the 
café is run according to the legal provision for ‘associative cafés’ (café associatif), which can 
only serve association members. This legal setup has several benefits: opening hours and 
prices are flexible and do not submit to trade-competition regulations; and while Le Simone is 
not licensed for hard liquor, it can still serve wine and beer. Signing up for membership is a 
formality: a 0.10€ charge is added to new clients’ first bill, who are asked to input their email 
address onto the membership roll. On this occasion, baristas are supposed to mention Les 
 
well-to-do neighbourhood of Lyon; so taking a concern for isolated or precarious white-collar professionals was 
a compromise of sorts. 
88 See Thesis Introduction for a sociological description of the cathosphère. 
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AlterCathos – as the associative body running Le Simone – and offer a booklet with the year’s 
conference programme. In practice, they only do so when they remember to, and there is no 
queue waiting to be served – but these conversations between baristas and customers form a 
successful advertising platform for the association. All new members are automatically signed 
up for Les AlterCathos’s monthly email newsletter: by this definition, Les AlterCathos 
gathered 3,000 ‘members’ by the end of my fieldwork, a year and a half after the opening of 
Le Simone. This chapter refers more realistically to 250 or so Simone ‘regulars’, who include 
the Committee of Les AlterCathos, composed of around 25 members of varying dedication; a 
dozen volunteer baristas who hold an intermediate position half-in and half-out of the 
Committee; 40 or so coworking space members, who are not necessarily local to the 
neighbourhood or indeed Catholic; a crowd of regular participants in the diversity of events, 
workshops, and conferences hosted in Le Simone in the evenings and at the weekend; and 
finally, a friendly collection of recurring customers such as the construction workers or the 
employees of the nearby dance studio who primarily take an interest in the café qua café, 
rather than in the rest of the association’s events. 
 
Le Simone – a conceptual (albeit equivocal) introduction 
In Chapter Three, I addressed Les AlterCathos’s conferences, which introduce growing 
audiences to the paradigm of écologie intégrale in an explicit and intellectual way. The café 
Le Simone has, since 2016, been intended as a practical and everyday means to discover 
écologie intégrale outside of the conference setting. But how can a space introduce a 
paradigm? In this section, I show that Le Simone has an equivocal décor, based on hints and 
irony. Visual hooks draw on Catholic, green, and local cultural ‘roots’, but do not clearly spell 
out the tenets of écologie intégrale. This equivocal décor, initially accidental and now 
intentional, induces newcomers into asking questions and becoming involved in Le Simone’s 
activities. It therefore serves the purpose of community-building, which is in and of itself one 
of the aims of écologie intégrale. It is also a first instance of the tension discussed throughout 
this chapter, between efficacy – here, running a café qua café, and decorating the space 
without reflecting at first on the decorations’ meaning – and conviction, as the café’s 
haphazard décor becomes retroactively ‘justified’ in terms of ecology and Catholicism. 
      No Simone customer is ever asked whether they are Catholic when baristas sign them up 
for membership upon their first visit and introduce them to Les AlterCathos. The question 
would be inappropriate in social life in general and even more so in a business context. 
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Nonetheless, it is also because of the retail setting that these conversations between strangers 
are possible at all; and it is over the course of discussing a third party – the association Les 
AlterCathos – that a mutual introduction occurs between customers and Le Simone, embodied 
in the person of the barista. Indeed, clients who mention having heard about Les AlterCathos 
previously implicitly hint at their own social background, very likely tied to the elite private 
schools described in Chapter Two, and therefore, very likely Catholic. Mutual acquaintances 
might be pinpointed, who might have recommended that these new clients visit Le Simone. 
Other customers are surprised, and express interest – the assumption that they might be 
Catholic but perhaps from a different social milieu is left unsaid. These conversations, at first 
glance, resemble ‘anonymous introductions’ (Candea 2010b) which establish connections 
rather than identities. Key personal information is momentarily bracketed off – names are not 
exchanged, and Catholicism is not addressed directly – until such a time as underlying 
‘mutual possessions’ of acquaintances, backgrounds, and interests are revealed (cf. Tarde 
1999 [1895]: 86; in Candea 2010b: 125). In Matei Candea’s case study among Corsican 
villagers, ‘anonymous introductions’ serve to hold in abeyance the disconnections between 
strangers: rather than acknowledging that one does not know one’s interlocutor by asking for 
their identity point-blank, the exploration of pre-existing connections ‘pre-empt the direct 
opposition between self and other’ (Candea 2010b: 130). In Le Simone, there are rare 
occasions when new clients express disquiet – worry or annoyance – when they are told about 
Les AlterCathos. Stating that they, themselves, are not Catholic, these clients return to an 
identity-based – and oppositional – introduction to question whether they belong in the café89. 
When such explicit disconnections are established, however, the baristas assure clients that 
they are more than welcome: the café is a public space, baristas will insist, before suggesting 
that among the diversity of events held within Le Simone, perhaps one – other than the 
Catholic conferences – might interest the newcomers after all. 
   And there are many events in Le Simone. The glass front door of the café is covered in a 
multitude of colourful Scotch-taped A4 posters, advertisements for the near future or left over 
from the recent past. Inside the café, a narrow room with a spare, modern aesthetic, visitors 
 
89 I have never known a café customer to refuse to be added to Le Simone’s membership: while a few have made 
clear that they would unsubscribe from the email newsletter, they have not found this to be an impediment to 
having a one-off meal or coffee. However, in one case, a prospective coworking member – i.e. someone whose 
visit would not be one-off but long-term – decided not to join Le Simone after all, as she did not want her 
monetary contribution (the monthly coworking subscription) to finance Catholic conferences. 
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will find that the posters continue on a large cork board next to the small counter. Most of the 
flyers concern the conferences run weekly or twice-weekly by Les AlterCathos, but there is a 
profusion of other events on offer. To new arrivals, it is not immediately clear why a café 
should also offer poetry evenings and folk dances on an irregular basis, or a weekly comic-
drawing workshop, or a vegetable collection point. Some new arrivals also express doubt as to 
what, exactly, is the main financial priority for Le Simone: while a portable billboard on the 
pavement advertises sandwiches, those run out mid-lunch rush more often than not, leaving 
only a small selection of coffees, teas, and bottled beers. The counter next to the (empty) 
sandwich fridge is cluttered with home-printed copies of the café’s own newspaper – a 
scrawled Post-It indicates ‘2€ for the monthly revolutionary Lyonnais Catholic broadsheet!’. 
It may seem odd for a café to have a monthly paper, but since it does, it may in turn seem odd 
that the ‘monthly’ paper is systematically a season out of date – it hardly sets itself up as a 
sound business or editorial plan. Overall, Le Simone is peculiar in that it gives off a first 
impression of calm and harmony – seen from the street through broad windows, the white 
walls, light wooden furniture and tall plants create an attractively serene atmosphere – which 
is immediately belied by the haphazard, lived-in feel of the place at second glance. Layered 
across the clean, sophisticated décor are a profusion of eclectic add-ons: a goldfish tank 
labelled ‘Sushi – 2€’, for instance, or a tip jar labelled ‘democratips’, with two coin slots 
encouraging customers to arbitrate between Star Wars and Lord of the Rings. By the time 
customers have noticed that every sandwich on the menu is named after local football stars or 
Catholic Popes, and spotted the bookshelf filled with political texts and children’s colouring 
books, they might have developed the impression that a great many things are run at once in 
Le Simone, but not always fully or coherently. 
   Customers might not be aware of the existence of the much larger coworking space next 
door to the café; they might notice, however, a number of smartly-dressed young men and 
women in their late-twenties and thirties walking into Le Simone with a cheerful hello to the 
barista, heading straight to the door marked ‘loo’, and never reappearing. In fact, there is a 
tiny, dark, windowless room behind that door: it holds a cramped kitchenette and three more 
doors, two of which open onto toilet stalls and the third marked ‘no access’. This one leads 
into the coworking, a bright, spacious, and high-ceilinged room with a mezzanine and the 
same modern and plant-filled aesthetic as the café. Once again, first and second impressions 
clash: the decorating scheme may be airy and fashionable, but the low bookshelf is filled with 
zombie-themed board games, comic books and toy cap-guns. Likewise, the young 
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professionals typing away at their laptops seem studious, but a peek at their computer screens 
might reveal that several of them are engaged in a multiplayer round of the first-person 
shooter game Counter-Strike. 
   In short, neither the café nor the coworking space quite look like one might expect a 
‘Catholic space’ to look. While there are signs of Catholicism, many of them seem to be an 
after-thought or even ironic: there is a foot-tall, plain wooden cross on the café counter, but it 
is propped behind the coffee grinder and partially hidden by the music speakers. In the winter 
there are Christmas trees in the café and in the coworking space, but they are decorated with 
handmade cardboard ornaments cut out of egg boxes and loo rolls – the tree in the coworking 
is topped by a beer bottle spray-painted gold in lieu of a star. Finally, on the café bookshelf, 
there is a framed A4-size image of Pope Francis – but rather than a traditional devotional 
memento, it is a cartoon depiction of Francis in a neon-green cassock and zucchetto90, angrily 
brandishing a stone tablet inscribed with ‘THOU SHALT NOT POLLUTE’ (tu ne pollueras point), 
cut out from the front page of left-wing newspaper Libération. The cartoon, dated mid-June 
2015, not only parodies the Ten Commandments but evokes the terrorist attacks of January 
2015 in Paris, after the satirical left-wing newspaper Charlie Hebdo published caricatures of 
the Prophet Muhammad. In the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo shooting, cartoon depictions 
of religious figures were intended as deliberate expressions of journalistic free speech, against 
accusations of blasphemy (Favret-Saada 2017: 475ff). As an ornament for Le Simone, this 
framed portrait of an irate green Pope Francis – parodic at best, blasphemous at worst – can 
therefore seem ambiguous, to say the least. In other words, even customers who had, upon 
first discovering Le Simone, established ‘connection’ and belonging on the basis of mutual 
acquaintances, a shared social milieu, or a shared interest in the premise of a Catholic café, 
eventually reach a stage of confusion or incomprehension. The sense of disconnection 
acknowledged immediately by newcomers who state that they are not Catholic, occurs later 
down the line for the majority of customers whose knowledge of Catholic traditions and 
doctrine only goes so far in explicating the functioning of Le Simone. 
   Visitors are encouraged to view the decoration and organisation of Le Simone as purposeful 
– the playful eclecticism is clearly not arbitrary – but the purpose is far from transparent. If 
anything, the most explicit elements, which suggest a Catholic politics – the ‘revolutionary’ 
 
90 The hemispherical skull-cap worn by Catholic clerics. Its colour – never green – denotes the cleric’s rank; the 
Pope and Pope emeritus wear white cassocks and zucchetti. 
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Lyonnais Catholic broadsheet on the counter, the framed Libé on the bookshelf – are also the 
most likely to seem farcical, on par with the coin jar of ‘democratips’. The dissonances within 
Le Simone recreate a boundary of knowledge and belonging, which sets it apart from other 
Catholic spaces in Lyon: ‘an inside, an interiority which is all the more impenetrable for not 
being straightforwardly spatialized’ (Candea 2010b: 128). This boundary can only be 
breached thanks to the explanations of insiders, clarifying how the puzzle pieces fit together. 
Café customers, or new coworking members familiarising themselves with the space, very 
often ask to understand, and prompt conversations with baristas or longstanding regulars who 
delight in enlightening them. Why decorate Christmas trees with recycled trash? Why refuse to 
sell Coca-Cola or other mainstream brands? Curious customers are introduced in broad terms 
to the Catholic and anti-capitalist notion of écologie intégrale, and told that ‘Thou shalt not 
pollute’ should be taken at face-value, as a summarization of Le Simone’s ethical and 
religious purpose. Likewise, the hodgepodge of activities held within Le Simone – the folk 
dance events, say, or the weekly vegetable-basket table set up by a local market gardener – 
can all be more or less directly related to Pope Francis’s encyclical Laudato Si’, advocating 
for a renewal of community ties, social economics, and green politics for the joint welfare of 
mankind and the planet. Some customers might push further: why sandwiches named after 
Popes and the football players of the Olympique Lyonnais? Well, they represent Le Simone’s 
roots91, they will be told: Catholicism and the city of Lyon – in fact, the sandwiches are also a 
feminist commentary, since the local women’s team is more successful than the men’s, and 
female footballers feature more heavily on the sandwich menu. Why ‘democratips’, then? A 
philosophical reflection on the current state of political institutions, is the answer – customers’ 
attention will be called to the bottom of the jar, where the coins mingle into a single pile 
regardless of which voting slot they have been dropped through. And why a goldfish named 
Sushi? Oh, they will be told, that was just the coworkers having a laugh, but it can surely be 
interpreted as an ecological commentary, if you give us a minute to think up a convincing 
explanation – after all, the Christmas tree, ‘democratips’, and sandwiches named after Popes 
started out as jokes too. 
   Overall, then, the space of Le Simone serves as an introduction to écologie intégrale, but it 
does so in an equivocal manner. On the one hand, it offers itself up to be ‘read’: its eclectic 
décor attracts interpretation and can be tied back discursively to the core end-goals of 
 
91 The discourse of ‘roots’ in the French nation, and the place of ‘roots’ in écologie intégrale, are discussed 
respectively in Chapters Two and Three. 
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écologie intégrale, namely environmentalism and social community-building. On the other 
hand, the regulars of Le Simone are quite sanguine about admitting that much of the 
organisation of the space developed spontaneously or irreflectively after the café’s 
inauguration, as baristas and coworking members laid claim to the blank canvas they had 
been given, largely without any input from the AlterCathos Committee. It is only retroactively 
and narratively that the décor’s random features were folded back into the intentional ideal of 
‘Catholic ecology’. These personal touches which, from the outside, are neither obviously 
arbitrary nor clearly curated, ultimately play a central gatekeeping role: they force a 
disconnection between Simone ‘insiders’ and customers – even customers who have an in-
depth knowledge of Catholic tradition and doctrine. By prompting conversations between the 
two groups, they enable the integration of the latter once they possess the codes to understand 
the space. This mechanism was not intentional at first, but once regulars realised that 
customers were prone to asking for explanations about the décor, they repeated the process: 
the café’s second winter saw the installation of an upside-down Christmas tree, tied to the 
rafters of the café. Intrigued customers were told that the tree’s upside-down positioning 
symbolised the inversion – pun gleefully intended – of the mass-market consumerism 
associated with Christmas nowadays. 
   Overall, the regulars take seriously their interpretive responsibility towards newcomers. 
This includes, on the coworkers’ part, clear efforts to point out the rare elements of Le Simone 
which are truly unconnected to the café’s central purposes. Their habit of playing war-themed 
video games after lunch, in particular, is introduced with the caveat that it is just a pastime. 
They single out these games as ‘not very Simone’ (pas très ‘Simone’): while other elements of 
the café’s furnishings can be tied back to Catholic ecology in far-fetched ways – indeed, the 
more tongue-in-cheek the better – the first-person shooter video games seem to cross a line 
beyond which it would be abusive to try to claim any link to Catholic ideals, even jokingly. In 
short, less than a year after the creation of Le Simone, and despite knowing écologie intégrale 
only in the broadest of terms, its regulars – many of whom had never attended Les 
AlterCathos’s evening conferences – had collectively started to interpret and evaluate all of its 
internal actions according to two axes of meaning: environmentalism, and social Catholicism. 
They were, however, alert to the fact that such meanings were only equivocally intentional: 
retrospective analysis, rhetoric, and joking explanations were spliced alongside and into 
purposeful action and genuine personal engagement.  
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A successful grassroots expansion: ‘Laudato Si’ in Action’ 
Les AlterCathos promote a ‘do it yourself’ atmosphere within Le Simone: they encourage new 
arrivals – café regulars or coworking members, who are not all Catholic, philosophy-minded, 
or politically-inclined – to launch their own projects within the space of Le Simone. These 
projects can take several forms. Most often, they involve taking a low-commitment 
investment in the café’s organisation: new members who feel strongly about recycling, or 
decorating the café, are free to take responsibility for these aspects of daily life in Le Simone. 
This ‘light’ form of participation leads to the discursive introductions to écologie intégrale 
discussed in the previous section. More surprisingly, as far as new arrivals are concerned, 
they are encouraged to use the premises of Le Simone as a HQ to launch their own events, 
workshops, or think tanks, or to develop ties with other local businesses, neighbourhood 
inhabitants, or ecological groups; such that Le Simone might become a hub where a diversity 
of passionate individuals incubate fruitful new initiatives. One workshop in particular, 
founded by Marie Sève and her housemate Solène, illustrates how this bottom-up approach 
successfully induces growing numbers of regulars to commit more profoundly to écologie 
intégrale, and sustains the ‘vitality’ desired by the AlterCathos Committee. 
   When I met Solène in 2017, she seemed at home in Le Simone, but she quickly highlighted 
that she was a relative newcomer compared to long-term AlterCathos Committee members. 
Solène describes herself as ‘barely Catholic’ (à peine catho) and her background as mixed: 
her mother comes from bourgeois Catholic spheres, but her father is ‘an atheist lefty’ (un 
gauchiste athée) – they met while working in a charitable NGO. Solène and her siblings were 
taught to value strong principles, open-mindedness and respect: their mother went to Church 
on Sundays, their father joined syndicalist demonstrations, and both insisted on the 
importance of giving one’s time and energy for the welfare of others. As a result, all of 
Solène’s siblings are politically or ethically engaged; in particular, her elder sister has been 
living in the experimental, green and egalitarian utopia of Auroville (India) for several years. 
For her part, Solène’s PhD in neuro-psychology leaves her with little free time. Her ‘only’ 
ethical engagements, as she refers to them, are a fully zero-waste lifestyle; regular 
participations in the lobbying and civil disobedience protests run by radical ecological 
collective Alternatiba; and, finally, volunteering with Le Simone. Solène had heard her friend 
and housemate, Marie Sève, speak of the new café’s opening: since Le Simone is a five 
minutes’ walk away from their flat, Solène saw it as an ‘efficient’ opportunity to promote 
green lifestyles in a space where such initiatives are welcomed. 
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   Solène’s interest in practical green efforts, combined with Marie’s longer-term experience 
of Les AlterCathos’s intellectual and epistemological habits, led them to launch a regular 
ecological workshop dedicated to reading and applying the encyclical Laudato Si’. Solène had 
not read the encyclical, but had noticed that its table of contents follows a parallel reasoning 
to her favourite ecological manifesto, a documentary film and accompanying book called 
Demain (‘Tomorrow’; Dion 2016). Both Demain and Laudato Si’ address the links between 
climate change and global inequality; both start out with practical observations related to 
food, waste, and energy consumption in the West, and suggest relatively undemanding 
lifestyle changes; before scaling up their analysis to question global economic and political 
paradigms, and propose more in-depth transformations around corporations, banks, and 
democratic institutions. Both documents further suggest that neoliberal and consumerist 
lifestyles hamper emotional and social health, and therefore argue that degrowth (la 
décroissance) is also a matter of spiritual wellbeing – for Pope Francis – and self-care – for 
the authors of Demain. Marie and Solène’s workshop, titled Laudato Si’ en Actes – ‘Laudato 
Si’ in Action’ or ‘in Deeds’ – therefore aimed to introduce the largely neoliberal and 
consumerist population of Ainay to the notion and practice of sobriété heureuse, or ‘happy 
sobriety’ (Rabhi 2010) advocated by the encyclical and Demain. They hoped the workshop 
would foster solidarity between participants such that they might support each other through 
personal lifestyle changes, and collectively launch larger ecological projects within the space 
of Le Simone. Pairs of meetings were devoted to themes addressed by Laudato Si’, such as 
food, waste, or renewable energy: the first meeting would involve a theoretical conversation 
about the stakes of this topic, while the second would initiate concrete action. Participants 
were expected to read thematic excerpts of Laudato Si’ ahead of each pair of meetings, and 
were encouraged to engage with other ecological texts and films, such as Demain. 
   The ‘Laudato Si’ in Action’ workshop (henceforth LSiA) proved appealing to many among 
the diverse customer base of Le Simone, and formed a meeting ground for groups who 
otherwise do not intersect much in the daily life of the café. It gathered three of the long-term 
Committee members, who had helped to develop the political philosophy of Les AlterCathos; 
several theology students from the nearby Université Catholique de Lyon, who had in-depth 
knowledge of Laudato Si’ but no practical experience of environmental or political 
engagement; several coworking members sensitive to the climate crisis who found it practical 
to join a workshop taking place on their everyday work premises, despite being indifferent to 
religion or lapsed Catholics themselves; and finally, a number of stay-at-home mothers from 
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the neighbourhood, who welcomed the opportunity to socialize. Participants acknowledged 
that they would each bring different levels of readiness to the conversation: some forgot to 
read the passages from Laudato Si’, others struggled to ‘think out of the box’ of their daily 
habits; but they were confident that pooling their resources would result in ‘Laudato Si’-
compatible’ ecological efforts (a designation which in effect covers most ecological efforts, 
with the exception of anti-natality views). Participants also acknowledged that they had 
different personal motivations for joining the group: good-natured barbs were occasionally 
exchanged, as middle-aged housewives with a personal background of pious Catholicism 
noted how little time of each meeting was actually devoted to reading Laudato Si’ – ‘Pope 
Francis must be feeling a tiny bit instrumentalised, poor dear’ – and younger coworkers with 
prior experience of environmentalism needled the former – ‘I can’t believe it takes a Pope to 
get you to start recycling’. 
   These comments, half-joking and half-serious, hinted at workshop participants’ awareness 
that the group gathered multiple traditions of piety and of environmental consciousness (cf. 
Laidlaw 2010), with different articulations of individual duty and responsibility vis-à-vis the 
planet, humanity, the Pope, or God. But what might have devolved into explicit moral 
disagreements never did: instead, participants gave credit to one another for providing 
interpersonal motivation, and focused on ‘getting on with’ their respective and collective 
ecological efforts. As Solène summarized it, the group aspired to a ‘green conversion’ 
(conversion verte/ écologique): the term is not intended to be religious in nature, but signals 
the profound and rapid transformation workshop participants wanted to achieve together. 
‘Ecology is like the conversion of St Paul in Damascus,’ is a metaphor Solène used among 
this audience, whose proportion of lapsed- and non-Catholic members were nonetheless 
largely conversant with Biblical narratives: ‘the scales fall from your eyes and you can only 
cease to persecute the planet’92. In this sense, the LSiA group focused more on concrete 
action and rapid outcomes – what progress can be done, and what ‘persecutions’ can be 
ceased – than on the long-term spiritual or ethical justifications which might undergird each 
participant’s own investment. 
 
92 St Paul, or Paul the Apostle, is known for having persecuted early Christians, before experiencing a radical –
miraculous, according to the Biblical Book of the Apostles – conversion. He devoted the remainder of his life to 
founding Christian communities in Asia Minor and Europe, and developing Christian theology through 
epistolary correspondences with these communities. 
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   The LSiA workshop swiftly laid its mark on Le Simone. They introduced recycling bins and 
plans for compost collection; they negotiated an affiliation with the French branch of 
‘Incredible Edibles’ and, with the approval of the neighbourhood council, planted vegetable 
plots in the public square adjacent to the café; and finally they created a partnership with a 
local vegetable producer. The task of developing new projects did not fall to Marie and 
Solène despite their status as workshop convenors: the responsibility lay with the participants 
who had submitted each idea. One LSiA member, Stella, was vegan – a rare occurrence in 
bourgeois Catholic circles – and determined that the agricultural partnership should be vegan-
friendly: she took the lead in selecting and liaising with a local organic producer. The contract 
Stella negotiated, known as an AMAP (‘Association for the Maintenance of Farmer 
Agriculture’93), consists in weekly distributions of crates of fresh vegetables on the basis of 
subscriptions. Stella had not, prior to joining LSiA, been an active member of Le Simone’s 
community, but her passionate investment in the AMAP caused her to become a much more 
central figure; first as she drummed up interest for vegetable baskets, and then as she presided 
over their distribution every Tuesday inside Le Simone. Two years later, when Stella stopped 
being able to devote so much time to the project, another volunteer took over, and undertook 
to add fresh eggs to the erstwhile vegan baskets. Likewise, when Marie and Solène stopped 
being able to commit to the LSiA workshop after two years at its helm, a newcomer to Le 
Simone, André, volunteered to take charge, and ensured its continued existence and ‘vitality’. 
In recent years, the ‘Laudato Si’ in Action’ group has followed the impetus of Demain and 
Laudato Si’ by moving on to address systemic political-economic matters: notably, several 
workshop members have transferred their personal finances to cooperative banks with ethical 
investment programs. Under the impetus of LSiA, Le Simone has also rejoined an emerging 
and still-tentative network of Lyon-based paper currency: Le Simone now accepts payment in 
‘Gonettes’94 in addition to Euros. In turn, the café contributes to local economic redistribution 
by acquiring its coffee beans from a nearby independent torrefactor; a transaction which also 
takes place in Gonettes. 
 
93 Association pour le Maintien d’une Agriculture Paysanne. 
94 The name ‘Gonette’ is a made-up diminutive form of the word ‘gone’, an archaic regional term meaning 
‘male child’ which today designates true Lyonnais inhabitants. Although the suffix –ette most often indicates a 
female diminutive, ‘gonette’ is not the feminine form of ‘gone’: the counterpart for female children in Lyonnais 
dialect is ‘fenotte’. Les Gones and Les Fenottes are also the respective nicknames of the men’s and women’s 
squads of Lyon’s football club, L’Olympique Lyonnais. 
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   The ongoing success of the ‘Laudato Si’ in Action’ workshop proves David’s intuition, 
expressed during the open consultation evening, that key activities within Le Simone can self-
regulate without much input from the AlterCathos Committee. By giving free rein to 
passionate individuals to launch one-off events or long-lasting projects – running LSiA, 
opening the AMAP, managing Gonettes finances, organising folk dances, board-games 
evenings, poetry evenings, comic-drawing workshops, Christmas decoration workshops, 
clothes-swap weekends, and so on – the founding members of Les AlterCathos gradually 
induce new acquaintances into joining the wider Simone community, and partaking in 
écologie intégrale. Neither Stella, nor André, nor indeed Solène, would have become invested 
in Le Simone had they not first proposed and taken charge of one of its multitude of internal 
events. This is what David Coureau and Marie Sève recognise not only as ‘collective life’ but 
also as the conjunction of ‘life, reflection, and labour’ which, according to écologie intégrale, 
guarantees personal fulfillment as well as a social and environmental Common Good. 
 
A problematic initiative: Yoga, and the limits of a Catholic space 
In the autumn of 2017, a year and a half after the opening of Le Simone, the AlterCathos 
Committee intervened to shut down an independent initiative for the first time, claiming that 
it did not correspond to the core values of Le Simone or of Les AlterCathos. This incident 
highlighted the extent to which, despite its profusion of tongue-in-cheek narratives, Le Simone 
takes seriously its nature as a ‘Catholic space’. It also showcased that when push comes to 
shove, beyond its do-it-yourself decentralisation and inclusivity, Le Simone’s target audience 
remains the conservative Catholic bourgeoisie, with the aim of changing this audience’s 
politics in favour of écologie intégrale. 
   The AlterCathos Committee’s intervention into the usually largely-unregimented daily life 
of Le Simone caused controversy firstly because it concerned an event launched by Blandine, 
who had been a pillar of Le Simone since its inauguration, and whom all regulars appreciated 
and respected. Between 2016 and late-2017, Blandine was one of the two part-time managers 
of Le Simone, both Lyonnais Catholics in their late-twenties. She had been recruited before 
the opening of Le Simone on the grounds that her degree in events management and her vast 
social network among the grandes familles of the Lyonnais bourgeoisie95 would be assets to 
the launch of Les AlterCathos’s new business. Neither Blandine nor the second manager, 
 
95 See Thesis Introduction for a discussion of the grandes familles lyonnaises. 
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Hippolyte, had been members of Les AlterCathos before being placed in charge of the 
executive running of Le Simone, and both occasionally bemoaned the fact that the Committee 
expected them to bring to fruition an intellectual ideal – écologie intégrale – which they were 
only just discovering themselves. Both Hippolyte and Blandine pointed out to me, on separate 
occasions, that their position as salaried café managers was a paradoxical one: their duty to 
not only run Le Simone, but run it in line with écologie intégrale, coincided poorly with the 
AlterCathos Committee’s hands-off, decentralised directives. Whereas other users of Le 
Simone were encouraged to launch passion-driven initiatives as a means to avoid alienated 
labour, Hippolyte and Blandine individually admitted that they occasionally wished to be 
given clearer guidance by the Committee – in their view, their own ‘dignity of work’ could be 
well-served by successfully implementing instructions for the development of the space, even 
at the cost of a lesser scope for improvisation. 
   Hippolyte had the advantage over Blandine – as he himself put it – of having studied 
philosophy; not at the elite level of the AlterCathos founders, but at least as far as a Master’s 
degree at the Parisian Institut de Philosophie Comparée. The IPC, Hippolyte jokingly 
explained, has a reputation for attracting very traditional Catholic young women, who follow 
its classes only as long as it takes them to meet and marry equally traditional young men 
studying at the nearby Faculties of Medicine and Law – still ironically, Hippolyte expressed 
regrets that his best efforts hadn’t ‘landed him’ a doctor for a wife, but at least his time at the 
IPC had prepared him to follow Les AlterCathos’s conferences. Hippolyte’s facetious 
character can be credited for some of the more tongue-in-cheek decorations of the café, 
described earlier. Quick-witted and brash, Hippolyte excelled at entertaining himself and 
others through rhetoric, and could be counted on to provide deadpan commentary justifying 
just about anything with reference to ecology and Catholicism. By contrast, Blandine didn’t 
play: a more reserved character, she was aloof and prickly with newcomers until a mutual 
rapport was established, at which point she became a fiercely supportive and reliable friend – 
the coworkers joked that one becomes a Simone ‘regular’ when one learns to see through 
Blandine’s impatience and chronic irritation to the heart of gold beneath. In their different 
ways, Hippolyte and Blandine were both devoted to making Le Simone an inclusive space: 
Hippolyte’s enthusiasm made every café customer feel instantly comfortable, while Blandine 
took on a more long-term nurturing role towards the coworkers, orchestrating their coalition 
into a social group by remembering birthdays, celebrating milestones, encouraging them to 
gather around homemade baked goods, and always acerbically refusing thanks for her efforts 
 157 
with crabby warnings that this one was the last cake she would bring. Hippolyte and the 
regulars often pushed Blandine to take on a more carefree attitude, but she replied that 
managing Le Simone was her job: while she did wish to treat Le Simone as a space for 
creative initiatives, she was upfront about struggling to do so. 
   Blandine eventually overcame her reticence when she had the idea of organising a regular 
yoga class in Le Simone. This would offer an opportunity for physical exercise and relaxation 
to stay-at-home mothers and middle-aged women from the neighbourhood of Ainay, who 
were not catered for by the local sports clubs in Blandine’s opinion. Blandine contacted a 
yoga instructor, who agreed to run a trial session in Le Simone; and she crucially requested 
that the instructor should use the French name for each posture rather than Sanskrit, and avoid 
any reference to Eastern spirituality. Advertised through Le Simone’s social media accounts, 
the inaugural ‘Yoga in Le Simone’ event received mixed responses: the sign-up list was soon 
full, but a large number of online comments were posted to express surprise, disappointment, 
and even anger against this scheduling. One virulent response on Facebook – by a young 
woman who regularly attended Les AlterCathos’s conferences and could not be dismissed as 
an intrusive online troublemaker – stated that a yoga session would be ‘risky, and even 
dangerous’ (risqué, et même dangereux) to the spiritual development of participants, whom 
she assumed would all be Catholic. Both online and in the café, the following few days saw 
an escalation of arguments for and against ‘Yoga in Le Simone’, prompting many to express 
their previously-implicit understandings of what Le Simone stood for, what Les AlterCathos’s 
ultimate purpose was, and what place Catholicism was meant to have in those projects. 
   Blandine, dismayed and a little defensive in the face of this commotion, argued that a yoga 
session was no different from the other events held in Le Simone: she pointed out that it 
would fulfill an inclusive community-building role, and indeed restore a measure of ‘human 
dignity’ to women marginalised by the patriarchal sports industry. She added that it was also 
compatible with Le Simone’s ecological concerns, since yoga trains practitioners to be 
mindful of their immediate surroundings and respectful of the natural environment. By 
putting forward these arguments, Blandine replicated the usual pattern of narratives in Le 
Simone, whereby participants’ Catholicism and faith are ‘bracketed off’ as a topic of 
discussion, while outcomes – community-building and green practices – are the primary 
object of concern and are held up as evidence of écologie intégrale in action. This view of 
écologie intégrale as an efficacy-driven, world-oriented teleology, treats the social world as 
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‘neither residual nor ancillary to the self’, but as ‘itself the purpose of moral judgment and 
action’ (Piliavsky & Sbriccoli 2016: 376). 
   But Blandine’s detractors on Facebook replied that yoga’s element of mindful training was 
precisely the problem: was she prepared to take the risk that participants would ‘accidentally 
become Buddhist’ (se retrouver bouddhistes par mégarde)? This comment was dismissed as 
entirely preposterous by some, especially since all knew that the yoga session would involve 
no mention of spirituality. But others argued that the religious elements of yoga were in-built: 
if its repetitive physical motions had been designed, for millennia, to facilitate interiority and 
a focus on the self, their cultivation could only result in self-absorption and distanciation from 
God. One of Les AlterCathos’ Vice-Presidents, Raphaël, who dropped by Le Simone for a 
beer one evening, was of this opinion: citing philosopher Pierre Hadot’s notion of ‘spiritual 
exercises’ (2002 [1981]) and its influence on Michel Foucault’s work on techniques of the 
self (1990 [1984]; 1992 [1984]), Raphaël categorically asserted that bodily and spiritual self-
formation are inescapably tied. After all, he argued, Catholicism has its own physical 
practices, such as genuflection, which predispose the faithful to worship, and to a decentred 
rather than self-centred attitude – several Simone regulars surrounding him while he made this 
point guffawed and replied that Blandine could hardly organise an hour-long session of 
genuflection as a form of physical exercise for neighbourhood housewives.  
   On a baseline level, though, Blandine’s argument that yoga teaches environmental 
mindfulness, and her detractors’ response that it ineluctably leads to spiritual transformations, 
outline a shared emic theory of practice: on both sides of the debate, habit and repetitive 
engagement were considered to contribute to convictions and (new) allegiances. In theoretical 
terms, Blandine’s reliance on a world-oriented, outcome-driven teleology of community and 
green practices was undercut by the shared belief that interior states are part and parcel of 
those outcomes, and must be taken into consideration. In this case, matters were further 
complicated by the widespread assumption, among Le Simone’s members, that yoga promotes 
self-centred development (an ‘I-oriented’ telos) while Catholicism instead teaches to place 
God and one’s ‘brother’ or ‘neighbour’ (son frère, son prochain) above oneself. As one 
Simone regular – with a PhD in theology – concluded, Catholicism is about self-abandonment 
(l’abandon de soi): in other words, the Catholic telos is to relinquish I-oriented teloi. The 
spiritual and ethical conversation taking place around ‘Yoga in Le Simone’ was therefore a 
particularly recursive conundrum: participants’ personal spiritual development was revealed 
to matter insofar as, in the long run, Catholic practices were assumed to allow a transcendence 
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of the self in service of world-oriented projects – such as écologie intégrale, but also other 
projects of environmentalism. 
   Debates in Le Simone went on as regulars weighed the outcomes of yoga in terms of 
interiority, spirituality and the self. Perhaps a mitigating solution would be for each 
participant to recite the Rosary in their own minds during the yoga session, one café regular 
suggested. Another continued: the clientèle of the yoga event would in any case benefit from 
spending time in Le Simone, since it is a Catholic space – if they found Le Simone to be 
friendly and welcoming, they might be attracted to the Catholic faith, and then abandon their 
misguided inclination towards yoga. At this point, Raphaël peremptorily cut short to the 
debate: Le Simone might be a Catholic space, he judged, but it ‘is not a space of 
evangelisation’ (Le Simone n’est pas un lieu d’évangélisation). 
   At length, while the ‘Yoga in Le Simone’ event took place as advertised, the AlterCathos 
Committee requested that Blandine not schedule any subsequent sessions. This decision was 
not, they insisted, a theological or a spiritual one: the Committee were divided on the question 
of whether yoga is or isn’t an acceptable practice for Catholics, but the problem laid 
elsewhere. More critically, the ‘Yoga in Le Simone’ event had damaged Les AlterCathos’s 
reputation, which they already considered to be on shaky ground among the largely Right-
wing, bourgeois Lyonnais cathosphère due to occasional rumours that Les AlterCathos had 
become ‘Left-wing’ (cf. Chapter Three). The Committee told Blandine that it was already 
enough of an uphill battle for Les AlterCathos to encourage the conservative Catholic 
community of Ainay to shift their political and economic habits away from liberalism and 
towards degrowth, without adding to the mix an impression that Les AlterCathos toyed with 
their members’ faith. By organising an event which could be considered ‘anti-Catholic’ from 
a certain perspective, and thereby making a number of their most pious regulars feel 
unwelcome in Le Simone, the Committee argued that Blandine had discredited the rest of their 
activities – whose underlying morality had thus far not been questioned – and effectively 
obstructed the promotion of écologie intégrale. The Committee, like Blandine initially, relied 
on an outcome-oriented evaluative frame – all aimed to introduce new audiences to Le Simone 
and écologie intégrale – but the difference laid in the audiences they respectively considered 
to be the priority. Blandine’s intended audience of neighbourhood women and yoga 
enthusiasts was outweighed by the Committee’s target audience of the conservative Catholic 
bourgeoisie. 
 160 
   When the Committee concluded that the yoga event did not correspond to Le Simone’s core 
values, therefore, they did not count Catholic faith as a core value per se: as far as they were 
concerned, the spiritual lives of Simone regulars were their own business. However, 
effectiveness in putting écologie intégrale into action was the Committee’s core aspiration:  
this, in turn, required approachability and non-confrontation vis-à-vis conservative target 
audiences, for whom traditional Catholic deontology could be a non-negotiable value. This 
formed the hard limit of Les AlterCathos’s decentralised, ‘do it yourself’ approach to running 
Le Simone: any initiative which could be considered ‘anti-Catholic’ either on a conceptual 
level or on the pragmatic level of scaring away certain traditional Catholic audiences, would 
be shut down. 
 
Conclusion: Political theology as world-oriented religious ethics  
To conclude this chapter, I would like to reflect on what the place of Catholicism in Le 
Simone, and in Les AlterCathos’s practical efforts to put écologie intégrale into practice, 
might tell us about analytical approaches to religious politics more widely. 
   The anthropology of religion has long struggled against a tendency to view instances of 
religious politics through the lens of what one might call the ‘façade of faith’96 (cf. Deeb 
2006) – that is, the assumption that political practices enforced by religious institutions are an 
instrumentalisation of faith, and not real religion. This perspective stems from the modernist 
definition of what counts as ‘faith’ and as ‘religion’: anthropologists of Christianity have 
already pointed out that the modern definition of religion as a private, interior matter produces 
the subsequent, ingrained idea that ‘religion done right’ necessarily relies on transcendent 
faith and inner belief (Coleman 2014: 290), and vice-versa, that religion is no better than 
‘heterodox’ when it ‘fails to offer a radical separation between body and spirit’ (Cannell 
2006: 7-8). This can be seen in literature that takes for granted that religious encounters with 
the secular world and public spheres are less pure or less ‘religious’ than other, more 
introspective forms of religious life – that ‘wherever it engages in down-to-earth concerns of 
 
96  I borrow this phrase from Lara Deeb’s recollection that before she started her fieldwork among pious 
Lebanese Shi‘i women, ‘a colleague in Lebanon (...) urged me to seek out the places where what he called “the 
façade of faith” did not hold up (...) in order to explain how faith is “really” a political-economic strategy’ (Deeb 
2006: 40). 
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governance and policy, law and order, [religion] cannot but secularize – that is to say, 
ultimately render profane – its ways’ (de Vries 2006: 1397). 
   To counter this view, anthropologists such as Lara Deeb (2006) and Ruth Marshall (2009) 
have eloquently and convincingly argued that their Shi‘i and Pentacostal interlocutors, 
respectively, view inner faith and political action as mutually co-constitutive – in other words, 
that religious politics can be a fully pious practice rather than an instrumentalisation of faith. 
Deeb’s and Marshall’s analytical strategy maintains the core idea that ‘religion done right’ 
concerns inner belief and piety; but they stretch the ethnographic scope beyond mosques, 
churches, and rituals to encompass pious practices of governance and community-building, 
performed by devout men and women in order to become self-improved Muslims (Deeb 
2006: 30-31) or attain redemption and salvation (Marshall 2009: 8). But whereas Deeb’s and 
Marshall’s interlocutors are pious and value piety, the members of Le Simone have a far more 
ambiguous conception of the place and value of faith and piety in relation to écologie 
intégrale. How, then, can they escape being tarred with the brush of instrumentalism? Can 
they at all avoid the conclusion that écologie intégrale is ‘really’ a political-economic strategy 
behind a ‘façade’ of religion? 
   In the field, it took me an (embarrassingly) long time to realise that while Catholicism is 
present in Le Simone in the form of physical objects – like the wooden cross hidden behind 
the coffee percolator – and as a ubiquitous topic of conversation in explanations of the space’s 
Catholic ecology – the café is nonetheless largely devoid of piety. This absence was pointed 
out to me through a comparison with a Catholic café/bar in another neighbourhood of Lyon 
where piety is contrastingly cultivated. A much smaller business, open only on alternate 
Saturday evenings, the other bar is run by a Dominican congregation – an institutional branch 
of the Catholic Church under the purview of the diocese, contrary to Le Simone’s autonomous 
management by lay Catholics. In the Dominican bar, prayers are said collectively at opening 
and closing time, customers recite Grace before consuming any food or drink, and regulars 
are encouraged to view the biweekly bar nights as opportunities to ask the Dominican monks-
cum-bartenders for spiritual advice – indeed, regulars can even schedule Confession if they 
get in touch in advance. None of these forms of piety are available, or desired, in Le Simone.  
 
97 This quote by a divinity scholar focuses on Islam, and continues by asserting that ‘The ways of politics are the 
ways of the world. One cannot but be of this world, that is, come to belong to this world, as soon or as long as 
one is in this world, in other words, as soon or as long as history and human finitude follow their course’ (de 
Vries 2006: 13, original emphases). 
 162 
   I once asked David Coureau if Les AlterCathos had ever included prayers in their events. 
He answered that they briefly had, in 2011, at the very start of the association: AlterCathos 
‘reflection groups’ (cf. Chapter Three) were scheduled to take place every Sunday morning 
from 8.30am to noon, and participants were encouraged to meet earlier to attend the 7am local 
Mass together. By the third week, only David, Marie Sève, and their friend Hilaire woke up 
on time for the 7am service. The place of the impractical early-morning Masses was then 
drawn into question: it was already implicitly agreed that they would be discontinued, and the 
challenge was rather to narrativise this into a coherent statement about the association’s 
spiritual purposes. To this day, David acknowledges the rhetoric nuances of this process: 
We agreed that we were giving up on collective Mass attendance for a contingent reason 
and an intellectual one (une raison conjoncturelle et une raison intellectuelle). The 
contingent reason was that Mass at this hour, among this particular group of people, was 
not working. We tried monthly prayer groups instead and that failed too, maybe because 
we were just not great [pas très bons, i.e. insufficiently motivated to make an effort], or 
because structurally it wasn’t a good fit for us. Maybe it would have kept going in other 
circumstances; remembering this contingent reason keeps us honest when we explain the 
intellectual reason. That second reason, which is really more primordial, is that we want 
lay Catholics to receive a Catholic intellectual education which is distinct from their ritual 
lives (la vie de culte). 
Abandoning the group prayers due to their lack of ‘vitality’, members were freed to pursue 
more individually-chosen and ‘vitality’-inducing ritual lives (vie de culte) among the many – 
competing – forms of Catholic worship on offer across the diocese of Lyon. David 
enumerates: 
Some go to the Messe tradi [a slightly pejorative shorthand for the traditional, 
extraordinary-form Mass], others go to the Messe cha-cha [an equally pejorative 
shorthand for the charismatics], others still to their local parish Mass, which is my case 
(la Messe paroissiale). Some people go to ‘renewal’ Masses [des Messes ‘renouveau’], 
what do I even know about that, and there’s also people who don’t go to Mass at all. 
   Les AlterCathos thus established that to their minds, ‘Christian life is wide-ranging’; and 
they decided to aim their own associative range of action specifically away from both ritual 
life (la vie de culte) and doctrinal or theological life (la vie gnostique). Instead, they 
pinpointed lay life (la vie laïque) as their sphere of predilection, the dimension of Christian 
life which they could authoritatively scrutinize and to which they could offer novel 
suggestions (cf. Mayblin 2017). This had two practical consequences on the running of the 
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association: it enshrined the decision not to discuss theology – God or Christ are only ever 
mentioned on exceptional occasions, such as when the yoga event opened the can of worms – 
and it marked the end of any form of prayer during AlterCathos events. The opening of Le 
Simone reinforced these choices: contrary to the Dominican-run bar, ‘we have no “priest in 
residence”, and neither do we want one’, David concluded. He wrapped up his explanation 
with reference to the community-building goal of écologie intégrale: a ‘priest in residence’ 
would likely intimidate certain Catholics and prevent them from joining Le Simone, to say 
nothing of scaring off the more-or-less lapsed ones along with all non-Catholics. Returning to 
the prevalent mode of justification whereby the effective implementation of écologie 
intégrale is paramount, David this time classified ‘priests in residence’ and ‘intimidating’ 
collective prayers under the same category as yoga: as obstacles potentially deterring Catholic 
audiences from taking part in the ‘lay life’ of Le Simone. 
   Returning to the question of analytical approaches to projects of religious politics: does 
David’s cavalier attitude towards ‘priests in residence’ make Le Simone less Catholic, 
écologie intégrale less of a ‘religious’ paradigm, and Les AlterCathos’s desire to ‘do politics 
as Catholics’ a mere façade for ‘just politics’? I suggest that the ethnographic ambiguity 
between ethics of efficacy and ethics of conviction in Le Simone only seems ‘ambiguous’ 
from an analytical perspective which implicitly values the latter over the former. Phrased 
differently, the practices of écologie intégrale in Le Simone only seem inconclusively 
‘Catholic’ from an analytical perspective which assumes that one must be Catholic in order to 
act in a Catholic manner. From the standpoint of ethics of conviction, it is genuinely difficult 
to parse out the multiple ‘I-oriented’ spiritual and ethical motivations spurring the diverse 
participants in écologie intégrale, or to outline a clear way in which écologie intégrale maps 
onto Catholic piety. 
   I consider, however, that this ambiguity proves analytically fruitful if it is observed from a 
zoomed-out, broader theoretical scale. The observation that Simone regulars are unsure 
whether personal Catholic faith matters in the course of putting into practice a discourse, 
écologie intégrale, which they acknowledge as ‘Catholic’ overall is, to my mind, more than 
an ethnographic observation: it is an analytical answer to a question anthropologists of 
religion haven’t quite framed yet. In light of recent work which views ‘ordinary lives’ as truly 
religious (Schielke & Debevec 2012; cf. Chapter Three) and world-oriented ‘ethics of 
efficacy’ as truly ethical rather than mere ‘calculative instrumentalism’ (Piliavsky & Sbriccoli 
2016: 374), I argue that we might take political theologies, that is, world-oriented religious 
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ethics, seriously – as truly religious and truly ethical. By adopting this analytical starting 
point, we might then jettison the implicit impetus to argue that politics can be fully religious if 
they are also fully based on personal piety, and open up a space for comparative ethnographic 
investigation by asking, in each context, how personal faith and piety are negotiated in the 
process of efficaciously practicing paradigms of political theology. 
    In short, against modernist assumptions that ‘religion done right’ concerns inner belief and 
cannot be ‘of this world’ without ultimately rendering its ways ‘profane’ (cf. de Vries 2006: 
13), I advocate for an investigation of the emic conceptions of actors who might have a 
different view of what ‘being of this world’ entails, and of where the interface between ‘the 
profane’ and ‘the religious’ falls. Lara Deeb’s and Ruth Marshall’s respective explorations of 
‘pious modern’ Shi‘i lives in Lebanon (Deeb 2006) and Pentacostal ‘political spiritualities’ in 
Nigeria (Marshall 2009) are, in this sense, two instances of political theologies – one each 
from Islam and Christianity – which both prescribe that personal piety is essential in the 
course of carrying out everyday actions of governance and community-building. In line with 
this central prescription, Deeb and Marshall describe the mechanisms through which their 
respective interlocutors negotiate the interface between religious and profane – the ways in 
which pious Shi‘i women view and sustain distinctions from non-Shi‘i Muslims and non-
Muslim Lebanese communities, and the role of evangelisation in ‘winning Nigeria for Jesus’ 
(Marshall 2009: 13). Écologie intégrale is also a political theology – a world-oriented 
religious ethic, which is ‘oriented’ towards the environmental care of the planet and the social 
care for its people – but it has a different internal articulation of belief, piety, and action, of 
which the dedication of Laudato Si’ to ‘every person living on this planet’ (Pope Francis 
2015: §3) is only a first indication. 
   This chapter has addressed several ways in which the articulation of Catholic culture, 
‘roots’, faith, and piety are negotiated in Le Simone in the course of putting écologie intégrale 
into practice: I have shown that Le Simone creates a welcoming yet disconcerting interface 
whereby non-Catholics and Catholics alike are invited to recognise visual signs of 
Catholicism in the décor, yet to transform their prior understanding of these Catholic cues 
through the interpretive codes provided by café ‘insiders’. I have shown how Le Simone’s 
decentralised organisation allows passionate individuals to launch and pursue green and 
collective initiatives, and thereby to implement écologie intégrale efficaciously without 
necessarily being practicing Catholics themselves – ‘practicing’, that is, in the sense of piety 
and ritual. Indeed, I have shown that forms of pious Catholic practice have been deliberately 
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kept away from the café, insulating its ‘lay Catholic life’ (la vie laïque) from ritual and 
doctrinal life. While the place of Catholic faith and piety are explicitly debated in the café on 
occasion, I have shown that the tensions which arise in Le Simone – such as the yoga 
cancellation – tend to occur over pragmatic disagreements as to the café’s preferred target 
audience, rather than fundamental disagreements as to whether écologie intégrale is or is not 
effectively taking place. My overall conclusion is rather simple: I argue that the Catholic 
discourse of écologie intégrale is a political theology, i.e. a world-oriented religious ethic, in 
which personal faith is a variable rather than a paramount requirement. 
   Authors in the anthropology of Catholicism have pointed out its complexio oppositorum 
(‘complex of opposites’): that is, the fact that there appears ‘to be no antithesis it does not 
embrace’ (Schmitt 1996 [1923]: 7; Muehlebach 2009, 2013). This is visible in case studies of 
syncretic Catholic beliefs and rituals, which embrace pre-Catholic cosmologies and culture 
without becoming less Catholic in the process (Cleary & Steigenga 2004; Mosse 2017, 
Hoenes del Pinal 2019). This ‘capacity to hold such tensions and to unite within itself thesis 
and antithesis’ (Mosse 2017: 105, on Schmitt 1996 [1923]) has been argued to preserve an 
‘externality’ to Catholicism: ‘it implies a political idea of Catholicism that keeps the church in 
the public sphere’ (ibid.) where such tensions are negotiated dynamically. For example, David 
Mosse (2012; 2017) outlines historical shifts in the relationship between Catholicism and the 
caste system in rural South India, and contrasts two distinct ways in which Tamil Catholicism 
has negotiated the ideal of ‘equality between men’ – what I would call two political 
theologies, or world-oriented ethics. The first, spearheaded by 19th-century Jesuit 
missionaries, involved carving out a Catholic ‘world’ which was kept separate from the 
‘outer’ world of Tamil society: by representing the Church as ‘beyond the social’, caste 
inequality was neutralized within the space of churches and rituals, allowing practices such as 
cross-caste godparent relationships among Tamil Catholics (2017: 114). By contrast, late-20th 
and 21st-century activism on the part of Dalit Catholics has instead argued that the Church 
should become invested in resolving caste inequality in the ‘outer’ world: a policy of 
‘preferential option for the Dalits’ was postulated as a local iteration of the Church Social 
Teaching precept of ‘the preferential option for the poor’ (Jesuit Madurai Province 2002: 64-
66, in Mosse 2017: 115-116). I suggest that the case study of Le Simone can be added to this 
body of research concerning forms of Catholic ‘hierarchical encompassment’ (L.Dumont 
1986: 525; 1980 [1970]: 240; Robbins 2009, 2013b): it witnesses that the Catholic complexio 
oppositorum extends beyond negotiations of belief and ritual practices, and can be 
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spearheaded by lay actors as well as the clergy. The notion of complexio oppositorum has 
allowed anthropologists of Catholicism to pay particular attention to the ‘externality’ of the 
Church; but the ‘worldly’ concerns and projects of actors in any religious tradition might be 
fruitfully approached through the question of political theology, or world-oriented religious 
ethics. Écologie intégrale, which is one among many instances of political theology, 
embraces a particularly wide interface with the ‘profane’, since it includes not only lapsed- 



































Scaling ‘Our Common Home’: 




This chapter explores the ways in which Les Alternatives Catholiques deploy ‘subsidiarity’ as 
a mode of subjectivation to orient their personal practice of écologie intégrale. It argues that 
subsidiarity, as a scalar vision of the world, enables Les AlterCathos to contribute to the 
welfare of ‘Our Common Home’ on many concatenated scales simultaneously, and thereby 
undercuts previous French Catholic conceptions of politics which were predicated on the 
scale of the nation-state and on ‘Frenchness’. This chapter concludes Part Two’s exploration 
of the core concerns and modes of subjectivation of écologie intégrale, as well as the 
overarching investigation of French Catholic politics conducted throughout this thesis; 
making the case for anthropological and ethnographic engagements with religious actors’ 
conception and curation of ‘good worlds’. 
 
Introduction 
Founded as a private group in 2011, advertised in 2013 among the participants of La Manif 
Pour Tous, and expanded into a neighbourhood community in 2016 with the opening of Le 
Simone, Les Alternatives Catholiques have rapidly become influential and increasingly public. 
So public, in fact, that traces, hints, and explicit mentions of their operations can now be 
found in mainstream media coverage of Catholic life in France. This final chapter therefore 
continues Part Two’s exploration of the development of écologie intégrale, but also addresses 
the recent intersection between this development and the pre-existing concerns explored 
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throughout Part One of the thesis – the equivocal visibility of French Catholics on the national 
public stage, and the contestations between ideals of community, belonging, and nationhood 
which arise as a result. 
   The role played by the media during La Manif Pour Tous has been addressed in Chapter 
One; bookending the thesis, the press now returns in Chapter Five. Tabloids the world over 
scrutinize the living arrangements of public figures in order to pass judgment on their 
character. In France, two types of housing situations have recently been deemed concerning 
enough to be subjected to critique by the mainstream press as well: civil servants who abuse 
of their political reach for the benefit of their own family life – for instance by fraudulently 
occupying low-rent council habitations, or by refurbishing government lodgings sumptuously 
with public funds – and, in a completely different register, Catholic intellectuals who choose 
to leave Paris and settle in rural villages. 
   Why is the latter worth reporting on, and what is it thought to reveal about Catholics? It has 
certainly preoccupied media outlets from all political sides in recent years. One case in 
particular features regularly in the news, that of a young Catholic family who left the capital 
to acquire a small provincial house ‘full of books but with neither fridge nor washing 
machine’ (Gonzague 05/11/2016). Wife and husband are both well-known public speakers 
and authors despite being only in their early thirties, and interviews with one or the other tend 
to follow the same template: ‘he claims that he is locavore, he only eats local produce’, 
reports one article (Guyet & Cuccagna 26/10/2015), while another quotes the wife as 
explaining that ‘we eat little meat but a lot of fresh local produce, so a fridge is unnecessary, 
and for laundry we use the local laundromat’ (Gonzague 2016). Speculating that this trend 
must be explained by something ‘beyond this shared love for vegetables’ (Guyet & Cuccagna 
2015), most left-wing news outlets consider that it is the visible outcome of an underlying 
wave of conservative, anti-modern sentiment among Catholics. But the bafflement extends 
also to right-wing media. Causeur, a conservative, nationalist, and republican outlet, titles 
their article ‘It’s an organic house...’ – dot dot dot – and cannot seem to decide what to make 
of the ‘absence of a television’ and choice to ‘integrate into an existing [village] community’ 
(Bories 25/12/2015). Too religious for this republican outlet? The article sarcastically 
wonders if the young ‘écolo catho’ couple ‘plant organic salads in their kitchen garden 
between two Masses’ (ibid.). Too activist for the conservative press? ‘Or else perhaps they 
have recruited a Syrian refugee to take care of it’ (ibid.), the author muses, tongue-in-cheek, 
 169 
confirming that the relationship between Catholic intellectuals and their vegetable patches is a 
matter of widespread national puzzlement. 
   From a distance, it is not evident why Catholic intellectuals’ recent advocacy for small-
scale, rural, or ecologically-minded lifestyles should appear so problematic to outside 
commentators; there is nothing strikingly wrong about appreciating the ‘existing 
communit[ies]’ of villages and small towns. Moreover, all the details on which the press 
lingers – the consumption of local produce, the use of the local laundromat – seem innocuous, 
or indeed virtuous in an era of acknowledged ecological crisis. And yet, the slew of recent 
Catholic publications98 in support of these lifestyle choices tends to be treated with suspicion 
in mainstream French media. Reports suspect that this new interest in ecology is an ‘avatar’ 
for the ‘conservative and Catholic Right’ (Brésis 09/02/2015), deplore a self-serving ‘grab’ of 
the theme of degrowth by the ‘ultraconservative Catholic young guard’ (Sauvaget 
06/09/2015), and warn of the emergence of a ‘new reactionary tribe’ (Gonzague 2016). By 
2019, notwithstanding the attempts, by a variety of Catholic actors, to present their point of 
view in the press (Choquet et al. 24/07/2018; Bès 10/05/2019), the overall rise in interest for 
all things green among French Catholics is seen as part and parcel of the ‘ideological 
recomposition of the hard Right’ (Blin 05/05/2019). In particular, the fact that ecological 
topics eventually came to be featured by Marine Le Pen among the new themes of the 
Rassemblement National99 party was perceived by the centre-left press as proof of the joining 
of the ‘neopagan and Catholic Rights’ into a single ‘ultrareactionary discourse’ (ibid.; see also 
Berteloot 14/04/2019). Any countervailing efforts to disambiguate the groups in question and 
explore their individual motives for ‘going green’ are lost in the midst of this moral panic. 
   The reasons for the moral panic itself are elucidated when taking into account the long-term 
history of French Republican civic nationalism (Stolcke 1995), discussed throughout Part 
One. On the one hand, the construction of the French nation has long been predicated on 
‘turning peasants into Frenchmen’ (E.Weber 1976; McDonald 1989; Reed-Danahay 1996; 
Chapter Two) by reducing their local particularisms or co-opting their regional attachments 
into a scaled framework of paramount love for the Nation (Thiesse 1997). On the other hand, 
 
98 Van Gaver 2011; Bès, Durano & Rokvam 2014; de Plunkett 2015; Revol 2015; Richard & Rey 2016; 
Arnsperger & Bourg 2017; Bès 2017; Hermann & Hermann 2018; Lafage 2020; Hermann & Hermann 2020. 
99 Marine Le Pen’s far-right Front National party (‘National Front’) was renamed Rassemblement National 
(‘National Gathering/Re-assembly’) on 1st June 2018. 
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the early 21st-century has seen a rise of fears over religious communalism, epitomised by the 
2004 ‘affair of the veil’ (Asad 2006b, 2006c; Bowen 2007; Iteanu 2013; Fernando 2014) and 
re-awakened in 2013 by La Manif Pour Tous, which put the spotlight onto French Catholics 
in addition to ongoing attention directed towards French Muslims (Chapter One). In this 
setting, French Catholic intellectuals’ choice to leave Paris – the capital and metonym for the 
Republic – in order to integrate into rural village communities raises old spectres. From the 
perspective of Republican commentators, this recent trend looks like an inversion of the 
‘peasants to Frenchmen’ trajectory, an ideological subscription to discourses hailing the 
Christian and rural ethnic ‘roots of France’, and, overall, proof that Catholics are jettisoning 
their Republican identities in favour of a new far-right/religious identitarianism. 
   The écolo catho couple mentioned in the press coverage above – they of the ‘organic 
house’, kitchen garden, absent television, and local laundromat – are, it so happens, already 
known to the readers of this thesis: the husband is Hilaire Broie de Bugey, whose role in the 
foundation of Les AlterCathos was described in Chapter Three. During La Manif Pour Tous, 
Hilaire had been particularly invested in the public discussion group called Les Veilleurs, and 
in their early development of a paradigm of ‘integral ecology’ (Bès et al 2014; Chapter 
Three). It is in this context that he met his future wife, Mathilde, a young Catholic literature 
professor living in Paris – he moved from Lyon to the capital to rejoin her after they married. 
Charismatic, articulate, and unhesitatingly outspoken, both Hilaire and Mathilde became well-
known figures among Les Veilleurs, and thereafter stayed on the radars of the media. I never 
had the chance to meet Hilaire myself, as he had already left Lyon to rejoin Mathilde – first in 
Paris, and then in the countryside – when I began my fieldwork. However, several other 
AlterCathos members whom I knew in Lyon have followed similar trajectories to Hilaire’s 
and Mathilde’s, moving to small provincial towns and rural villages. This decision was 
justified not with reference to communalist or identitarian projects, but with reference to 
Laudato Si’ and the paradigm of écologie intégrale. 
   I suggest that the media’s flawed conclusion – that young Catholic intellectuals are pursuing 
a new ultrareactionary politics – stems from a less-obvious, but crucially erroneous initial 
assessment of the scalar process they are observing. The press reports that Catholics are 
‘going local’, and it is this directional move that they interpret as an ethno-cultural 
entrenchment – viewing Catholics as ‘going local’, the conclusion that they are ‘going to 
ground’ follows easily. In this chapter, I argue that a different scalar logic is at play in French 
Catholics’ recent interest in all things ecological: not localism, but the logic of ‘subsidiarity’. 
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Subsidiarity is one of the pillars of the Catholic Social Teaching (Pope Leo XIII 1891; Pius 
XI 1931); and a central tenet of the paradigm of écologie intégrale developed by Les 
AlterCathos. Simply put, the principle of subsidiarity entails a vision of the world as nested 
scales, and suggests that the smallest appropriate scale for each context of life is the most 
beneficial. 
   I therefore argue that the newfound ecological pursuits on a local level of Hilaire, Mathilde, 
and many other young Catholic intellectuals must not be viewed as ‘going local’ but rather as 
one expression, among many, of their efforts to evaluate the ‘appropriateness’ of multiple 
ways of scaling economic, political, and community life. Rather than promoting a particular 
pre-fabricated politics, or following a programmatic vision of the articulation between roots, 
identity, belonging, and nationhood, I argue that they are engaging with the principle of 
subsidiarity as a problematic: its scalar logic questions their prior habits, more often than it 
prescribes new ones. 
   In the previous chapter, I argued that écologie intégrale is a ‘world-oriented’ rather than ‘I-
oriented’ religious ethic (Mattingly 2014; Piliavski & Sbriccoli 2016): its telos is not directed 
towards the care of the self (Foucault 1984) but towards the ‘care for our common home’ 
(Pope Francis 2015), including the environmental care for the planet and the social care for its 
population, plagued by global inequality. But the absence of a clear I-oriented telos does not, 
to my mind, prevent the use of analytical frameworks recently developed in the anthropology 
of ethics to address ‘ethical reasoning and practice’ (Laidlaw 2014: 104). Specifically, I argue 
that the principle of subsidiarity is employed by my interlocutors as a ‘mode of 
subjectivation’ or ‘technique of self-formation’100 (Foucault 1986 [1984]: 26-8; 1997: 263-6; 
Laidlaw 2014: 103), albeit one whose telos goes beyond the self itself to encompass the 
world. In this chapter, I therefore explore, within the political theology of écologie intégrale, 
the particular mode of subjectivation that is subsidiarity: I aim to show how my interlocutors 
think with and through subsidiarity in order to calibrate their actions and life-choices for the 
sake of the Common Good. 
 
100 Practices that ‘permit individuals to effect, by their own means, a certain number of operations on – their 
own bodies, their own souls, their own thoughts, their own conduct – and this in a manner so as to – transform 
themselves, modify themselves, and to attain a certain state – of perfection, happiness, purity, supernatural 
power’ (Laidlaw 2014: 101; on Foucault 1997: 177, 255). Here, the principle of subsidiarity is directed towards 
agents’ conduct and everyday actions – and the ‘certain state’ desired is a state of the world rather than the self. 
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   As a scalar logic predicated on finding ‘the smallest scale appropriate’, the principle of 
subsidiarity drives my interlocutors to question several concomitant and concatenated scales 
of belonging and acting – the family, the workplace, the food production and distribution 
chain, the village, the neighbourhood, the region, the Nation, the European Union (cf. Holmes 
2000; Shore 1993, 2005), the diocese, the universal Catholic Church. This process, 
epiphenomenally but inescapably, intersects awkwardly with the Republican scalar 
imaginaries of French nationhood. 
 
A troubling red herring: The political theology of the ‘Benedict Option’ 
French media commentators are not unjustified in worrying that young Catholic intellectuals’ 
transhumance to small provincial towns and rural villages indexes a desire for religious 
communalism. Indeed, this exact process has been very explicitly advocated recently by 
conservative Catholics in the United States, garnering world-wide attention – including 
among my Lyonnais interlocutors, who insist that it is precisely what they are not doing, and 
agonise over the risk that the two projects will be conflated by undiscerning external 
observers. To launch this chapter’s exploration of the modes of subjectivation of écologie 
intégrale, I start by addressing what Les AlterCathos consider to be a red herring: a seeming 
convergence between two political theologies, which they labour to disambiguate in the eyes 
of their own audiences. 
   James Laidlaw’s (2010) case study of diasporic ‘Eco-Jains’ who are attracted to global 
environmentalist and animal liberation movements alerts us to the complex interfaces 
between ethical traditions with similar surface practices, but different underlying teloi. 
Laidlaw illustrates that, while younger generations of diasporic Jains highlight convergences 
between Jain practices and ecological ones – for instance, Jain vegetarianism and Western 
veganism – these are undergirded by two very different conceptions of the impetus to ‘do no 
harm’. While veganism in the West is supported by a biophile vision of the world whereby 
Nature – animals and plants – must be protected from human-caused harm, Laidlaw shows 
that the ethical tradition of Jainism, rather inversely, holds that Jains must renounce and 
escape a cosmos which is fundamentally defined by suffering (2010: 77). Laidlaw therefore 
concludes that ‘Eco-Jains’’ dialogue with ecological discourses involves questioning and 
renegotiating – in ways which are not yet settled – the ‘cosmology and metaphysics’, 
‘conception of the self’, and ‘catalogue of virtues’ of the Jain tradition (ibid.; MacIntyre 1988: 
349). A similar ethical negotiation is at stake in Les AlterCathos’s dialogue with a competing 
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Catholic political theology which has gained public visibility in France recently. Contrary to 
the ‘Eco-Jains’, however, Les AlterCathos are trying to sustain divergence rather than 
articulate convergence. It is they – preempting the anthropological observer – who call 
attention to ethical incompatibilities between two seemingly similar political theologies 
within the single tradition of Catholicism. In this process of disambiguation, Les AlterCathos 
confirm core elements of their own ethical project. 
   In 2017, Rod Dreher, an American editor and a self-defined ‘conservative’ Catholic, 
published The Benedict Option: A Strategy for Christians in a Post-Christian Nation. 
Addressed primarily to Catholics, but with the ambition to gradually convince all Christians 
(including Orthodox and Protestant) in the USA, The Benedict Option proposes to combat 
what it sees as the disappearance of genuine faith and religious practice in the modern ‘post-
Christian’ nation by concentrating the faithful into self-standing communities. Spurred by 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue (1981), it aims – according to its dust jacket – to counter 
the new ‘spiritual crisis’ and ‘culture war’ of the ‘dark age that has overtaken us’ in the 
secular liberal West. Drawing inspiration from the sixth-century development of the earliest 
Christian monasteries, whose communal living was heavily regulated according to edicts 
drawn by their founder, Saint Benedict, The Benedict Option calls ‘to embrace exile from 
mainstream culture and construct a resilient counterculture’ (Dreher 2017: 120). Despite its 
explicitly USA-centric approach, the book’s cover is illustrated with a photograph of the 
French Mont-Saint-Michel: rising from the mist of dawn, in soft blue and gold tones, the 
outline of the island topped by its tall church spire is intended to suggest the mutually-
constitutive self-sufficiency and devoutness of Dreher’s proposed new Christian communities. 
   The ‘Benedict Option’ is not centrally an evangelizing project. Instead, it is premised on 
changing the life fabric of the devout Christians who might follow it: by fostering solely-
Christian neighbourhoods, schools, and professional networks, Dreher argues that Christians 
will be better able to reflexively pursue a scripturally-observant lifestyle in all aspects of their 
family lives, education, friendships, professional choices, medical choices, devotional 
practices, and political participation. By ‘political participation’, Dreher does not mean 
‘campaigns, elections, activism, lawmaking – all the elements of statecraft in a democracy’ 
(2017: 88). Instead, he views Christian politics as the ‘process by which we agree on how we 
are going to live together’ (ibid.) in countercultural communities inspired by Václav Havel’s 
notion of ‘antipolitical politics’ and Václav Benda’s notion of ‘parallel polis’ (Havel 1978, 
Benda 2017, in Dreher 2017: 91-96). The Benedict Option can be analysed as promoting an 
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extreme form of religious ‘anti-syncretism’, as Charles Stewart and Rosalind Shaw label 
‘[demands] for purification for the sake of an untainted authenticity’ (1994, in Schielke & 
Debevec 2012: 5): here, the anti-syncretism at hand is both doctrinal and socio-political. 
   Immediately successful among conservative Catholic circles in the United States and United 
Kingdom, the book was translated into French101 within the year. It spurred a certain amount 
of skepticism among French Catholic spheres regarding Dreher’s avocacy of a ‘communalist 
withdrawal’ (B.Dumont 2017: 5) – the phrase used by critics, le repli communautaire, is not a 
theological term but one which is usually employed in French discourse to critique anti-
Republican forms of communalism (Bowen 2007: 156). Nonetheless, most of the influential 
French Catholic newspapers and blogs credited Dreher with a sound overall intention, that of 
vivifying faith and piety in Catholics’ everyday lives; and the book was widely cited and 
discussed102. 
   On the surface, many of the features of the ‘Benedict Option’ resemble those of écologie 
intégrale. Dreher recommends detachment from the democratic politics of the nation; Les 
AlterCathos encourage their audiences to distance from party politics and consider politics as 
a quotidian matter (Chapter Three). Dreher advocates the creation and consolidation of 
Catholic communities; Les AlterCathos run an explicitly Catholic café and attempt to draw 
into it a wider socio-cultural network known as la cathosphère (Chapter Four). Dreher 
encourages Christians to forsake liberal modernity (cf. Harding 2001; Orsi 2012: 148); Les 
 
101 The translation included significant changes to the marketing style. On the cover of the French edition, the 
photograph of the Mont-Saint-Michel is replaced by a childishly colourful drawing of houses; one of which, 
topped by a small greyish cross, can only be identified as a church at second glance. The title is also edited: the 
book is rebranded as How to be Christian in a World Which is Christian No Longer, with a smaller subtitle: The 
Benedictine Gamble (Dreher 2017, trans. Darbon). By removing the Mont-Saint-Michel, a recognisable 
landmark for French readers if not necessarily for American ones, and extending the title to a ‘post-Christian 
“world”’ rather than ‘nation’, the editorial choices involved in the translation shy away from invoking the thorny 
question of the Christian past of the French nation, and the even thornier one of its potential re-christianised 
Benedictine future. In fact, rather than an objective ‘option’, the revival of Benedictine regulations and 
communities is framed as a ‘gamble’ (le pari bénédictin). The lack of a translator’s preface prevents a conclusive 
assessment of the extent to which this de-politicised and somewhat dubitative presentation may have been 
deliberate, but it is quite possible that it was – for their part, both the Spanish and Italian translations conserved 
the Mont-Saint-Michel front cover and the title of ‘option’. 
102 Cf. Chapter Two regarding the preponderance of book publications and philosophical debates within elite 
Catholic spheres. 
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AlterCathos promote an anti-liberal and anti-capitalist paradigm. Dreher promotes ‘exile’; 
AlterCathos members and other young Catholic intellectuals move with their families to small 
towns and rural villages. Throughout the autumn of 2017, during the final months of my 
fieldwork, Committee members of Les AlterCathos worried that their project of écologie 
intégrale might be conflated with Dreher’s better-publicised communalist paradigm on the 
basis of abductive observations – if it looks like a (Benedictine) duck, then so must it be. 
Popular secular media had, by that time, already started reporting in critical terms on young 
Catholics’ relocation to provincial areas, but the mainstream press were not the main reason 
for Les AlterCathos’s worry. Instead, the Committee were concerned that Catholic audiences, 
who were more likely to have read or heard about Dreher’s manifesto in the first place, might 
believe that Les AlterCathos were engaged in instantiating a Lyonnais version of the 
‘Benedict Option’; and might therefore approach Le Simone with erroneous expectation of the 
association’s aims and values. 
   The topic of communalism was directly addressed, and Les AlterCathos’s own intent 
clarified, on the occasion of the first meeting of the ‘Laudato Si’ in Action’ workshop of the 
school-year 2017-18 (Chapter Four). It was held in Le Simone shortly after the early-
September publication of the French edition of The Benedict Option, at the peak of the initial 
debates about the book’s contents. The meeting was chaired by André, a student in theology 
at the nearby Université Catholique, who had come to France from his native Ivory Coast for 
the sake of these studies and was therefore a relative newcomer to the bourgeois Catholic 
spheres of Lyon. In recognition of his role as convenor of the LSiA workshop, André had 
recently been included into the Committee of Les AlterCathos, and had taken active part in 
their internal discussions about Dreher’s book. 
   André started the meeting by reading out a paragraph from Laudato Si’ which, he told us, 
would be easy to mis-interpret. Since this inaugural meeting gathered a number of attendees 
who had not participated in previous years of the LSiA workshop, or even read Laudato Si’ 
themselves, André wished to avoid misguided assessments of the encyclical’s – and the 
workshop’s – objectives. The paragraph he chose is one in which Pope Francis oulines the 
moral core of his encyclical: 
Disregard for the duty to cultivate and maintain a proper relationship with my neighbour, 
for whose care and custody I am responsible, ruins my relationship with my own self, with 
others, with God and with the earth. [...] Ancient [biblical] stories, full of symbolism, bear 
witness to a conviction which we today share, that everything is interconnected, and that 
 176 
genuine care for our own lives and our relationships with nature is inseparable from 
fraternity, justice and faithfulness to others. (Pope Francis 2015: §70) 
   It would not be acceptable, André expounded, to read this paragraph through a selfish lens 
(une optique égoïste): to see ‘my relationship with my own self’ (ma relation intérieure avec 
moi-même) as the finality of the relationships built ‘with my neighbour’. The ‘duty to 
cultivate and maintain’ a ‘proper relationship’ with the people around oneself, André warned, 
is not to be interpreted as a validation of l’entre-soi – the decision to live ‘among ourselves’ 
in communities of similar class and religion103. Instead, he concluded, it is a call to be truly 
attentive to the social and material conditions which enable each of one’s neighbours to live a 
full and fulfilling life (une vie pleine et épanouie). André therefore addressed a word of 
welcome and of reassurance to all new workshop participants, explaining that they could 
participate in the workshop’s ‘ecological conversion’ (conversion écologique; cf. Lafage 
2020: 15-21; Hermann & Hermann 2020: 81-96) even if they were not Catholic, but simply 
motivated by the conviction that ‘we do not inherit the Earth from our ancestors, we borrow it 
from our children’104. 
   André’s pointed exegesis of the passage from Laudato Si’ made no mention of The Benedict 
Option, but was rather transparent in its opposition against Dreher’s advocacy of Christian 
communalism, for those LSiA attendees who were themselves part of the Catholic spheres 
concurrently debating the recently-published book. By contrast with his amicable tone when 
articulating Catholic and non-Catholic ecological discourses, André was firm in his efforts to 
disambiguate two possible Catholic orientations towards the world. The ‘Benedict Option’ 
and écologie intégrale may have had similarities in practice, but André’s intervention 
 
103 I do not believe André’s forcefulness in making this point was intended to comment on his own (successful 
or not) inclusion into Lyonnais Catholic spheres a few years previously – he had a forthright character and did 
not, to my knowledge, engage in insinuations. Nonetheless, he was aware that among the participants of the 
workshop were conservative bourgeois Catholics who might approve of, or at least not take issue with, the 
prospect of l’entre-soi (‘among-ourselves’). 
104 ‘Nous n'héritons pas de la terre de nos ancêtres, nous l'empruntons à nos enfants’. The quote is attributed to 
Antoine de Saint-Exupéry (1939), a native of Lyon, one of the most beloved local historical figures. Like some 
of the ‘Eco-Jains’ discussed by James Laidlaw (2010), André considered the convergences between religious 
and non-religious ecological discourses from the standpoint of the religious tradition first and foremost – rather 
than a meeting of distinct ecological discourses on equal terms, André’s presentation foregrounded the ways in 
which écologie intégrale can encompass and include other traditions and non-religious actors. 
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clarified and insisted on the incompatibility of their underlying ethical architectures. In 
theoretical terms, they differ in two of the four criteria outlined by Michel Foucault to 
recognise and analyse ethical modes of subjectivation (Foucault 1986 [1984]: 26-8; 1997: 
263-6; in Laidlaw 2014: 103). Rod Dreher’s book is predicated upon the improvement of 
Christian faith, and its readers are expected to engage with it both ‘as’ and qua devout 
Christians (Thesis Introduction; Maritain 1927). Broadly speaking, the ‘Benedict Option’ is to 
Catholicism what revivalist movements are to Islam, or radical Pentacostalism to Protestant 
Christianity: movements which have been analysed as ‘fundamentalist’ for their insistance on 
scriptural and/or clerical authority and pious discipline, and for their rejection of liberal 
modernity in favour of social conservatism (Harding 2001; Orsi 2012: 148). Its deontology – 
‘the ways in which people position themselves in relation to their ideals of injunctions or 
rules’ (Laidlaw 2014: 103) – and its teleology – the kind of being that the ethical subject 
aspires to be (ibid.) – differ altogether from those of écologie intégrale, which neither 
presumes a deontological premise of devout Christianity, nor expects such a pious telos 
(Chapter Four). 
   While both political theologies issue forth from the same religious tradition, they have 
opposite moral and spatial ‘centres of gravity’. The ‘Benedict Option’ is centripetal: both 
spiritually and socially, it gravitates towards or withdraws into (repli) its Christian core. 
Écologie intégrale, on the other hand, is centrifugal: its moral catalyst resides in the 
exogenous ‘neighbours’ – including the most distant ones on the scale of the planet, whose 
care can be undertaken by promoting environmentalism and social equality according to the 
adage that ‘everything is interconnected’ (Pope Francis 2015: §70). André’s next task in the 
‘Laudato Si’ in Action’ workshop was to clarify, for his audience, how to grapple with this 
universalist scope in practice. 
 
The principle of subsidiarity: A matter of scale 
‘The great difficulty of putting Laudato Si’ in action is not to figure out what should be done 
for Earth and for humanity, but to determine what we are called to do ourselves,’ André 
explained to the assembled audience. He continued: 
Pope Francis does not ask us to be superheroes. He does not ask us to abandon our lives, he 
asks us to transform our lives in what measure we can, on our scale. There is nothing worse 
than the hypocrisy which consists in saying, I can do nothing big, when we have not 
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confronted the smaller inequalities and pains which surround us. There is always more 
fraternity105 to be built in our days and in our lives. 
In this inaugural ‘Laudato Si’ in Action’ meeting of the year, therefore, participants were 
immediately given a filter through which to read the encyclical: the lens of scale. Because 
‘everything is connected’, André explained, seemingly minor efforts to ameliorate the quality 
of a community’s life on a small scale are a valuable contribution to the effective 
implementation of Laudato Si’ on a quantitatively large scale, that of the planet – and 
therefore, the commitment to ‘care for our common home’ does in fact begin ‘at home’ on a 
daily basis. 
   The scalar vision André was alluding to is not outlined explicitly in Laudato Si’ itself, but 
draws on a longer history of Catholic scalar thinking, articulated in a notion called the 
‘principle of subsidiarity’. Subsidiarity is only mentioned twice in Laudato Si’ (Pope Francis 
2015: §157, §196), and in my experience its lexicon is only used with complete familiarity by 
the minority of Catholics who have extensive knowledge – either as academics 106  or as 
members of the clergy – of the full range of the encyclicals of the Church Social Teaching107. 
The founding members of Les AlterCathos had explored this principle in the early years of 
their association, which had been devoted to discussing the Church Social Teaching (Chapter 
Three); and André, although a latecomer to the association, was familiar with this principle 
due to his academic background in theology. Les AlterCathos’s conceptual and practical uses 
of the principle of subsidiarity follow the pattern explored throughout Chapters Three and 
Four with reference to écologie intégrale more broadly: the first stage entailed articulating the 
 
105 The mention of brotherhood or fraternity, fraternité, takes on an additional layer of meaning in the French 
context, where it is the final third of the Republican motto of ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity’. 
106 The following academic sources on Laudato Si’ were read by or written by Les AlterCathos: Revol & Ricaud 
2015; Hériard Dubreuil s.j. 2016; Conférence des Évêques de France 2017; Danroc & Cazanave 2017; Dufoing 
2017; Hermann & Hermann 2018; Lang 2020; Lafage 2020; Hermann & Hermann 2020. 
107 When my interlocutors described the source of their awareness of the principle of subsidiarity, they cited 
religious texts (e.g. encyclicals) and religious events (e.g. conferences) rather than contemporary political 
contexts in which subsidiarity has been a matter of public discussion, such as the 1992 and 1999 debates 
surrounding the creation of the European Union and its monetary union (Shore 1995; Holmes 2000). It is quite 
likely that my interlocutors, who were in their late-20s and early-thirties in 2017, had been too young to follow 
debates about European subsidiarity in the 1990s. Instead, when they discussed European subsidiarity, it was as 
one instance of the principle they had discovered through the CST. 
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‘theory’ of subsidiarity in intellectual terms, before considering modes and forms of putting it 
into practice in Le Simone. The following definition of subsidiarity in conceptual terms 
corresponds to the way it was explained to me by André and several other AlterCathos 
Committee members, who hoped I would then learn to ‘spot’ its presence in action. 
   ‘Subsidiarity’, AlterCathos Committee members explained, was first laid out as a principle 
in Pope Pius XI’s 1931 encyclical Quadragesimo anno. The text, as its name suggests, was 
written to mark the fortieth anniversary of the publication of another core document of the 
Catholic Church: Pope Leo XIII’s 1891 encyclical Rerum novarum, the very first papal 
writing in a series that would later be gathered into the Compendium of the ‘Church Social 
Teaching’. Rerum novarum, subtitled Rights and Duties of Capital and Labor, responded to 
the Industrial Revolution and to the attendant two-pronged rise of socialism and capitalism by 
offering a third, Catholic option. Among other suggestions, Leo XIII encouraged labour 
unions, defended private property, and attempted to sketch out the responsibilities of 
governments to protect the physical and spiritual integrity of the working classes. In 1931, 
Pius XI returned to those concerns – where his predecessor’s stance on private property had 
earned him the reputation of siding with the bourgeoisie over the proletariat, Pius aimed to 
restore Leo’s good name and explain once more the reasons for Catholicism’s equal dislike 
for capitalism and communism 108 . The Catholic perspective laid out throughout 
Quadragesimo anno emerges through a discussion of the mutual constitution of rights, 
responsibility, and dignity. Pius argues simultaneously that private property should be 
protected as the rightful fruit of one’s labour, and that evangelisation should be a priority 
among the lower classes in order to educate workers to the dignity they acquire through their 
own labour: 
This constant [pastoral] work, undertaken to fill the workers' souls with the Christian 
spirit, helped much also to make them conscious of their true dignity and render them 
capable, by placing clearly before them the rights and duties of their class, of legitimately 
and happily advancing and even of becoming leaders of their fellows. (Pius XI 1931: 
§23) 
Moving from the economic sphere to the political one, Pius carries out a similar argument, 
namely, that men should be entitled to labour and responsibilities concerning their own lives, 
 
108 AlterCathos Committee members occasionally expressed fellow-feeling for Pope Leo XIII on the basis of 
being similarly engaged in attempting to temper bourgeois lifestyles with ideals of social justice, without 
antagonising or alienating audiences on the basis of their socio-economic backgrounds. 
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not only for the sake of the economic or social outcomes of these positions, but also for the 
sake of their integral development and dignity. Consequently, he argues, governments should 
limit the centralisation of tasks, at any scale: 
It is a fundamental principle of social philosophy, fixed and unchangeable, that one 
should not withdraw from individuals and commit to the community what they can 
accomplish by their own enterprise and industry. So, too, it is an injustice and at the same 
time a grave evil and a disturbance of right order, to transfer to the larger and higher 
collectivity functions which can be performed and provided for by lesser and subordinate 
bodies. Inasmuch as every social activity should, by its very nature, prove a help to 
members of the body social, it should never destroy or absorb them. (Pius XI 1931: §79) 
This paragraph, nestled towards the middle of the encyclical and not particularly emphasised, 
was later taken up as the definition of the principle of subsidiarity, which the AlterCathos 
Committee readily paraphrase as ‘the principle of the smallest scale appropriate’ (le principe 
de la plus petite échelle appropriée), and summarise as ‘do not administer on a large scale 
what can be done on a smaller scale’. 
   This conceptual definition of subsidiarity frames the AlterCathos Committee’s 
contemporary reading of Laudato Si’. They consider that the implementation of the connected 
ecological and social themes of Laudato Si’ must proceed through Quadragesimo Anno’s 
teachings on the correlation between dignity and small-scale labour and responsibility. 
Through the lens of subsidiarity, Les AlterCathos draw out a scalar element of the ‘Care for 
our Common Home’ advocated by Pope Francis: they consider not just the objects of care, 
namely the planet and its people, but the act of caring itself, constrained by this scalar co-
constitution of labour, fraternity, and dignity109. 
   Among the AlterCathos Committee, it is explicit that the principle of subsidiarity underpins, 
on a microcosmic level, the organisation of the café Le Simone (Chapter Four). The 
AlterCathos Committee’s rejoinder that all members of Le Simone should feel free to launch 
and sustain new activities is an attempt to foster the cycle of personal liberty, responsibility, 
and dignity set out by Leo XIII and Pius XI. Stricto sensu, the Committee’s ‘hands-off’ 
approach to regulating the activities held in Le Simone enables them to successfully avoid the 
administration of events on a large scale when a smaller one would suffice. Furthermore, by 
 
109 Due to a decision not to include elements of prayer or devotion in the daily life of their association and café 
(Chapter Four), Les AlterCathos do not engage with the element of evangelisation and pastoral care present in 
Pius XI’s discussion of the dignity of industrial workers. 
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encouraging individuals to undertake their own projects, rather than delegating pre-
determined tasks, they promote the relationship between personal labour and peer leadership 
described in Quadragesimo Anno. To reuse the words employed by Pius XI, it is by 
encouraging newcomers to invest in discrete ‘social activities’ that these individuals 
eventually become wholly members of Le Simone’s ‘body social’ (1931: §79). After setting 
into motion this subsidiary organisation within Le Simone, the AlterCathos Committee 
considered two further challenges: how to apply the principle of subsidiarity in their everyday 
lives more widely, and how to encourage others to share in this mode of subjectivation. 
 
From ‘localism’ to ‘subsidiarity’: A problematic transition 
We return to the ‘Laudato Si’ in Action’ workshop, and to André’s efforts to mediate through 
a scalar lens new participants’ discovery of the encyclical’s call to environmental and social 
action. Each September, the first two meetings of the LSiA group focus on the ecological and 
human stakes of the mass-market food industry. Workshop members research and present 
short briefings on food production, distribution, and consumption; and the overall aim of 
these two sessions is to encourage new participants to consider shopping for local produce as 
a first tentative step towards greener and more fraternal consumption habits. By buying local 
produce, workshop participants are told, they can simultanously boycott the overly-large and 
environmentally-costly distribution networks of supermarkets, and empower local producers 
(Lafage 2020: 103-108). 
   This first focus on food is a deliberate tactic, André admitted to me, which soothes the 
audience’s possible apprehensions about the difficulty of putting Laudato Si’ in action. The 
topic of food allows André to draw out clear-cut, readily implemented instructions, before 
introducing the encyclical’s more complex topics later down the line. Following in the 
footsteps of the two women who had run the seminar in previous years, André purposely uses 
the topic of local vegetables in order to ease his audience into discovering the core 
connections drawn by the encyclical: the connection between ecology and human dignity, and 
the connection between a global crisis and individual efforts on a local level. As a pedagogic 
approach, André invites his audience to focus on what he considers to be a proxy – local 
produce – before gradually encouraging them to think about other green and fraternal efforts 
they can undertake on the scale of their local communities. By the end of the year, André 
hopes, his audience should understand that just as the purchase of locally-grown produce is 
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only a particular instantiation of a broader attitude towards ‘the local’, so is ‘the local’ itself 
only a particular instantiation of a fully subsidiary mode of ‘[caring] for our common home’. 
   What the Pope argues in his encyclical, the LSiA workshop explores each year, is that 
environmentalism and charity – respectively the care for the planet and the care for the poor – 
are each crucial on their own terms, but that the full realisation of one necessitates the full 
realisation of the other. Francis’s mantra is that ‘everything is connected’: a ‘biocentric’ but 
anthropophobe (2015: §118) approach to ecology will fail to save the planet if it does not 
address humanity, and in particular the sweep of human lives responsible for, and suffering 
from, climate change and the collapse of biodiversity. Vice-versa, traditional Catholic charity 
misses the mark if it does not ensure that all populations across the globe retain a livable 
environment. The question of transport is particularly illustrative of the feedback between 
environmentalism and charity: by scaling down one’s travels, and prioritising the train over 
planes and car journeys, one contributes to limiting pollution and climate change, and this in 
turn helps to protect vulnerable coastal populations across the globe whose livelihoods are 
threatened by rising sea levels. Therefore, the personal injunction that the majority of my 
Lyonnais interlocutors took away from their growing awareness of Laudato Si’ was that, 
firstly, they should be more environmentally-friendly in their daily lives, and secondly, they 
should renew – or begin – their commitment to the age-old New Testament injunction to care 
for the poor, the weak, ‘the least of these brothers and sisters’ (Matthew 25:40). These 
twinned commitments, André explains to LSiA workshop participants each year, benefit 
several scales of the ‘common home’, since ‘everything is connected’ – from the smallest 
scale of the family home, to the somewhat larger scale of the interpersonal networks centred 
around one’s house, then onwards and upwards to the largest scale of our home planet.  
   In 2017, André’s focus on food consumption and travel as entrypoints into subsidiary 
practices easily convinced members of the ‘Laudato Si’ in Action’ workshop of the value of 
local scales of action in terms of environmental benefits – less transport of persons and goods 
means reduced carbon emissions. However, the question of charity – Pope Francis’s joint 
priority alongside environmentalism – proved more complex to navigate, and challenged Les 
AlterCathos’s early hopes that a shift to subsidiary lifestyles might be straightforward. 
Several AlterCathos members and Simone regulars had previously volunteered with charities 
abroad – a few had travelled to Erbil, Iraq in 2014, and then to Mosul in the spring of 2017, to 
carry out international aid efforts coordinated by Lyon’s Cardinal Barbarin – a practice that 
they were now re-evaluating, ends versus means, pitting the merit of their presence in Iraq 
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against the critical carbon footprint of the plane journey. Neither André nor the other 
AlterCathos Committee members had a clear solution to the problematic realisation that it 
would be rather retrogressive for them, as well-off, privileged Catholics, to fall back on 
‘local’ charity close to home.  
   In the autumn of 2017, the question of ‘local’ charity was raised among Simone regulars by 
a young father – an old hand of the ‘Laudato Si’ in Action’ workshop – who had been alerted 
to the plight of Syrian refugees in Lyon. Refugee families had been instructed by 
governmental organisations to enroll their children in specific schools in and around Lyon, 
but had been provided with accommodation situated very far from these schools. Since 
regular school attendance was a requirement of their refugee status, several Syrian families 
slept in the streets close to their children’s schools, rather than occupy their impractically-
distant official accommodation. Several AlterCathos members working in primary or 
secondary education found themselves teaching homeless Syrian children, and many others 
knew that their own school-aged children had refugee classmates. For weeks after the start of 
school in September, a collective created by local teachers and parents – all regular or 
occasional visitors of Le Simone – campaigned to be allowed to take charge of housing the 
Syrian families attending their neighbourhood schools. They argued firstly that the national 
administration in charge of these families was proving to be slow and ineffective, and 
secondly that, on principle, the care for these newcomers should be their own responsibility. 
They claimed that les parents d’élèves, the collective noun referring to all the parents of the 
student body in each school, should be allowed to provide for the welfare of newly-arrived 
Syrian families, thereby including the refugee parents into their fold and fostering the 
integration of the entire family into the neighbourhood community. To their great 
disappointment and anger, this proved impossible to set up, as the administration in charge of 
housing the refugees did not have the werewithal to delegate to any local civilian collective, 
however well-intentioned. This experience contributed to alerting Simone regulars to the 
points of friction (Tsing 2005) between subsidiary scales of action promoting the ‘smallest 
scale appropriate’, and those of the nationwide State administration. 
   While Les AlterCathos’s renewed sense of responsibility for the poorest inhabitants of the 
immediate vicinity had some positive outcomes – they persevered in helping the Syrian 
families, providing food and clothing and hosting ‘study groups’ in their own homes to allow 
refugee children and parents alike to stay indoors in the evenings after school – they 
occasionally expressed worry that a greater investment in their own already-existing local 
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networks, at the scale of the school community for instance, might be a ‘cop-out’ from more 
impactful forms of charity – and that it might be (perceived as) a form of neighbourhood-
based bourgeois entre-soi, or socio-cultural communalism. One of the AlterCathos founders, 
who had been particularly invested in Cardinal Barbarin’s exchange program with Christian 
communities in Iraq – but who now took seriously the impetus not to harm the environment 
by taking frequent plane journeys between France and the Middle East – chose to resolve the 
conundrum of ‘local charity’ in a radical way. He moved with his family to Lebanon on a 
three-year contract with a Franco-Lebanese NGO: he and his wife would both work at a 
community school in a poor neighbourhood of Beirut, teaching high-school philosophy and 
primary school classes respectively, while volunteering among vulnerable Maronite Christian 
communities at the weekend and during school holidays. When explaining this choice to a 
crowd of regulars gathered in Le Simone one evening, the AlterCathos founder admitted that 
it had not been an easy decision to make: his three young children would only see their 
grandparents once a year at Christmas, but they would grow up learning that a charitable life 
can be conciliated with everyday family life. 
   In short, Les AlterCathos’s efforts to evaluate their own prior commitments according not 
only to broad ideals of environmentalism and charity, but also to the more pointed ‘principle 
of the smallest scale appropriate’, yield neither straightforward nor always comfortable 
answers. Part of the complexity experienced by Les AlterCathos and the regulars of Le 
Simone is due to the scope of actions which can fall under the remit of subsidiarity: taking 
seriously Pope Francis’s motto that ‘everything is connected’, in my interlocutors’ 
experience, leads to ethical conundrums not only on a daily basis but in every sphere of life. 
In his discussion of Michel Foucault’s notion of ‘modes of subjectivation’ or ‘techniques of 
the self’ (Foucault 1986 [1984]: 26-8; 1997: 263-6), James Laidlaw lists a range of possible 
ethical ‘ascetics’: the forms one’s self-forming activity can take, from stringent techniques to 
others ‘diffusely woven into forms of life, in work or other routines or in decisions over 
clothing, food, sleep, exercise, or sex’ (2014: 103). As a mode of subjectivation, subsidiarity 
is ‘diffusely woven’ indeed, and can come to encompass most of the above elements of daily 
life: for example, Les AlterCathos held a secondhand clothes-swap event in Le Simone to 
counter the mass-market clothing industry which not only violates human dignity in 
sweatshops but also wastes huge quantities of water. And as far as sex is concerned, women 
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in Le Simone have recently started to question the Pill110, arguing that while it is a means of 
offering dignity to women in their sexual and reproductive lives, large-scale pharmaceutical 
lobbies can also be critiqued for having promoted it far beyond any other means of 
contraception, to the extent of turning the Pill into an almost mandatory commitment for all 
women, constraining their liberty – in their view – and possibly harming the hormonal and 
emotional health of some (cf. Durano & Bastié 2017: 57; Ducoeurjoly 2017: 68-69; Durano 
2018). 
   It is with reference to this mode of subjectivation – to the application of écologie intégrale 
through the means of subsidiarity – that the recent trend of young Catholic intellectuals 
moving to provincial small towns (une petite ville, un bourg) and rural villages (une 
bourgade, un village) must be apprehended. Indeed, not only are rural or provincial lifestyles 
generally considered more ‘green’ than life in large urban centres such as Lyon or Paris, they 
also allow a streamlining of the multiple networks of work, home, school, sports, and so on in 
which environmentalism and charity must be promoted. While those Catholic intellectuals 
who moved to villages are ‘visible’111 in the eyes of the press, the less-noticeable majority of 
their friends who remain in Lyon also strive to foster degrowth (un mode de vie décroissant): 
my Lyon-based interlocutors also attempt to integrate, as far as possible, their daily networks. 
Some have transferred their children to schools near their home rather than in more distant 
arrondissements (districts) of Lyon; others now attend the Sunday Mass closest to home 
instead of travelling further afield to specific traditionalist or charismatic parishes; and one 
turned down a job promotion which would have required him to work in Paris two days per 
week. All of these adjustments reduce transport and pollution, and encourage the development 
of stronger community ties across their respective neighbourhoods. 
 
Scalar ascetics: Is the ‘smallest scale appropriate’ always small? 
I have so far described ways in which Les AlterCathos employ subsidiarity to effect change in 
their daily lives, often by attempting to reduce or ‘de-grow’ (décroître) the scale of their 
 
110 It has remained unclear to me what proportion – if any – of the women who regularly attend Le Simone 
might be on the Pill. While two of the women in question explicitly said they weren’t – and had several young 
children with short age gaps to ‘prove’ it – the rest did not comment on their personal choices in matters of 
contraception. 
111 Cf. Chapter One on the ambiguity of Catholic (in)visibility in the public sphere (Oliphant 2019). 
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environmental and economic impact on the planet. In this final section, I address more subtle 
traces of subsidiarity in my interlocutors’ daily lives: not changed actions, but a 
transformation of perspective which leads them to value on different terms some of their pre-
existing activities. In turn, this exploration showcases an important element of subsidiary 
ascetics: in the course of reflecting on the ‘smallest scale appropriate’, my interlocutors also 
engage with the possibility that certain scales of life might be inappropriately small. 
   I have described in Chapter Four the diversity of events which take place in Le Simone. 
After six months of fieldwork in Lyon, I was accustomed to thinking of Le Simone in terms of 
its disparate inner pieces; the constellation of events and seminars which each attract 
fluctuating audiences instead of sustaining one single group of attendees that I could reliably 
label, for the purposes of this thesis, ‘Le Simone’s community’. But one interlocutor, Thibault 
Mathulin, encouraged me to shift my perspective away from viewing Le Simone as the 
division of a whole – a single association fractured into many activities – and instead see it as 
the making of a whole, reunifying practices which would otherwise be split and scattered 
across separate locales. 
   I never knew Thibault very well – I knew his older cousin Benoît Mathulin better, because 
he volunteered as a barista for Le Simone to stay busy during a period of unemployment, and I 
knew his brother-in-law Auguste Paladru best of all, because I saw him every day in Le 
Simone’s coworking area, where he had chosen to base his activity as an independent 
photographer. Thibault, by contrast, flitted in and out of Le Simone, sometimes in the day, 
sometimes during the evening conferences, accompanied by a revolving door of friends as 
well as his fiancée Diane and his cousin – Benoît’s sister – Joséphine Mathulin. But it was 
Thibault who drew my attention to the role played by Le Simone in the lives of the Mathulin 
‘clan’, as they affectionately referred to themselves. One summer evening, when they had 
gathered for drinks around two café tables pushed together, he gestured at the group: ‘look at 
us’. Hélène Paladru, Thibault’s sister and Auguste’s wife, had a rare evening off from her 
demanding job as a nurse at the Children’s Hospital, and Thibault pointed out that she was 
able to join the relaxed evening without having to choose between her husband, her siblings, 
and her cousins because ‘so many of us are already here anyway’. 
   Le Simone gathers in one locale a variety of activities which the Mathulin clan could have 
otherwise experienced in a far more fragmentary way. It is simultaneously a place of work – 
volunteer work in the café for Benoît, independent work in the coworking space for Auguste, 
guaranteeing their regular presence on the premises – and a place of leisure away from work 
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for Hélène. It is a place of intellectual construction and personal growth for Thibault, Benoît, 
and Joséphine who, among the group, are the most committed to conference attendance and 
participation in the ‘Laudato Si’ in Action’ workshop; but outside of conference hours, it is 
also an undemanding place which encourages spontaneous gatherings and idle communal 
conversation. Because Le Simone has an AMAP partnership with a local agricultural producer, 
it is the place where Diane collects crates of fresh vegetables on Tuesday nights; and because 
one AlterCathos Committee member runs weekly comic-drawing workshops, it is where 
Joséphine dabbles in art on Saturday mornings. 
   None of the Mathulin clan belong to the historical core of Les AlterCathos’s founding 
philosophers, but they are pillars of Le Simone’s social core of invested regulars. Thibault had 
heard about the association through his mother around the time of the opening of Le Simone: 
Madame Mathulin, who lives in Provence, had started paying close attention to the goings-on 
of the diocese of Lyon when so many of her children, nieces, and nephews moved to the 
bigger city in their twenties and thirties to follow academic or professional opportunities. 
Following his mother’s advice to attend AlterCathos conferences, Thibault quickly chose to 
get involved in the association. Le Simone was about to open: he volunteered to set up the 
modalities of the coworking side in 2016, and then mentioned the brand-new and very cheap 
coworking space to his sister, Hélène, who in turn advertised it to her husband Auguste. The 
latter was seduced by the pricing of the work area, and orchestrated something of a mass 
migration among his friends, away from another more expensive coworking space and 
towards Le Simone. By the summer of 2017, when Thibault called my attention to Le 
Simone’s multifaceted presence in his family’s life, he had taken a step back from direct 
involvement in running the coworking area – but by then, a half-dozen Mathulins had stakes 
in the continued existence of Le Simone as a locale for diverse activities intertwining family 
and friends, work and leisure, personal development and collective integration. 
   It is easy to find, in Thibault’s recounting of his family’s history with Le Simone, echoes of 
the processes of decentralised personal investment already described in the previous sections; 
but from Thibault’s perspective, Le Simone’s many opportunities for pursuing individual 
goals crucially allowed the members of the Mathulin family to strengthen their collective 
bonds. As Thibault pointed out, the shared space of the café even gave her siblings and 
cousins a chance to see Hélène, the busy nurse. Later the same summer evening, with his 
family gathered around the tables on the pavement in front of the café, Thibault made himself 
the spokesperson for the Mathulin clan as he elaborated on the conceptual terms which, for 
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him, define Le Simone. He called it a ‘tiers-lieu’, a word which was unfamiliar to me and 
could ambiguously mean ‘third place’ or ‘place of thirds’112. 
   Thibault proceeded to illustrate the concept of a tiers-lieu through a description of a new 
initiative carried out by another Catholic association, the Association Lazare, who specialises 
in re-homing homeless persons in cooperative lodgings shared with Catholic youths or 
families. Lazare had recently renovated a farm on the outskirts of Paris, where two families 
now lived collectively along with a half-dozen previously-homeless men (and later women), 
with joint responsibility for the upkeep of the building and for running a sustainable 
polyculture business (Belhomme 14/09/2016). According to Thibault, this was a textbook 
example of a tiers-lieu: a place where the three ‘thirds’ of home life, work life, and 
community life could be reunited to lessen the fragmentation of neoliberal lives. Le Simone, 
he concluded, functions similarly. Even though no-one technically lives on the premises, 
forms of family life inside Le Simone – such as the dynastic ubiquity of the Mathulins, but 
also the common company of small children encouraged by a well-stocked play area in a 
corner of the café – allow the presence of an element of ‘home’ alongside the labour and 
community more obviously present in the space. 
   Thibault’s assessment that a truly fulfilling life – for oneself and for one’s neighbours – 
should ideally be achieved in tiers-lieux reuniting the usually scattered elements of family, 
labour, and community sheds a different light on the definition of subsidiarity as the 
‘principle of the smallest scale appropriate’. It highlights that it is possible to scale lives down 
inappropriately far – a critique which Thibault addressed to ‘neoliberal lives’. Thibault’s 
template of the tiers-lieu as a space which is simultaneously a total entity and split into three 
self-standing thirds suggests that each of these scales – the whole and its subdivisions – has its 
own merits. For Thibault, the value of Le Simone derived from its ability to simultaneously 
foster independent sub-groups – each with their own purpose, e.g. work in the coworking, 
 
112 Thibault suggested that I should refer to Roy Oldenburg’s sociological work on ‘third places’ (1989) in order 
to better understand the importance of tiers-lieux in the construction of ‘the neighbourhood’ as an imagined 
community and as a scale of public discussion (Anderson 1991; Habermas 1992). But Oldenburg’s ‘third places’ 
are called third places because, conceptually, he considers that they supplement and balance out individuals’ 
‘first’ home sphere and ‘second’ work sphere; acting as the third leg of a tripod to stabilise the post-Industrial 
Revolution division between domesticity and labour (1989; 1997:6). This is rather different from Thibault’s own 
definition of tiers-lieux as places which combine rather than partition the three ‘thirds’ of family, labour, and 
community life. 
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intellectual activity in the conferences, ecological consumption at the AMAP – and to coalesce 
these sub-groups into one wider community, circumscribed by the locale of the café. In other 
words, Thibault’s scalar reflection was not limited to identifying one, singular, ‘most 
appropriate’ scale of life – such as ‘the local’, the neighbourhood, or the café – but rather 
entailed an assessment of the segmentary articulation of several such scales (cf. Evans-
Pritchard 1940; Ben-Yehoyada 2017). 
   Thibault’s parts-and-wholes vision of Le Simone suggests that my Lyonnais interlocutors’ 
concern with scales does not have ‘smallness’ as its overarching finality, or decentralisation 
as its only mechanism. Subsidiarity, as they put it into action, is not only about scaling down 
when possible, it is also about curating and sustaining the discrete existence of concatenated 
wholes – such as the individual, the family, the community of the tiers-lieu, the 
neighbourhood, and so on – and, in some circumstances, resolving the problems of atomised 
or inappropriately small forms by scaling up. 
   The press articles described at the outset of this chapter offer ready examples of this multi-
directional, evaluative scalar thinking. What reporters tend to notice and focus on are the 
elements of downsizing: Hilaire and Mathilde Broie de Bugey, newly-settled in a small town 
with their two young children, promoting a ‘locavore’ lifestyle (Guyet & Cuccagna 
26/10/2015) – among my interlocutors, Auguste and Hélène Paladru were among those who 
also made the choice of moving to the countryside after the birth of their first son. But the 
interviews with Hilaire and Mathilde also showcase instances of scaled-up practices, such as 
when Mathilde explains that ‘for laundry we use the local laundromat’ (Gonzague 
05/11/2016). While this is not spelled out explicitly in the interviews, the ‘principle of the 
smallest scale appropriate’ goes both ways: by buying local produce, Hilaire and Mathilde 
boycott large distribution networks and empower local agricultural businesses; and by using 
the village laundromat, they signal their belief in the greater sustainability and cost-
effectiveness of communal appliances. In this case, the ‘smallest scale appropriate’ is deemed 
to be that of the collectivity, while family-owned washing machines are considered 
superfluous. Throughout, Hilaire and Mathilde sustain the good of several concatenated 
scales: the good of their own family, of their village community, of the economic 
cooperatives gathered around the communal laundromat and the local organic farms, and, 
because ‘everything is connected’, their efforts of degrowth contribute to the good of ‘Our 
Common Home’ on the largest scale of the planet. 
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Conclusion: Being subsidiary in a Republican nation 
At the start of this chapter, I described an ongoing moral panic, in the French mainstream 
press, about the noticeable trend for young Catholic intellectuals to leave urban centres and 
settle in small provincial towns and villages. Hilaire, Mathilde, or any of these young newly-
rural Catholics (néo-ruraux, Léger & Hervieu 1983; Hervieu-Léger & Hervieu 2005) are 
rarely, if ever, asked by interviewers why they took the step of moving to the countryside – 
what they think they are doing. Instead, the very fact that they did move is perceived to be the 
proof that Catholics are shifting over to the far-right. News reports suggest, more or less 
explicitly, that the rise in ecological commitment among Catholics isn’t about ecology, but is 
merely a symptom, an ‘avatar’ (Brésis 09/02/2015) for a broader, nefarious political 
recombination. It is thought that an ‘ultraconservative Catholic young guard’ is in the process 
of forming a new ‘ultrareactionary’ ‘tribe’ (respectively Sauvaget 06/09/2015; Blin 
05/05/2019; Gonzague 05/11/2016). 
   I argue that the agitation provoked on the national public stage by these instance of small-
scale Catholic ecology hinges on a mistaken or miscommunicated understanding of the ethical 
project at stake, and of the scalar modes of subjectivation entailed. As I have shown in this 
chapter, not only are external, secular commentators struggling to interpret this trend, but 
there are also contestations among Catholics themselves as to the moral finality of Christian-
led community projects. Three different ethical projects – at least – can underpin young 
Catholic intellectuals’ choice to move to the countryside: an integralist, far-right politics 
aiming to return to the Christian and rural ethno-cultural ‘roots of France’ (Stolcke 1995; 
Holmes 2000); an anti-syncretic, fundamentalist project of religious communalism aiming to 
create material conditions for truly faithful Christian lives through ‘exile from mainstream 
culture’ (Dreher 2017: 120; Harding 2001); and finally, the lesser-known political theology of 
écologie intégrale. Contrary to the centripetal withdrawal (repli) and communalism (entre-soi 
or communautarisme) advocated by the first two ethical projects, the third is a world-oriented 
religious ethic of care, articulated through the belief that ‘everything is interconnected’, and 
mediated through a subsidiary vision of how individual efforts scale into a global telos of 
environmental and social wellbeing. 
   But even though it is neither integralist nor anti-syncretic – that is, it neither advocates for 
class-, culture-, or faith-based forms of separatism – the project of écologie intégrale 
nevertheless intersects poorly with the Republican scalar imaginaries of French nationhood. 
After the French Revolution, one of the founding principles of the new political order was the 
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idea that all citizens should have equal and unmediated access to the Republic – unmediated 
by the toppled estates of the Ancien Régime, namely the aristocracy, the clergy, and the Third 
Estate, but also by ‘intermediate corporate bodies, such as guilds and religious groups’ 
(Bowen 2007: 160). In this political paradigm, it is through the ‘processes of direct 
communication between the state and citizens’ (ibid.) that citizens can not only be equal but 
also free: the Revolutionary Republican state was intended, in ur-Foucauldian terms, as ‘the 
domain in which citizens realize their freedom’ (Kriegel 1998; Bowen 2007: 15). The scalar 
imaginary of the Republic, in which there are two key scales – the individual citizen and the 
overarching Republic – therefore entrenches a moral ‘conception of the self’ (MacIntyre 
1988: 349) whereby freedom and human dignity are dependent on, and provided by, the 
primordial existence of the Republic. 
   The paradigm of écologie intégrale has a rather different view of the articulation between 
the self, the collective, and the pursuit of dignity. Following Leo XIII’s (1891) and Pius XI’s 
(1931) encyclicals on the Industrial Revolution and workers’ dignity, Les AlterCathos 
articulate a ‘conception of the self’ (MacIntyre 1988: 349) whereby individual dignity goes 
hand-in-hand with collective labour and the opportunity for free, personal investment and 
responsibility. This conception of the self was summarized to me by David Coureau, the 
President of Les AlterCathos, as: 
a refusal of the scission between private self and public self, between labour and 
intellectual life, and between labour and leisure or intellect and leisure. 
In line with this, David explained that opening Le Simone had allowed Les AlterCathos to: 
show – for those who notice it – our Christian anthropology (notre anthropologie 
chrétienne113): our integral vision of man. […] We unify several dimensions of human 
life which should never have become entirely self-standing: labour, sociability with the 
folk-dances and poetry events, corporeal life with the food and drink, and intellectual life. 
This view of the self, and of the places which allow a fulfilling life – such as Le Simone and, 
more widely, what Thibault called tiers-lieux – does not look to the Republic as a source of 
freedom and dignity, putatively flowing down unmediated from the State to its citizens. 
 
113 The notion of an ‘integral Christian anthropology’, mentioned by Pope John Paul II during a speech in 
Puebla (1979: §I.9, §III.2), follows the original etymology of anthrôpos-logos to indicate the ontological nature 
of Man – ‘in God’s image’ – according to the Church. 
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Instead, it values precisely the ‘intermediate corporate bodies’ (Bowen 2007: 160) which, on 
small and local scales, foster collective labour and sociability. 
   Nonetheless, as I have shown in this chapter, écologie intégrale does not only value small 
and local scales. One large scale which my interlocutors evidently and wholeheartedly 
embrace is the global scale of the Pope’s doctrinal and exemplary reach, which they see as 
superseding – ‘appropriately’ – the occasional tensions and debates in smaller subsets of the 
Catholic Church, such as national Conferences of Bishops or lay Catholic populations 
(Napolitano 2016; Senèze 2019). Following the principle of ‘the smallest scale appropriate’, 
my interlocutors therefore reflect on, identify, and promote large scales of action when they 
consider them to be most ‘appropriate’ for given environmental or fraternal purposes. This is 
why Mathilde and Hilaire, although they forgo a fridge and washing machine to reduce their 
energy consumption, do not desire to be energetically self-sufficient or to go ‘off-grid’. 
Instead, they encourage the promotion of green energies at a national level, on the basis that 
no smaller scale has the resources to orchestrate the energetic transition away from fossil fuel 
yet. In the same vein, many AlterCathos members have recently subscribed to green energy 
providers, who use the nationwide power circuits to circulate electricity produced via 
renewable energy sources: in this case, centralised national infrastructures are considered to 
be an optimal scale allowing growing numbers of consumers to transition from fossil to green 
sources of energy. 
   In addition to nationalised infrastructures, the French Republican ideal of equal and 
‘unmediated’ access between citizens and the state is embodied in an extensive and 
centralized state administration, which distributes directives and delegates certain 
responsibilities from the centre in Paris, downward and outward to the regional peripheries. In 
the course of scrutinizing different scales of life for their potential ‘appropriateness’ and 
value, Les AlterCathos engage with these administrative scales – renewing an engagement 
with statecraft and democratic processes which they had set aside in the early years of the 
association. Recently, AlterCathos members have lobbied municipal and regional councils on 
matters of environmentalism: these administrative scales of the State, who hold a certain 
amount of executive power, can be viewed as ‘appropriate’ scales to obtain practical 
outcomes. For example, following lobbying from a collective headed by Marie Sève and her 
housemate Solène, whom we met in Chapter Four, several municipal districts of Lyon have 
now banned the installation of new digital advertising screens at bus stops and metro stations 
– a waste of energy, in my interlocutors’ view, and a source of alienation through the 
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pressures of mass-market consumption. In this way, through the logic of subsidiarity, my 
interlocutors find value in discrete scales of State administration – but this value emerges 
from each scale sui generis, and not as a function of its relation to the Republic as a whole. 
   Les AlterCathos’s political endeavours have therefore become profoundly different from the 
politics of conservative Lyonnais Catholics explored in Part One – that is, their own 
background and the politics in which they engaged until recently. Whereas La Manif Pour 
Tous, in 2013, had been an attempt to curate ‘the world’ at the scale of the nation-state – with 
reference to ‘natural’ reproduction, but also to the fundamental co-constitution between the 
Nation and the families defined by its Civil Code – Les AlterCathos no longer prioritise the 
scale of France above any other. Moreover, whereas La Manif Pour Tous had been centrally 
articulated around the impetus to negotiate protesters’ presence in the public sphere in terms 
of ‘religious’ or ‘secular’ identities, this is no longer a matter of pressing concern for Les 
AlterCathos. The central ‘mode of subjectivation’ of La Manif had entailed reflexive thought 
(Foucault 1997: 117; Laidlaw 2014: 102) about the distinctions between acting ‘as’ Catholics, 
qua Catholics, and ‘as’ French citizens, but this modality has faded away in Le Simone, where 
‘ethics of efficacy’ largely prevail and subsidiarity serves as the main mode of subjectivation 
in the joint pursuit of ecology and fraternity. 
   When Marie lobbied the French government in 2013, and when she lobbied Lyonnais 
mayors and regional councillors in 2018-2019, the analytical difference114 between the two 
endeavours was therefore more complex than it might seem at first glance. On the face of it, 
both events entail a Catholic actor engaging with the French administration. Both are 
underpinned by ethical projects, and both projects are political theologies, that is, ‘world-
oriented’ religious modes of engagement with the political – indeed, both are even grounded 
in the same, Catholic tradition. But the ‘world’ they are ‘oriented’ towards is not the same, 
either in terms of its scale or of its other defining properties. It is by attending to these 
changing efforts to curate ‘good worlds’ that we can take the measure of the ethical, political, 
and to a certain extent spiritual journey undertaken by Marie Sève and Les AlterCathos in the 
past decade. Indeed, while Marie’s political theology is still intrinsically Catholic, it has 
 
114 And here I mean ‘difference’ strictly analytically. It is acutely obvious – to Manif protesters, to supporters of 
marriage equality and reproductive rights, and especially to anyone who has personal stakes in either – that the 
decision to campaign against ‘Marriage for All’ is incommensurate – in its legal, moral, and emotional 
repercussions – with small-scale lobbing regarding matters of publicity. Marie would wholeheartedly agree that 
a fundamental order of magnitude separates the two. 
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undergone a ‘radical’ transformation – in both senses of radix: rooted yet radical (Bès 2017), 




































Vatican vignettes #1: The ‘baby of paper’ 
In July 2018, the Vatican marked the 3rd anniversary of the publication of Laudato Si’: On 
Care for Our Common Home by convening an International Conference gathering lay and 
clerical Catholics who had, in the intervening three years, taken a particular engagement to 
put Laudato Si’ in practice. Out of fewer than ten representatives from France, three were 
members of Les AlterCathos: Marie Sève, and a couple called Johannes and Mahaut 
Herrmann 115 . After receiving invitations to the Conference, all three spent a few days 
debating the wisdom of taking the plane to Rome and back: was their personal desire to meet 
the Pope worth the carbon footprint? They eventually resolved that the opportunity to meet 
with other advocates of Laudato Si’ from across the globe was too good to pass up: all 
attendees had been instructed to bring objects and stories presenting their local forms of 
environmental and fraternal effort, and the three AlterCathos members hoped to draw 
inspiration from these worldwide examples of Laudato Si’ in action. 
   For their part, Johannes and Mahaut brought a brand-new copy of their recently published 
book on the collapse of biodiversity (2018). The book, destined to a Catholic or Christian 
audience, retraces religious conceptions of Nature and reminds its readership of the 
importance of attending to the critical extinction of animal and plant species, within broader 
 
115 ‘Johannes and Mahaut Herrmann’ are pseudonyms used by the couple in their journalistic and literary 
publications (e.g. 2018; 2020).  
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engagements with climate change. Several years in the writing, this text had been imbued by 
Johannes and Mahaut with very high hopes that it would help bring Laudato Si’ to the 
attention of wide audiences across France. But there was another emotional element to this 
recent publication: it was, in Mahaut’s words, the couple’s first ‘baby of paper’ (bébé de 
papier). 
   Mahaut and Johannes cannot have children. As long as I have known them, they have been 
very open about this source of suffering. They married very young, and tried to start a family 
for over a decade before coming to the conclusion that, due to medical circumstances, they 
would never be biological parents. Both Mahaut and Johannes are very well-known public 
speakers among French Catholic spheres; they regularly publish articles in Catholic 
newspapers and journals, travel across France to give conferences about ecology, and sustain 
an active correspondance with many associations. They are very present on social media, 
where they share insights into their daily lives, thoughts, and struggles: every year on 
Mother’s Day and Father’s Day, Mahaut and Johannes post heartfelt messages celebrating the 
beauty of parenthood and expressing compassion towards any of their Facebook friends or 
Twitter followers who, like themselves, might find these festive occasions to be lonely and 
painful reminders of their own infertility. 
   These posts on social media attract a large range of equally-heartfelt responses from 
relatives, friends, and more distant acquaintances. Some evoke Mahaut and Johannes’s 
political engagements: ‘Learning of your difficult circumstances,’ wrote a woman in 2017, ‘I 
am even more impressed by your courage in the fight against medically-assisted procreation 
and surrogacy during LMPT [La Manif Pour Tous]’.  
   ‘Of course, and thank you’, was Mahaut’s sober response. Like other AlterCathos members, 
Mahaut is uncomfortable with recurring mentions of La Manif as the ‘be-all and end-all’ of 
Catholic political participation – even though it is true that she had, in 2013, taken it all the 
more seriously for knowing that she was campaigning against reproductive technologies 
which could have made her a mother, had she not chosen to defend ‘natural’ filiation.  
   Others attempt to lift the couple’s spirits by highlighting the value of their ongoing public 
commitments: ‘Infertility is an ordeal,’ commented an older man the same year, ‘but you must 
be comforted by the thought of your intellectual fertility, which touches many more [i.e. more 
people than a hypothetical number of children] and ensures your legacy’. Mahaut did not 
view this message with a good eye: ‘We are conscious that it is a privilege to be able to 
pursue our intellectual activities both invidually and as a couple,’ she wrote back, ‘and we are 
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thankful for it, but on days like these I would thank you not to compare the benefits of a 
productive mind against the pain of empty arms’.  
   A year after these messages, however, when Mahaut and Johannes completed the draft of 
their first jointly-written book, they both expressed that it had been cathartic to bring this 
‘baby of paper’ into the world together. Among traditional Catholics, young parents 
occasionally travel to Rome with newly-baptised babies in order for them to be blessed by the 
Pope. Johannes and Mahaut held this tradition in mind when they gifted a copy of their book 
to Pope Francis on the occasion of the International Conference. The gesture showcased their 
efforts to promote Laudato Si’ across France; but more poignantly, it was the occasion to ask 
for the Pope’s blessing in carrying out their lives as a family, albeit a family of two, in service 
of the ‘Care for Our Common Home’. 
 
Dissertation Summary 
In this thesis, I have explored the ways in which highly-educated, bourgeois French Catholics 
engage with and in ‘the political’. I argued that these political or ‘worldly’ engagements are 
informed by changing visions of how, as Catholics, they can contribute to the formation and 
maintenance of a good world – visions which, in turn, are informed by shifting articulations 
of cultural ‘roots’, political tradition, and religious doctrine. Building on anthropological 
discussions of how ‘religion’ in the modern world comes to be defined (Asad 1993), 
publicized (Engelke 2013), and discursively partitioned from the domains of politics and 
culture (Fernando 2014); and in dialogue with anthropological literature on the ethical 
construction of good religious selves (Deeb 2006; Marshall 2009), I made a case for an 
investigation of ‘good religious worlds’. By exploring transformations in the worldly 
commitments of French Catholics through the frame of ‘political theology’, this thesis offered 
a new angle for analyses of cultural and religious change (Robbins 2004), and contributed 
ethnographically to the growing anthropology of Catholicism (Mayblin et al 2017) while 
complementing more longstanding accounts of secular French Republicanism (Asad 2006). 
   In 2015, Pope Francis published an encyclical letter calling Catholics around the world to 
‘Care for Our Common Home’, spurring lay French Catholics to envisage new engagements 
with worldly concerns such as climate change and global inequality, and highlighting 
continuities and transformations from their prior modes of engagement with politics. The lay 
Catholic population of France is very far from homogeneous, and its subsections undoubtedly 
 198 
hold different conceptions of their own place in society and role in caring for the world at 
large. I have argued, however, that French Catholics hold unique affordances when engaging 
with politics at the scale of the French Republic. By virtue of their longstanding engagement 
with imaginaries of national ‘order’, and due to their ability to foreground Catholicism as 
‘culture’ rather than or in addition to faith in the secular public sphere, French Catholics are 
able to seamlessly imagine themselves to represent ‘real’ Frenchness and the whole ‘France’. 
By negotiating their presence in the secular public sphere on those terms, I argued, French 
Catholics can therefore manipulate or resist categorization as a ‘religious minority’ (cf. 
Favret-Saada 2017). Focusing on the cathosphère of conservative, middle-class Catholics in 
the city of Lyon, I showed how these French Catholics navigate the paradoxes of their place 
in the secular Republic; cross-cutting boundaries of public and private as they engage in 
political protests about the family (Robcis 2013), and challenging ideals of Republican 
cultural integration as they attempt to prevent the de-christianization and ‘uprooting’ of 
‘French culture’ (Oliphant 2015). I interpret this form of French Catholic ‘worldly’ 
commitment as a broadly secular political theology oriented towards the scale of the French 
nation-state, defined by and in response to the secular nature of the Republic. Often implicit 
rather than clearly articulated, this mode of engagement with the political is largely predicated 
upon negotiating whether, when, and how Catholics may act explicitly as Catholics (en tant 
que catholiques) in the secular French public sphere – and how to deploy or withhold this 
religious identity in the course of claiming to represent the French. 
   Within the Lyonnais cathosphère, I highlighted the role of an association of young 
philosophers, Les Alternatives Catholiques, who endeavour to transform conservative French 
Catholics’ political habits and introduce a new political theology which is predicated neither 
on the scale of the nation-state nor on Frenchness, but instead follows Pope Francis’s call for 
‘interconnected’ fights for environmentalism and social justice. I argued that in the course of 
developing an initially ‘prefigurative’ (cf. Krøijer 2015) Catholic political epistemology, Les 
AlterCathos maintained an engagement with their socio-cultural roots and the value of 
‘rootedness’ overall, but put these roots in service of a new, ‘radical’ political engagement. 
Through ethnographic descriptions of Les AlterCathos’s recently-opened café Le Simone, and 
a discussion of Les AlterCathos’s use of ‘subsidiarity’ as a scalar mode of subjectivation 
(Foucault 1986; Laidlaw 2014), I explored the ways in which Les AlterCathos put into 
practice the paradigm of écologie intégrale – both applying, and further constructing, the 
‘grand scheme’ of this new political theology in their ‘everyday lives’ (Schielke & Debevec 
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2012). While Les AlterCathos primarily aim to transform conservative Catholics’ political 
concerns, and prioritize them as audiences, I showed that they nonetheless include lapsed- and 
non-Catholic members in their project: I therefore argued that écologie intégrale is a ‘world-
oriented’ ethic (Piliavsky & Sbriccoli 2016) in which personal piety is a variable rather than a 
deontological requirement or paramount telos. 
   Throughout the thesis, I offered snapshots of two particular modes of Catholic engagement 
with ‘worldly’ considerations and the political: la cathosphère and Les AlterCathos share a 
juxtaposition of traditional socio-cultural roots, French citizenship, and Catholic faith, but I 
traced how they come to articulate these into two different ‘political theologies’. I therefore 
suggested that further engagements with religious actors’ ‘worldly’ commitments need to 
attend to the articulations and modes of subjectivation of these ‘world-oriented’ religious 
ethics without a priori assumptions about the place of piety or the role of politics within. 
 
‘Rooted’ politics 
A first running thread throughout this thesis has been my French Catholic interlocutors’ 
concern with ‘roots’ (racines) and rootedness (enracinement), articulated and expressed in 
different ways by the conservative cathosphère and the ‘radical’ political epistemology of Les 
Alternatives Catholiques. 
   Throughout Part One, references to ‘roots’ featured predominantly as a vector of ‘cultural 
Catholicism’ (cf. Mayblin et al 2017). They are a point of contention between multiple 
Catholic and multiple Republican conceptions (cf. Bowen 2007: 11-13) of the history, culture, 
and identity of the French nation. Historians have argued that, since the early-2000s and 
especially since the visit of Pope Benedict XVI to the Parisian Collège des Bernardins in 
2008, French Catholicism has shifted into a retrospective and conservative modality of ‘desire 
for the past’ (désir de passé, Pelletier 2019: 284). During his visit to Paris, Benedict XVI 
claimed that French and European culture are grounded in ‘Christian roots’: anthropologists 
of France have argued that this narrative has, since, allowed French Catholics to bring 
Christian culture into the public sphere, for instance in conferences and the arts, by labelling it 
as a shared element of national culture and therefore as a crucially ‘secular’ heritage (Oliphant 
2015). My exploration of conservative Catholics’ engagements with public politics and with 
philosophical conferences on ‘general culture’ both confirmed and complicated this picture. 
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   In Chapter One, which addressed the ways in which family and politics intersected for 
French Catholics in the course of the 2013 anti-same-sex-marriage protest La Manif Pour 
Tous, I showed that right-wing French Catholics employ references to the abstract past in 
order to present themselves as the repositories of French ‘order’ (L.Dumont 1977). The rarity 
of their participation in street demonstrations (manifestations) over the past decades has 
sustained, I argued, the chronotope of right-wing Catholicism as a long-standing, slow-
changing, ‘orderly’ representation of the ‘real France’, by contrast with more fast-paced 
images of progress associated with left-wing demonstrations. The rare instances of French 
Catholics’ presence ‘in the streets’ (‘les cathos sont dans la rue’) are themselves predicated 
on what they consider to be the ‘natural’ order of the private family, threatened in their view 
by reforms to the school system and to marriage laws and reproductive rights. The ‘roots’ 
claimed by conservative Catholics in the course of these protests are not only considered to be 
inalienable foundations of the family and of the State’s provisions for filiation and national 
belonging; they demand to be acted on and protected. 
   I showed that this association of French Catholics with long-term order is nonetheless 
heavily contested. On the one hand, I explored how news reports focusing on the ‘incivilities’ 
committed during La Manif Pour Tous – such as a breakaway cohort who illegally attempted 
to protest on the Avenue des Champs-Élysées, the mythical avenue symbolizing ‘France’ in its 
entirety – contributed to portraying Catholics as a source of social disorder, illegitimately 
crossing boundaries between public and private and thereby causing a risk to the order of the 
secular public sphere. On the other hand, I showed that right-wing Catholic protesters’ 
recognizably traditional clothing and families also proved a point of contention: signs of 
traditionalism, far from evoking an orderly past encompassing the ‘whole’ of France, were 
mobilized by critics as a means to portray the protesters of La Manif as an un-representative 
minority, both in terms of class and of religion. 
   In Chapter Two, which addressed bourgeois Lyonnais Catholics’ efforts to protect French 
culture générale (‘general culture’) and prevent the ‘death of transmission’, the stakes of 
claims to ‘rootedness’ became further explicit. I showed that, in the context of conference 
centres preparing élite students for examinations organised by the national Ministry of 
Education, highly-educated Catholics undertake a ‘re-christianization’ of the ‘general culture’ 
associated with the French Nation and the Republican ideal of integration – despite finding 
themselves at odds, in this respect, with recent governmental instructions which view 
conceptions of ‘general culture’ as discriminatory and therefore anti-Republican. Nonetheless, 
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I argued that their efforts to protect the Christian ‘roots’ of ‘French culture’ do not – at least in 
the context of these conferences associated with education – index a rise of communalist 
‘integralism’ among conservative Catholics (cf. Holmes 2000), or a desire for a re-
christianization of French society overall (cf. Elisha 2011). I showed that they are undertaken, 
in my interlocutors’ view, for the sake of the continued transmission of high status French 
‘high culture’. This is discursively presented as a public-serving rather than self-serving effort 
to sustain inalienable pieces of French history and culture – a narrative concomitantly 
rendered equivocal by the acknowledgment that Catholic students might benefit, in national 
examinations, from the cultural capital gained by being the rare repositories of this knowledge 
among their peers. I suggested that contestations over culture générale therefore entail 
negotiations of the French nation as a whole and its mechanisms of Republican integration. 
Outlining the critiques formulated either by French Catholics or contemporary governments 
inspired by Bourdieusian social sciences regarding one another’s conceptions of culture, I 
argued that these critiques are isomorphic: each lay claim to ‘true’ French culture and accuse 
their detractors of manipulating this culture for the sake of particularistic interests. Overall, 
Part One argued that French Catholics’ claims on the history of France and on its cultural 
‘roots’ pose a challenge to Republican understandings of secular politics and national culture. 
   Part Two details a different emic understanding of ‘roots’, developed by Les Alternatives 
Catholiques in the course of their creation of a new Catholic political epistemology. I showed 
how Les AlterCathos came to question their own socio-cultural biases, developed a 
hermeneutics of suspicion vis-à-vis their own background, and later reconciled with their 
‘roots’ by including them and articulating them within a framework of ‘radicality’. Moving 
away from understanding roots as inalienable and programmatic, Les AlterCathos instead 
actively select which ‘roots’ they wish to claim by drawing inspiration from historical figures 
from France and beyond. In this framework, ‘rootedness’ – with any roots, not just Catholic 
or French ones – is seen as a virtue which helps to combat the alienation and ‘up-rooting’ of 
the neoliberal, capitalist world. I therefore argued that écologie intégrale forms a ‘hierarchical 
encompassment’ (Robbins 2013b) whereby ‘roots’ are valued and celebrated at the same time 
as their inclusion in a ‘radical’ politics renders previous rooted frameworks obsolete.  
   This picture of a clear-cut intellectual framework whereby any rootedness can support 
individual participations in the world-oriented ethics of écologie intégrale was complicated in 
Chapter Four, which explored the practical instantiations of this paradigm in Les 
AlterCathos’s newly-opened café Le Simone. Indeed, I showed that a certain measure of 
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awareness of, if not full familiarity with, Catholic culture and roots remains necessary in 
newcomers’ introduction to, and early participation in, the communal project of Le Simone. 
   Chapter Five, finally, explored the ways in which Les Alternatives Catholiques deploy 
‘subsidiarity’ as a mode of subjectivation to orient their personal practice of écologie 
intégrale. It argued that subsidiarity, as a scalar vision of the world, enables Les AlterCathos 
to contribute to the welfare of ‘Our Common Home’ on many concatenated scales 
simultaneously. It concluded that, by no longer placing any paramount emphasis on the scale 
of the nation-state, the paradigm of écologie intégrale detaches from nationalist imaginaries 
of rootedness and allows an investigation of French Catholics’ political engagement on both 
smaller and larger scales of belonging and responsibility. 
 
For an anthropology of political theology 
The second thread running throughout this thesis has been an endeavour to develop ‘political 
theology’ as a flexible analytic for the study of religious actors’ ‘worldly’ commitments.  
   In 2015, Pope Francis called on Catholics across the globe to ‘Care for Our Common 
Home’. Drawing inspiration from this phrase, I have treated it in this thesis as a ‘window into 
complexity’ (Candea 2010: 34) calling forth ethnographic and analytical engagement with the 
ways in which religious actors, in diverse places and traditions, pursue worldly commitments 
to care for their respective ‘common homes’. What ‘homes’ do religious actors care about, 
and care for? To what extent are they defined doctrinally or experienced in the everyday, by 
religious institutions and by lay actors? What makes them ‘common’? To what extent do these 
‘common homes’ map onto, question, or discard other collective imaginaries such as nations, 
states, ethnic boundaries, cultures, social movements, and indeed religious communities? 
What forms are taken by religious actors’ ‘care’ for them? How do they envision their own 
agency to maintain desired orders and effect desired changes, and through what modes of 
subjectivation do they endeavour to do so? 
   By defining ‘political theologies’ as religious visions of how to order the political, I aimed 
to go beyond analytical interventions questioning the adequation between public religions and 
‘modernity’ (cf. Casanova 1994). In part, this was motivated by the particular context of 
France, where the longstanding presence of Catholicism demands different analytical tools 
from contemporary studies of religious revivals across the globe (Harding 2001; Mahmood 
2005). Historians of France have argued that the fierce contestations between French 
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Catholicism and secular Republican modernity throughout the 19th and early-20th centuries 
were powered by a contradictory ‘double demand’ (double exigence) for the French Catholic 
Church to both be ‘of its time’ (de son temps) and ‘combat this time’ (combattre ce temps) – 
in other words, to both find ways to inhabit the new secular order of modernity, and resist its 
gradual socio-cultural slide away from the values of Christianity (Pelletier 2019: 279-280). 
This paradoxical impetus which, at several points of the 19th and early-20th centuries, 
polarized French Catholics according to the progressivism or conservatism of their 
engagement with secular modernity, is comparable to many ethnographic accounts of the 
contestations and negotiations between pious revivalism and modernity in the early-21st 
century (Harding 2001; Deeb 2006) – critically, however, historians of France have argued 
that this historical account no longer accurately represents the contemporary place of 
Catholicism in France. Instead, they argue that the tripartite conflict between French 
modernity, progressive Catholicism, and conservative Catholicism started running out of 
steam after the Second World War, and rapidly ceased to be a relevant analytic in the interval 
between the mid-1960s (marked by the Council of Vatican II and the cultural revolution of 
May 68) and the mid-1980s (Pelletier 2019: 279-280). For the purposes of this thesis, my 
interest in ‘political theology’ as a broader and more flexible frame through which to explore 
religious actors’ ‘worldly’ commitments was based on its ability to transcend the single index 
of modernity in explorations of French Catholics’ public engagements. 
   ‘Political theology’ appeared far more clearly in Part Two of this thesis than in Part One. 
When I started my fieldwork in Lyon at the end of the year 2016, I did not expect to study 
political theology – in fact, I had never heard the term – and it is through good luck and 
serendipity that I came to follow Les Alternatives Catholiques through their development of 
écologie intégrale, which they explicitly glossed as ‘political theology’ (théologie politique) 
and were only just starting to put into practice in their newly-opened café Le Simone. In this 
sense, what was remarkable about Les AlterCathos wasn’t that they held a religiously-
informed vision of the political, but that they focused on it almost to the exception of 
everything else, allowing the process of the creation and implementation of this new political 
theology to stand out sui generis. It is only because of the transparency of Les AlterCathos’s 
engagements with écologie intégrale – its intellectual and discursive construction, efficacious 
implementation, and its problematic new modes of subjectivation – that I was later able to 
search for similar, albeit more nebulous, mechanisms not only among the wider population of 
the Lyonnais cathosphère but also in the existing anthropological literature on pious politics 
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(Deeb 2006; Marshall 2009). While the ethnographic investigation of French Catholic ‘roots’ 
logically entailed placing Part One of this thesis – the cathosphère – before Part Two – its 
transformation by Les AlterCathos – the theoretical investigation of political theologies could 
be read the other way around. 
   In Chapter Three, I followed Les Alternative Catholiques’s initially ‘prefigurative’ and 
largely discursive efforts to ‘renovate society, not the Church’ through the development of a 
new Catholic political epistemology drawing on two sets of sources: the lives of world-wide 
historical Catholic figures, and the encyclicals of the Church Social Teaching. I argued that 
this development of a new ‘grid of analysis’ by lay Catholic actors complicates our 
understanding of the normative nature of Catholic doctrine, and of the exegitical power of lay 
Catholic actors, by calling attention to the ambiguous place of papal encyclicals in the 
Catholic tradition. 
   Chapter Four then explored Les AlterCathos’s efforts to instantiate écologie intégrale and 
transmit it to new audiences in their café Le Simone, creating but also managing a tension 
between ethics of efficacy and ethics of conviction. This chapter aimed to question the place 
of ‘piety’ as a sine qua non telos of subjectivation in studies of religious ethics; an aim 
continued in Chapter Five through the exploration of the alternate mode of subjectivation of 
‘subsidiarity’. Arguing that subsidiarity, as a scalar vision of the world, enables Les 
AlterCathos to contribute to the welfare of ‘Our Common Home’ on many concatenated 
scales simultaneously, Chapter Five concluded by drawing a contrast between this new 
political theology and previous, nebulous French Catholic conceptions of politics, largely 
predicated on the scale of the nation-state and on ‘Frenchness’. 
   Indeed, despite the disappearance over the course of the 20th century of the ‘double demand’ 
for the French Catholic Church to both engage with and resist modernity, it is still possible to 
explore and analyse French Catholics’ broad vision of politics, the political, and their own 
duty and capacity to defend their conception of a ‘good world’ on the public scene of the 
Republic. By contrast with the global concerns of écologie intégrale, I argued that the 
cathosphère’s main scale of political engagement is that of France, and that the modalities of 
this engagement are centrally predicated on the secular nature of the Republican public 
sphere. I showed that whereas écologie intégrale is concerned with solving the interconnected 
suffering of the environment and the poor, conservative French Catholic conceptions of the 
political expressed over the second half of the 20th and early-21st centuries were centrally 
concerned with protecting ‘good’ visions of the private family – in the context of schooling 
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and education, and the context of reproductive bioethics – from the interventions of the State. 
And while Les AlterCathos orient their practice of écologie intégrale through the 
problematics of subsidiarity, I suggested that conservative French Catholics orient their 
presence in the public sphere through debates about whether and when they should participate 
in politics explicitly as Catholics (en tant que catholiques), thereby managing and strategising 
their own presence either as a secular ‘moral majority’ or a religious minority on the public 
stage (Favret-Saada 2017). 
   Overall, I showed that these two modes of visible presence by Catholics in the French 
public sphere do not straightforwardly index purely ‘religious’ endeavours – neither the 
cathosphère nor Les AlterCathos prioritize evangelization, devotion, or the application of 
religious doctrine qua ‘doctrine’ in their ‘worldly’ lives. Nor do they straightforwardly index 
purely ‘political’ aspirations: despite the absence of religious ritual and the relatively 
peripheral place of personal piety in both projects, they remain visible as ‘Catholic’ 
endeavours either in the eyes of their participants or in those of external secular 
commentators, leading to fraught negotiations and diverse forms of ‘management’ of these 
projects’ ties to religion. The modes of subjectivation of ‘Catholic’ projects cannot be taken 
for granted, and are not always clearly articulated: even projects which are not conducted in 
the optic of piety – of acting ‘as’ Catholics, en catholiques – nonetheless remain ‘Catholic’ by 
virtue of their ties to Catholic actors and culture, and by virtue of Catholicism’s 
encompassment of lapsedness (Mayblin 2017). To paraphrase Rane Willerslev, the worldly 
commitments explored throughout this thesis can be described as ‘Not [piously] Catholic and 
Not Not Catholic’ (2004). Vice-versa, in the particular context of the secular French Republic, 
French Catholics who endeavour to pursue public commitments while keeping their faith 
private can to a certain extent manage their identity qua Catholics (en tant que catholiques) – 
but rather than ever occupying a straightforward position as ‘secular’ actors, they remain ‘Not 
Secular and Not Not Secular’ (ibid.). 
   I therefore argue that a study of ‘worldly’ religious commitments requires suspending a 
priori assumptions that they are ‘religious’ only in proportion to their piety, and attending 
instead to the ways in which our interlocutors interweave, incorporate, or disambiguate 
religious and polical poles and index their own actions accordingly. I further advocate for an 
investigation into whether such emic conceptions of the articulation of politics and religion 
are experienced by our interlocutors as straightforward facts, or fraught negotiations. In other 
words, I believe that ethnographic encounters with interlocutors who consider piety and 
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politics to be completely coterminous (e.g. Deeb 2006) or completely distinct (e.g. French 
Republicanists in Bowen 2007) matter, not because they provides a glimpse into the ‘nature’ 
of religion or politics, nor because they define ‘the’ singular political theology of a given 
religious tradition (contra Gellner 1981), but because they signpost outliers allowing the 
comparative study of all the more messy political theologies in between. I hope to have 
shown, in this thesis, how this messiness plays out in the two cases of conservative French 
Catholics’ engagements with the secular Republic, and of Les AlterCathos’s ‘radical’ 
engagement with the environmental and social care for a planetary Common Home. 
 
Coda. 
Vatican vignettes #2: ‘The girl with the potato’ 
The contribution of Marie Sève to the International Conference was far less emotionally 
charged than Mahaut and Johannes’s bébé de papier, but it was nevertheless carefully 
thought-through. She planned to give the Pope a copy of Les AlterCathos’s conference 
program for the year which had just elapsed – a slim and brightly-coloured booklet 
symbolizing all the audiences whom Les AlterCathos had introduced to écologie intégrale. 
But Marie also prepared a surprise: she wanted to gift Pope Francis with... a potato. 
   Marie let me in on her plans for a potato-based surprise on the occasion of my return visit to 
Lyon in the early summer 2018. The potato (fam., patate) would be sourced from Le Simone’s 
partnership with a local vegetable producer, Marie explained, and it would serve both as a 
publicity stunt and as a genuine symbol for Les AlterCathos’s commitments. ‘I want them all 
to remember me as “the girl with the potato”116,’ she enthused,  
If I just spoke about what we do, nobody would remember. But if I’m holding up the 
locally-grown patate as proof of the positive consequences of our engagements, that’ll be 
more striking. 
Elaborating on the vegetable metaphor, she continued: 
 
116 ‘La fille à la patate’. Whenever Marie discusses her potato, she uses the term patate, a colloquial word, 
rather than the proper pomme de terre. This word choice also suggests a sly pun, since une patate can also be 
used to refer to a silly young girl – on social media, Marie entitled a series of posts ‘a Lyonnais patate in the 
Vatican’, which could be taken humorously to mean her own self as well as the vegetable. 
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What’s more, the patate really represents what we stand for! Our engagement for local 
economic and political systems, our rejection of large-scale distribution, of course, but 
underneath all that l’enracinement, rootedness. Rootedness, root vegetables, get it? 
And she concluded, laughing: ‘After all the fuss about the “Christian roots of Europe”, I bet 
no-one expected to see someone actually brandishing a genuine Christian root!’. 
   True to her word, Marie did indeed hold up a potato while introducing Les AlterCathos to 
the gathered Vatican Conference. Once more proving the power of ironic signs as 
conversation starters, like the tongue-in-cheek décor of the café Le Simone, news about 
Marie’s potato stunt spread like wildfire on French Twitter: picked up by Catholic blogs (Le 
Samaritain 10/07/2018) and even by secular Lyonnais newspapers (Ballet 09/07/2018), the 
story of the potato in the Vatican fulfilled its role of introducing even wider French audiences 
to écologie intégrale. However, among the participants of the Vatican Conference itself, the 
potato offered a successful moment of comedy but was far from a showstopper – Marie later 
somberly reflected that most of the Conference attendees came from less prosperous countries 
than France, grew their own food anyway, and had concerns of a far more pressing nature 
than Lyonnais Catholics’ own crusade against large-scale supermarkets. 
   Johannes Herrmann summarised this sobering experience a few days later (07/07/2018) in a 
blog post which encapsulates all of the core themes of this thesis: concerns for the sake of 
families and nature, engagements with French and global scales of action, reflections on the 
role of the Church in promoting change, and through it all, a strong personal commitment, on 
the part of a Catholic author, to caring for the world. I leave the last word of this thesis to him. 
I wish everyone could meet these people from the Pacific Islands, the heart of the 
Amazon, from India or the Congo Basin, from Greenland or Burkina-Faso, who fight, 
there, every day, in their towns, villages, countrysides and forests, for their lands, their 
rivers, their families and their children. They would tell you why saving trees, 
wellsprings, the forest, why developping agroecology rather than oil wells, why limiting 
global warming to 1,5°C, and offering a decent future to all, is all the same thing. It is 
more than linked, it is one and the same. [...] 
We do not measure, in France, what Laudato Si’ means across the world. For us, it is a 
preoccupation which is slowly starting to mobilise a minority within society. Elsewhere 
and especially in what we call the ‘Third World’, it is a surge, a vital breath (souffle vital) 
which translates into innumerable initiatives in service of the planet and the dignity of the 
poor, the little, the disenfranchised, the forgotten indigenous people, how else can I put it 
– all of this at the same time, all of this together. [...] 
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It was beneficial to widen our horizon beyond Franco-French considerations (fam., 
franco-français) – which are admittedly important, because the situation, the state, and 
the future of our country deserve reflection – but looking beyond is regenerating. 
We Occidentals, Christian and non-Christian, faithful or not, do not fully grasp the role 
that the Church can play. I do not speak here of the institution, but of the network formed 
by the community of the faithful. [...] Everything that burgeoned here and there can now 
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